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STUDIES in INTELLIGENCE



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
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

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UNCLASSIFIED ARTICLE

The Ciano Papers: Rose Garden Howard McGaw Smyth
How US intelligence acquired some remarkable documents.

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THE SHERMAN KENT AWARD


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Allen Welsh Dulles

1893-1969

There is scarcely a reader of these paragraphs who will be satisfied. Beyond the normal desire to alter and amend will be a special urge to expand. Everyone will regret not finding notice of a particular something which to him revealed the integrity and warmth, or the wit, or the talent, or the courage, or the staying power, or the canniness, or the wide diversity of interest of this remarkable man. There has never been a chief who had a closer rapport with more of his people than Allen Dulles; each of us treasures his special encounters and favorite stories.

One thinks back to those moments of unwelcome news and the "Great Scot!" sentence that indicated an instant awareness of its portent and presaged the call to speedy action; or those other times—moments to be dreaded—that opened with an ominous "See here." One remembers with an inner smile his end of the unavoidably-overheard telephone talks, when he fell into transparent double talk, which one could not help but translate almost as fast as he spun it out. One can never forget the times of gaiety often hilarity, nor the flashes of anger which usually cooled as fast as they exploded.

One thinks back to those late afternoon sessions—seven o'clock—when our Director had already worked a twelve hour day at full throttle. The task would be the clearing of a difficult paper on a complicated substantive issue. There would be a pause as he shifted his mind from what to do about Antarctica or a clandestine operation of which he was self-appointed senior case officer. "AIIII right," he would say, "now let's look at your paper." Spectacles pushed up the forehead to the front hair, he would read, puzzle silently, reread, and then challenge. Unsatisfied he would draft something and ask "How about this?" And the "this" would reveal a man, thoughtful, knowledgeable, and sharp at the end of a day that would have numbed people twenty years his junior.

"What's the matter with getting exhausted," he once replied to a lieutenant who had observed uncomplainingly that he found a certain assigned task more onerous than all his other duties. The trouble with this story is that Allen Dulles gave the impression of not knowing what exhaustion was. Yet of all the men of our experience in com-

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mand positions none more consistently courted it. How did he stay fresh for all those years of neverending days and at the same time be the finest hand in the demanding and nerve-wracking craft of intelligence?

What Allen Dulles did for the people under him, he did for the Agency as an institution. By example he suffused both with a consciousness of professionalism and a reverence for it. He did more. He made his Agency the most competent in the world. The amount of attention accorded it by adversary services is the flattering acknowledgment, however unpleasant, of his talents as organizer and executive. He was the living and highly visible exemplar of the inspired master and the expert journeyman in his tireless efforts to defend the faith and serve his country.

SHERMAN KENT

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*Soviet economic slowdown
and CIA make headlines.*

CIA MEETS THE PRESS

Rush V. Greenslade

Long before the growth race between the US and the USSR became news, a Soviet propaganda theme, and a presidential campaign issue, CIA had organized a large-scale research effort on the economy of the USSR. This effort was started about 1950 in the Office of Research and Reports, the predecessor of the Office of Economic Research. The research developed in the CIA as a result of the unavailability of reliable information from open sources. Prior to the death of Stalin, officially released Soviet economic statistics were fragmentary, ambiguous, and unusable for analysis or policy support. Academic research on Soviet economic growth was under way but, hampered by the lack of open data, it was many years from fruition.

CIA studied production in various sectors in great detail and constructed independent measures for agricultural production, industrial production, and gross national product (GNP). The effort was a great deal larger than private groups could undertake and it benefited by access to classified information unobtainable outside. The results were much timelier than academic efforts even after the USSR began releasing voluminous statistics in 1956. Soviet aggregative statistics, even though more prompt and more numerous than before, still suffered from biases and a non-comparability with statistics of Western countries.

Economic intelligence research acquired new importance in the mid-1950's when Khrushchev challenged the US to a growth race. This peaceful competition was to take the place of the cold war and would establish the superiority of one of the two economic systems—capitalism or socialism. During the late 1950's and early 1960's, Khrushchev inaugurated a succession of campaigns for catching up with US economic performance. The Soviets were "catching up with the US" in meat and milk production, in steel production, and in industrial production. These several campaigns were accompanied by a barrage of statistics purporting to show progress in various fields, faster growth on the part of USSR than the US, and a closing of the gap between the USSR and the US.

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The Press

Through 1960 Soviet economic growth was impressive while that of the US was a little sluggish. Aided by the grain production from the "new lands," Soviet statistical performance compared favorably with that of the US, and the achievements of Soviet science in space made the statistics appear even more impressive and plausible. CIA estimates showed the growth rate of Soviet GNP to be about twice that of the US. For industrial growth the ratio was even more unfavorable to the US: in 1956-1960, 8½ percent in the USSR against 2½ percent in the US. The most thorough and respected academic estimate, that of Professor Abram Bergson of Harvard, was very close to CIA estimates for the 1950's. Bergson calculated the average annual rate of growth of GNP from 1950 to 1958 was 6.8 percent. CIA's estimate was 6.5 percent.

Soviet Slowdown in the 1960's

By the end of 1962 the rapid growth of the USSR relative to that of the US was widely known. CIA estimates had been publicized by the Director of Central Intelligence (Allen W. Dulles) in open testimony before the Joint Economic Committee of Congress in November 1959. This testimony was reported in the press and was printed in its entirety in a Congressional document. Mr. Dulles made another public speech in December 1959 before the National Association of Manufacturers repeating the same message. This also was widely reported in the press. However, for the following two years, 1961 and 1962, CIA estimates indicated a slowdown in growth. These estimates had not yet been made public. Suddenly, in August of 1963, the Soviet government began negotiating with Canada for a massive purchase of wheat. It soon became known that the USSR had suffered a severe drought and crop failure and did not have sufficient grain reserves to feed its population. The USSR contracted with Canada and the US for the surprising total of 11 million tons of wheat for delivery in 1963 and 1964 to be paid for by sales of gold.

At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence (John A. McCone), ORR prepared an assessment of the Soviet economy. This was incorporated into a briefing given by the DCI to President Johnson and the National Security Council in December 1963. The highlights of the economic portion of the briefing were:

1. Growth of Soviet GNP in 1963 would be about 1½ percent.
2. Growth in 1962 had already slowed, so the average of the two years was only 2½ percent, drastically lower than the previous rates of 5 and 6 percent.

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3. Agriculture accounted for a large part of the slowdown in both 1962 and 1963 but not all of it. Industrial growth had also slowed noticeably since 1958.

4. In trying to raise meat production, Khrushchev had prodigally used up his surplus grain production of the preceding years, 1958-1961, and had much smaller grain reserves than CIA had previously estimated.

5. The slowdown in industry was in large part the result of competition of defense for scarce investment and R&D resources.

6. Gold production and stocks were significantly lower than current public estimates.

7. The Soviet campaign to obtain long term credits from Western Europe for the purchase of advanced Western equipment was a natural consequence of its dwindling gold stocks.

The President was very interested in this assessment of the Soviet economy and suggested that it be made available to the public. How this was to be done was apparently left up to the Director.

The Press Conference

The objectives in releasing the story were fairly straightforward. After years of hearing that the USSR was rapidly and inexorably catching up with the US, the American public would surely be glad to hear that this was no longer true, at least temporarily. Secondly, the reported developments supported the US policy of discouraging the extension of long-term credits to the USSR. Thirdly, the report could be declassified without affecting its substance. In addition to releasing the story, however, the Agency decided to permit reference to itself as the source. This was uncommon but not unprecedented. In *The New York Times* of 23 June 1960, page 36, an article by Harry Schwartz had reported on some estimates prepared by CIA for a Congressional committee. The headline had read: "CIA Forecasts Soviet Output Will Grow 80 percent in Next Decade." The object of allowing attribution to the Agency in 1964 was simply to get the story on page one, if possible, rather than on page forty-one.

In short, the Agency had a good story to tell and wanted to be sure it was heard.

The main points in the Director's briefing appeared on 29 December 1963 in an article by Charles Bartlett on an inside page in the *Washington Star*. This article featured the limited Soviet gold stock and production, and the need for import credits. This was the first time the CIA gold estimates had been made public. In the body of the article the CIA was named as the source of the information in

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the article. On 5 January 1964 a similar article appeared in *The New York Herald Tribune* by Tom Lambert, datelined Washington. He attributed his information to "intelligence analysts here."

These two articles caused no particular stir. However, on 8 January 1964 an article by Edwin L. Dale, Jr. appeared on the front page of *The New York Times* under the headline, "Sharp Slowdown in Soviet Growth Reported by CIA." The article reported the CIA analysis at length and also discussed CIA's responsibility for research on the Soviet economy. Dale had received no special favor or dispensation and his article said nothing essential that was not in the previous articles. But somehow it caused a furore. Front page, *The New York Times*, with attribution! The Washington press corps raised an immediate clamor for equal briefing.

In response to this demand the Agency scheduled its first press conference for the following day, at CIA headquarters. Twenty reporters attended. The conference was conducted by the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Ray Cline. A press release, entitled "Soviet Economic Problems Multiply," was passed out. But by this time Soviet economic problems were no longer news. The first question asked by a reporter was, "Why? Why this public apparition, this naked materialization of CIA?"

The DDI replied: "Well, we thought we had a good story, so"

Twenty eager faces radiated frank and open disbelief.

The press conference made headlines all around the world. However, the message of Soviet economic slowdown was subordinated to speculation about CIA's motives in seeking the publicity. The most frequently cited motives were (1) a supposed CIA-State Department conflict over European long-term credits for the USSR—CIA opposing, the State Department approving; and (2) an alleged attempt to rebuild CIA's public reputation after the Bay of Pigs episode. The CIA-State Department rivalry hypothesis was illustrated by the famous Herblock cartoon in *The Washington Post* which showed a black cloaked figure offering to peddle some "hot statistics" to a foreign service officer on the steps of the State Department building.

The Reaction

The CIA analysis and estimates met with a mixed reaction in the US press, among the academic specialists on the Soviet economy,

and in foreign countries. In the US many commentators accepted the CIA position, but a substantial number reserved judgment pending further information, and a small number openly disagreed. On 9 January, the day after the first *Times* article by Dale, Harry Schwartz, who was the *Times*' Soviet economic expert, published the results of a telephone survey of academic experts. All five who were canvassed were surprised by the CIA's conclusions about rates of growth. One said, "It is impossible." Another said, "Fantastic." On the other hand, Professor Abram Bergson, whose own calculations of Soviet GNP growth up to 1958 were the most widely accepted of all estimates, said, "I am a little surprised but I can't rule it out." It was hard, as Schwartz pointed out, to understand how Soviet growth could plunge from 6 or 7 percent a year to 2½ percent. The explanation was primarily the decline in agricultural production for two successive years, a development not yet known to the academic specialists.¹

The British press was generally doubtful of the accuracy of the estimates of growth and of gold stocks. In particular, the London *Economist* thought that the proper estimate of the growth rate should be around 5 percent instead of 2½ percent. However, most British commentators agreed that Soviet growth had slowed noticeably. The British press unanimously interpreted the CIA action as an attempt to support the US policy of opposing the granting of long-term credits to the USSR, something the British Board of Trade was eager to do. The British, unlike some of the American press, knew that this was also US administration and State Department policy and not just CIA's policy.

¹ Schwartz's later analysis of the American reaction is interesting. The following quote is from his book, *The Soviet Economy Since Stalin*, Lippincott, 1965, pp. 33-34.

"The depth of this concern [with the rapid Soviet growth relative to that of the US] became strikingly clear in early 1964. The CIA—from which Mr. Dulles had retired—made public its calculations for 1962 and 1963, which showed that Soviet economic growth had slowed down dramatically, to less than 2.5 percent annually. It added that the gap separating American and Soviet production levels was once again widening so that Moscow's prospects for victory in the economic competition during the foreseeable future had dimmed substantially. A naive observer might have thought that a wave of joy would have swept the United States at this good news. The reality was the reverse, however, and numerous American voices were quickly raised to criticize the CIA and its new estimates. Having finally been convinced that there was such a thing as a Soviet economic threat, many Americans seemed reluctant to believe that even temporarily Moscow had received a setback and Washington was doing comparatively well."

The CIA press release took the Russians very much by surprise, appearing as it did even before the official Soviet announcement on the economic results for 1963. When these appeared later in January, the usual percentage increase in national income was absent. All that was given was a figure of 5 percent growth in gross social product. Gross social product is a heavily double-counted statistic summing the outputs of all sectors of the economy without netting out the intermediate sales from one producing sector to another.

In several letters to US newspapers, Soviet writers denounced CIA on a variety of grounds but could find no answer to the 2½ percent GNP growth rate except to cite the announced 5 percent growth in gross social product. When the statistical handbook, *Narodnoye Khoziaistvo, SSSR v godu 1963*, was finally released in early 1965—several months late—it showed the growth of national income (Soviet definition) to be 3½ percent for 1963, and a 4.2 percent average for the two years, 1962 and 1963, compared to an average of 7½ percent for 1959-1961. National income (Soviet definition) excludes most services, which grow slowly, and hence systematically increases faster than national income or product by Western definition. In the light of that bias the Soviet announcement came closer to supporting the CIA estimates than the Soviet economists' (or the London *Economist's*) estimate of 5 percent.

The reaction of Eastern European countries was the most interesting of all. As reported in a *New York Herald Tribune* dispatch of 10 February 1964, satellite officials accepted the CIA estimates and were using them to oppose Soviet policies, such as economic integration through CEMA, and to support their own hopes for increased policy independence.

The Final Outcome

In January and February 1964, the Director and his deputy for intelligence visited the major capitals of Western Europe, briefing the NATO governments on the Soviet economic and military positions. A representative of ORR accompanied them to brief economic specialists in the governments on the methodology and data underlying the economic estimates. All except the British Board of Trade were persuaded that the CIA estimates were generally valid.

The validity of CIA's analysis became generally acknowledged in the US press after the official Soviet report on economic performance

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in the first half of 1964. Harry Schwartz of *The New York Times*, a former skeptic, wrote a *Times* story in July 1964 with the following headlines: "Soviet Economy Seen Stumbling—Growth in Industrial Output During First Half of 1964 Falls Short of Hopes—Bright Spots are Few."

The US academic community was brought around by the appearance of carefully explained calculations of Soviet GNP by Dr. Stanley Cohn, of Research Analysis Corporation. Although his estimated growth rates were not identical with those of CIA, they were reasonably close, and his methods and procedures were essentially the same as the Agency's. Cohn's analyses appeared in successive volumes of studies on the Soviet economy published by the Joint Economic Committee. The latest revision of Cohn's estimates shows 4.5 percent growth in 1962 and 2.7 percent in 1963 for an average of 3.6 percent.

The CIA gold estimate, which rested on highly classified data, was accepted and published by the US Bureau of Mines in 1964. In due time it was also accepted by the Joint Intelligence Board in London and by the banking community in London.

An Endorsement from Siberia

The most unexpected support for CIA's economic estimates came from a prominent young Soviet economist, Dr. Abel Gezevish Aganbegyan, who is the head of the Laboratory of Economic-Mathematical Methods in Novosibirsk, and a corresponding member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He was one of a large number of economists who were urging radical economic reform on the Soviet leadership prior to 1965. In December 1964, he delivered a private lecture in Moscow, reportedly to the Central Committee, and again in June 1965 to the staff of a publishing house in Moscow. Notes taken by someone present at the latter lecture leaked to the press in England and Italy, and also were acquired by the American Embassy in Moscow. These notes may not be accurate in every particular, but their general authenticity has been substantiated.

Aganbegyan, according to the notes, vigorously criticized the operation and management of the Soviet economy. In addition, he criticized the statistics produced by the Central Statistical Administration and objected to the policy of secrecy regarding economic information. He alleged that Soviet economists are often forced to rely on American sources. He cited the report by the American CIA on the

decline in Soviet economic growth. This report, he said, was accurate and the Central Statistical Agency had been unable to refute it.

The notes were disavowed by the Soviet press and by Aganbegyan. However, he is not the only Soviet economist to have expressed grave doubts of the State's economic statistics, either privately or in print.

Epilogue

CIA's first press conference was also its last. The Director was earnestly advised to get CIA out of the news and keep it out.

Two years later, in October 1965, after the poor Russian harvest of 1965, the CIA again prepared a press release on Soviet growth, repeating estimates for preceding years and estimating growth of GNP in 1965 at 3 percent. This time the State Department issued the release. It was described as "prepared by the Department of State in consultation with other interested agencies." The report of this release did not make the front page of *The New York Times*.

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*Electronic detective work
on the Soviet ABM system.*

ON THE TRAIL OF HEN HOUSE AND HEN ROOST

Donald C. Brown

The last successful U-2 mission over Soviet territory in April 1960 obtained photographs of a very large research and development center at Sary Shagan, on the shores of Lake Balkhash.¹ It had been suspected for some time that research on antiballistic missiles (ABM) was conducted at Sary Shagan, but few who saw those first reconnaissance photos were prepared for the huge size of the program evidenced by dozens of separate facilities spread over an area approximately the size of the state of New Jersey.

Two of the more arresting objects observed in the 1960 photographs were large radars which came to have the intelligence nicknames of Hen House and Hen Roost. Both of these radars were located on the western shore of Lake Balkhash, and they looked out over the rest of the Sary Shagan complex toward Kapustin Yar, the launching point for ballistic missiles which served as targets for whatever ABM tests the Soviets were conducting.

Both the Hen House and Hen Roost were fixed installations of staggering size. The Hen House antenna building was more than 900 feet long—three times the length of a football field—and nearly 50 feet high. The Hen Roost had two antennas, each over 500 feet long, separated by over half a mile. The southernmost of the two Hen Roost antennas was very low to the ground—only 15 feet high—but the northern antenna rose 65 feet high.

The fixed nature of the antennas for the Hen House and Hen Roost meant that the direction of their beams of radar energy could not be steered or altered by simply moving the antennas. It was obvious that these radars, if they were not to be confined to looking in a single fixed direction, would have to employ some means of elec-

¹ The last U-2 reconnaissance mission in that program was that of Francis Gary Powers, who was brought down over Sverdlovsk in May 1960.

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Soviet ABM Radars

tronic rather than mechanical beam steering. Electronically steered antennas were just being developed in the US at that time, and the presence of two apparently operational radars of this type at the Soviet ABM center whetted the appetite of the intelligence community to know more about the Hen House and Hen Roost.

During the next two and a half years, little information became available beyond that obtained from the 1960 photography, but both radars continued to be subjects of considerable speculation. Those early estimates are best passed over here, mostly because they were wrong, however much they illustrate the severe limitations of analysis based on only one source of information. What was needed for the beginning of a useful analysis of either radar was knowledge of its signal.

The first break in the Hen House-Hen Roost story came in late 1962. The Soviets had resumed atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and some of their tests involved missile-borne weapons which were detonated as they approached the ABM test center. Besides the directly destructive effects of a nuclear burst, it releases enormous amounts of energy which can cause radical changes in the radio transmission properties of the surrounding atmosphere. Radar waves, which ordinarily would be propagated in essentially straight paths into space, can be reflected or bent to different directions in the highly ionized region created by a nuclear burst. On 28 October 1962 one of the ABM-related nuclear tests near Sary Shagan created propagation disturbances which caused many otherwise undetectable signals to be reflected to US ELINT stations in the Middle East. Thirteen new signals were recorded and many of these were thought to have originated at Sary Shagan.

The signal which excited the most immediate interest was one designated BUEB (its designation has varied with the years, and currently is B357Z). BUEB had a very low pulsing rate of about 100 pulses per second, which suggested that it was intended to operate against targets at ranges greater than 800 miles. Since even the highest flying aircraft are well below the horizon when they are between 300 and 400 miles from a radar, BUEB became an instant candidate for the signal of an ABM radar. Ballistic missiles, because they rise several hundred miles above the earth, can be visible at several times the normal range for aircraft and most other objects. In addition, missiles approach their intended target so rapidly that it is desirable

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to detect them at as great a range as possible. BUEB used very long pulses which could provide the energy necessary for such long range detection.

Most interesting of all, however, was the observation that each pulse of this signal was transmitted at a different frequency. Moreover, as the frequency changed, the direction of the transmissions also appeared to change. This effect—beam steering by changes in transmitted frequency—is one type of electronic steering, exactly what was expected from the Hen House or Hen Roost. BUEB was therefore a prime candidate as the signal from one—but only one—of them.

For the next couple of years a very strange argument, important for the answer sought, but rather pointless for the chances of finding it, developed within the community over which radar, Hen House or Hen Roost, was the source of the BUEB signal. By early 1964, a group of radio scientists from the Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), under the leadership of Jim Trexler, had succeeded in detecting BUEB transmissions after they were reflected from the moon.² These moon-bounce intercepts confirmed that the signal was indeed from a frequency-steered radar and provided considerable detail on signal characteristics. They even determined that the source of the signal was at Sary Shagan, which had been only an informed assumption in the analysis of the 1962 intercepts, but there was still not enough information to say which radar was the source. So the battle raged on. Despite the lack of firm evidence one way or the other, strong advocates for each radar nevertheless emerged. Emotional, numerological, and prescient arguments filled the evidential void. Since the radars were only three miles apart, were presumed to operate in much the same way for the same basic purpose, and were pointed in much the same direction, identifying the origin of BUEB was not an easy task.

Nor was the question merely an academic one. By 1964 reports had been received that Hen House radars were being operationally deployed at several locations in the Soviet Union. There was no corresponding evidence of Hen Roost deployment. If BUEB came from the Hen House, there was an opportunity, rare in the ABM business, of having an intelligence lead well before a system was com-

² See "Moon Bounce Elint," *Studies* XI 2, p. 59.

pletely deployed. On the other hand, if the signal was from Hen Roost, then we were in trouble, because in that case we would not have the slightest idea how Hen House worked.

The resolution to that controversy came in early 1965 when an external contractor, ESL, Inc., working with some carefully documented measurements made by Jim Trexler's moon-bounce intercept program, proved with mathematical rigor that BUEB came from Hen House. After a decent interval for the Hen Roost *aficionados* to recover, this answer was generally accepted, and Hen Roost began to slip into obscurity. The conclusion at the time was that the two radars had been in direct competition for the same job, that Hen House had won the competition, and that we were unlikely to see any more of Hen Roost. This conclusion was bolstered by the fact that Hen House was being deployed, and by a television film made in 1965 by the Soviets to celebrate their military might twenty years after the defeat of Nazi Germany, which featured some close-up shots of the northern antenna of the Hen Roost. Since the Soviets seldom tip their hand on advanced military technology, this revelation of structural details of the Hen Roost was taken as strong evidence that they, too, had given up on that radar.

During the same era that the Hen House-Hen Roost competition was being waged in the intelligence offices of the US, and presumably also on the sands of Sary Shagan, another significant radar development was taking place in the Moscow area. In 1964, a very large A-frame structure began rising above the trees near Naro Fominsk, 35 miles southwest of Moscow. This structure, nicknamed the Dog House, had all the earmarks of yet another electronically steered ABM radar. The two flat faces supported by the A-frame were essentially square and over 350 feet on a side. One face, pointed practically down the middle of the US ICBM threat corridor to Moscow, provided convincing evidence of an ABM function. The ABM utility of the opposite face, which points southeast toward the Indian Ocean, is somewhat obscure, but interest in Dog House among ABM analysts was—and remains—high.

By late 1967 the northwest face of the Dog House A-frame was completed, and in the summer of 1968 those stalwarts of Hen House signal collection, the NRL group, succeeded once again in pulling in a new signal by lunar reflections. The signal was quickly identified as being a transmission from the Dog House, but it was a most

peculiar signal indeed. Like Hen House, Dog House changes its transmitted frequency to effect beam steering. Quite unlike Hen House or any other large Soviet radar ever observed, however, Dog House uses a signal which is continuously on (continuous wave signal, or cw), and is not transmitted in short pulses. The Dog House signal is constantly changing frequency and beam pointing direction, so it is perfectly feasible for the radar to make simultaneous range and angle measurements without the ambiguities usually associated with cw signals. Nevertheless, most radar analysts were rather taken aback at the bizarre appearance of the Dog House signal when it was first identified.

Subsequent reports have revealed that there is more to the Dog House system than the A-frame. More than a mile to the southwest of the A-frame are additional long, low structures which are probably the actual transmitting antennas. The A-frame antenna is now believed to be for receiving only. Such a two-antenna system makes a cw signal more explicable. Conventional pulsed radars require only one antenna, which is used alternately for both transmitting and receiving. After a pulse is transmitted, the antenna is switched to the radar receiver for the detection of target echoes, then switched back to the transmitter during the brief time required to transmit the next pulse. Such a sharing of functions cannot be achieved with a cw radar like Dog House. Since the transmitter is operating all of the time, a separate antenna must be provided for the receiver. There are additional problems with cw operation, among them a requirement to prevent transmitted energy from masking very weak target echoes in the receiver. One way to achieve this isolation of transmitter from receiver is to provide a large physical separation between the two antennas. For the Dog House, they are more than a mile apart.

One puzzling aspect of the Dog House had been the lack of an identified prototype. Because of the vast physical size of the radar and its obviously great cost, it was reasonable for the first full-scale version of the Dog House to be placed where it would have some operational use. The Soviets, however, are great prototype builders and thorough testers of new equipment (the research and development Hen House is still in operation, nearly nine years after it was first spotted) and they probably would not use all of the unconven-

tional technology evident in the Dog House without some sort of developmental testing outside the laboratory.

After the initial shock of the Dog House signal had worn off, it occurred to some of us that a necessary feature of that radar's operation—the use of two separated antennas—had also been a prominent feature of our old friend, Hen Roost. Hen Roost did not have even a passing physical resemblance to Dog House, but it did have two antennas. While there are sometimes reasons to use separate transmitting and receiving antennas with a pulse radar, there must have been some compelling reason for the 3,800-foot separation of the Hen Roost antennas. Could it, too, have been a cw radar? Was Hen Roost in fact a testbed for the signal later used by Dog House?

There was some evidence that the Hen Roost had been dismantled by the Soviets after it was displayed in the 1965 TV film. If the reports of its demise were true, no more signals could be expected from Hen Roost, but those signals intercepted after the October 1962 nuclear test were still lying around on magnetic recording tape. It was possible that the Hen Roost signal had been there all the time and had been ignored because we were looking for a pulsed, rather than a cw radar.

Some hope that a Hen Roost signal existed and that it could be identified was generated by the following train of logic:

- a) The Hen Roost should have been operating at the time of the nuclear tests. If the tests had anything at all to do with ABM developments, then all Sary Shagan ABM radars should have been on.
- b) From considerations of Hen Roost antenna size and the beamwidth which would probably be required for it to do an ABM job, the radar should have operated at a radio frequency somewhere near 200 MHz.
- c) The Hen House signal, at a radio frequency similar to that estimated for Hen Roost, was intercepted; therefore, whatever propagation anomalies permitted detection of the Hen House signal should also have permitted interception of the Hen Roost signal.
- d) Then, if we were both logical and lucky, the problem would be reduced to identifying which signal, of those recorded, come from the Hen Roost.
- e) The Hen Roost signal should look like the Dog House signal.

The search soon narrowed to only one of the 1962 signals. In the records, and as reported in earlier analyses, this signal had the appearance of one from a very poor radar or perhaps some data trans-

mission system. The signal appeared as a train of ragged pulses whose width and repetition rate varied considerably throughout the intercept. The average pulsing rate was 12.5 pulses/second, too low for all but the most arcane of ABM applications. For this reason and because of its seeming instability, the signal had been dismissed in 1962 as an unlikely candidate for a Hen Roost transmission. Upon re-examination, however, another train of very narrow pulses, which had been overlooked during the 1962 analysis, was found intermixed with the broad pulses. When the repetition rate of this additional pulse train was determined to be a very stable 12.5 pulses/second, a powerful clue to the true identity of this long-lost signal was available.

Armed with hindsight, we can explain all of the observed signal characteristics in terms of a frequency-sweeping cw signal of the Dog House type. A signal which sweeps over a broad range of frequencies, even though it is transmitted continuously, will be detected by a narrow-band receiver as merely a pulse of energy. Consider the analogy of rapidly tuning your home radio. Many stations transmitting at different frequencies are on the air simultaneously. As the tuning dial is spun, the receiver will pass each station rapidly, and the listener will hear a series of brief bursts of sound. If this conceptual model is inverted and it is imagined that the radio dial is left at a single setting but the stations are constantly changing frequency, then a rough feel can be gained for the misleading appearance of a frequency-sweeping cw signal through a normal ELINT receiver.

The other features of the 1962 signal can also be explained by a cw signal model. As shown in Figure 1, the instability of the main pulse train could be caused by changes of receiver tuning. The short pulses could be caused by a much more rapid frequency slide of the signal as it returned from its highest value to begin a new sweeping cycle; the comparative stability of the short pulse train would result from the rapidity of the "flyback" and the consequent insensitivity of pulse timing to receiver tuning. Additionally, the width of the apparent pulse emerging from the receiver would be a function of signal strength, since receiver bandwidths are not sharp on-or-off functions, but instead fall off gradually on either side of the center frequency.




Figure 1. Frequency-Sweeping Continuous Wave Signal as Observed by a Narrow Band Receiver.

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All of these features of the hypothetical signal model were thoroughly checked against the observed characteristics of the signal. In all respects they matched. As the receiver was tuned, the positions of the broad pulses changed; with the receiver tuning steady, the interval between pulses was constant. The short and long pulses disappeared together when the receiver was tuned away from the signal band of frequencies. In addition, the width and amplitude of the broad pulses changed with frequency, providing evidence that the transmitted beam was changing position with changing frequency. All in all, the match to a Dog House-like signal was uncanny.

An uncanny match is not proof positive, however. The best that can be said is that the 1962 signal probably came from the Hen Roost, but it is doubtful that we will ever know for sure. The case for the relationship can be summarized as follows:

- a) The signal was intercepted due to anomalous propagation conditions after a nuclear burst. It appeared shortly after the burst and had not been seen before, nor has it been seen since.
- b) It probably came from Sary Shagan because of its coincidence in time with ABM tests and its appearance at the same time as the Hen House signal.
- c) It is a frequency-swept cw signal. Hen Roost was the only Sary Shagan radar at that time suitable for transmitting such a signal.

In comparison with some of the rather far-out present-day estimates on Soviet ABM developments, this is a pretty strong case.

It now appears, therefore, that those two large radars we first saw in 1960 were not really competitors at all, but were instead developmental models for two entirely different radars: the Hen House, which followed a fairly direct path to become an ABM early warning and space tracking radar, and the Hen Roost, which, from the intelligence point of view, meandered a bit but eventually grew into the Dog House ABM radar at Moscow.

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*The influence agent
in Biblical times.*

THE TALE OF HUSHAI THE ARCHITE

C. N. Geschwind

Since the publication of the *Studies* article, "Wanted: An Integrated Counterintelligence" in the summer of 1963, there has been an increase of community interest and concern about that most dangerous and least publicized of all agents, the "agent of influence."¹

Accordingly, it seems appropriate to review the story of the first influence agent operation on record. This operation was set up by King David and is recounted in II Samuel, 15-18. This account is a good deal more circumstantial and detailed than the frequently cited cases of Rahab the Safe House Keeper (Joshua 2: 1), and Delilah the Penetration Agent (Judges 16: 5). Furthermore, besides its historical and human interest, this operation reminds us of the efficacy of simplicity, audacity, speed, and the exploitation of human frailties in this kind of enterprise. Here is what happened, when King David played for time to counter his son Absalom's surprise attack.

The Situation

David's handsome and popular son, Absalom, having waited many years in vain for his father to go the way of all kings, formed a conspiracy to kill him and usurp the throne. King David soon became aware that Absalom had assembled a large revolutionary force from among the men of Israel, and that the King's best privy counsellor, Ahithophel the Gilonite, had defected to Absalom. Upon hearing of this counsellor's defection, King David prayed that the "counsel of Ahithophel might be turned to foolishness" but he also gathered his loyal generals and bureaucrats and fled. Absalom thereupon occupied the royal palace.

Mounting the Operation

When David stopped to pray in the course of his flight, Hushai the Archite, an aged counsellor, came to him with his coat rent and earth upon his head, professing grief and loyalty which the King

¹ *Studies* VII 3, p. 19.

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evidently knew to be sincere. King David said to Hushai, "If thou return to the city and say unto Absalom, 'I will be thy servant, oh King, as I have been thy father's servant hitherto'. . . . then mayest thou for me defeat the counsel of Ahithophel . . . and what thing soever thou shalt hear out of the Palace, thou shalt tell it to Zadok and Abiathar the priests, who have with them their two sons, and by them ye shall send unto me everything that ye can hear."

Capturing the Dupe

When Hushai the Archite had made his way to the palace, he approached Absalom, who knew him well, and said, "God save the King!"

Absalom asked, "Is this thy kindness to thy friend, David. Why wentest thou not with thy friend?"

Hushai replied, "Nay, but whom the Lord and this people and all the men of Israel choose, his will I be and with him will I abide . . . as I have served in thy father's presence, so will I be in thy presence." And so Hushai the Archite was accepted as a defector and re-established as a counsellor.

The Influence Operation

At the council of war which Absalom called, Ahithophel advised Absalom as follows: "Let me now choose out twelve thousand men, and I will arise and pursue after David this night and will come upon him while he is weary and weakhanded and will make him afraid. All the people that are with him shall flee, and I will smite the king only. I will bring back all the people unto thee." This proposal reportedly pleased Absalom and all the elders well, but they must have had some doubts and second thoughts as to where the glory would land, for Absalom said: "Call now Hushai the Archite also, and let us hear likewise what he saith."

Hushai lost no time in exploiting the distrust, jealousy, fear, and guilt complexes inherent in the situation, saying: "Thou knowest thy father and his men, that they be mighty men and they be chafed in their minds, as a bear robbed of her whelps in the field: and thy father is a man of war and will not lodge with the people. Behold, he is hid now in some pit or in some other place and it will come to pass when some of (our men) be overthrown at the first that whosoever heareth it will say, 'There is slaughter among the people that

follow Absalom! And even he that is valiant shall utterly melt, for all Israel knoweth that thy father is a mighty man. Therefore I counsel that all Israel be generally gathered unto thee from Dan even to Beersheba as the sand is by the sea for multitude and that thou go to battle in thine own person. So shall we come upon him in some place . . . as the dew falleth on the ground and of him and of all the men that are with him there shall not be left so much as one. Moreover, if he be gotten into a city, then shall all Israel bring ropes to that city and we will draw it into the river until there be not one small stone found there."

Now, Absalom and "all the men of Israel" thought this advice was better than the advice of Ahithophel, no doubt in part because it gave everybody a piece of the action, and when Ahithophel saw that his counsel was rejected, he went home, "put his household in order and hanged himself" rather than get into a stenching contest with a skunk. While this demonstrated Ahithophel's foresight, it also put Hushai the Archite fully in the driver's seat. A little effective counter-intelligence work on Ahithophel's part might have yielded bigger dividends.

The Espionage Action

Like Alger Hiss millennia later, Hushai the Archite was not content to stick to the relatively safe business of influence operations, but had also to dabble in espionage. Hushai immediately called on Zadok and Abiathar the priests and told them: "Thus and thus did Ahithophel counsel Absalom and the elders of Israel, and thus and thus I have counselled. Now therefore send quickly and tell David not to lodge in the wilderness but speedily pass over (the Jordan)." The sons of these priests, the couriers Jonathan and Ahimaaz, were staying under cover outside the royal city, and received this message via "a wench," not otherwise identified. An informer observed this contact and reported it to Absalom, who sent out an investigative force. The couriers were aware of the leak and sought help from a village woman who hid them in a well. When the investigators queried the woman she said, "They went that-away," or words to that effect, and the search went astray. The couriers then hastened to King David, who promptly crossed the Jordan and mobilized a desperate army.

The Pay-off

Eventually Absalom brought a large, but inexperienced force into battle against the tightly organized forces of the King in terrain in which the King's professionals had every advantage, producing twenty thousand corpses: "The wood devoured more people that day than the sword . . ." Among the casualties in the woods was Absalom himself, who appears to have been something of a beatnik, for he had long golden tresses of which he was very proud, and by which he got caught in a tree. There General Joab found and killed him, ending the insurrection. Since Hushai's accomplices subsequently prospered, it is reasonable to assume that he also retained an honored place in the restored administration and ultimately retired with a large pension. General Joab, however, did not fare so well, for King David bore him a lethal grudge for killing Prince Absalom. Perhaps the King saw his renegade counsellor Ahithophel as the real villain in the piece.

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*Basic principles and some
new challenges to CI.*

COORDINATION AND COOPERATION IN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Austin B. Matschulat

It is axiomatic that the structure and functions of a counterintelligence service, or of the counterintelligence part of an intelligence service, are determined by the activities of its chief adversaries more than by any other single factor.¹ Any realistic discussion of US counterintelligence thus must begin with the two Soviet services, the KGB and the GRU, respectively, the state security service and the military security service.

The scale of the effort that has been made and continues to be made by Soviet intelligence is difficult to exaggerate. Some 21,173 Soviet nationals reside in the 77 non-Communist countries of the world, of whom 5,943 are officials. At least 60 percent of these, or 3,560, are in fact intelligence personnel. Moreover, the Soviet services work very closely with the 19 intelligence services of the seven Communist governments of Eastern Europe. During the 1950's the Soviets dominated these services through a system of senior advisors whose word was law. Although this control has been somewhat relaxed during the 60's, close coordination continues. The testimony of defector Major Laslo Szabo before the Armed Services committee of the House of Representatives in March, 1966, amply bore this out. Szabo served in the AVH, the Hungarian foreign intelligence service, for 20 years before he defected. (He is now 43 years old.) He was given a full year of training by the Soviets in Moscow, starting in September, 1957. He testified that the AVH printed and distributed forgeries defaming the US, at Soviet direction. One instance was the dissemination of a forgery of *Newsweek* magazine in late 1963, principally in Asia and Africa. He said that another AVH officer, Bela Lapusnyik, who defected in Austria in 1962, was murdered by poison in a Viennese jail on AVH orders carried out by the Czechoslovak foreign intelligence service. His testimony shows the unified nature of the clandestine

¹ See A. C. Wasemiller's "The Anatomy of Counterintelligence" in *Studies* XII 4, p. 9 ff.

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tine Communist attack and illustrates the fact that it is still directed centrally from Moscow. It also helps to explain why the attack at the subterranean level is not affected by what is happening at the diplomatic or open level. The attack does not slow down, for example, because of thaws in diplomatic relations between the US and the USSR.

Our defenses against this attack are of two types, passive and active. These two kinds of defense are commonly called security and counterespionage, and they constitute the twin halves of counterintelligence. All US departments and agencies with intelligence functions are responsible for their own security abroad.² Within CIA, responsibility for security is divided in two different ways. Basically, CIA and all other agencies are trying to defend three things: its personnel, its installations, and its operations. The first two, security of personnel and security of installations, are in the Agency the responsibility of the Office of Security. Responsibility for the third element, the security of operations, is in turn divided between the operating divisions, which have a line function, and the counterintelligence staff, which has the staff responsibility. This kind of division clearly requires close coordination, and this in fact occurs on a daily basis.

US practices in physical security abroad are not uniform but are also not widely divergent. Our safes are much alike. So are our guard systems, floodlights, pass control systems, and the rest. The same is true for security of US installations, where one of the chief dangers is hostile audio penetration. In this area uniform measures of defense are ensured through the work of the Audio Countermeasures Committee of the US Intelligence Board.

One significant difference in personnel security measures is inherent in the basic nature and functions of the military as contrasted with CIA. A military officer typically serves a tour of duty in the intelligence specialty and then moves on. Intelligence is only one of the many functions of the armed forces, which need well-rounded officers. CIA personnel, in contrast, usually spend their entire professional lives in the same business. The result is a steady growth in sophistication, including counterintelligence sophistication, and the added advantage of a far smaller turnover rate in personnel. It also means that Agency people with access to classified information usu-

² The Soviets have adopted the opposite system: the civilian service, the KGB, is responsible for the security of the GRU.

ally have a functional need for it. They are themselves a part of the process of getting and reporting that information.

The point is, however, that even though the security of each element overseas is its own responsibility, the hard fact is that US intelligence security is essentially indivisible. The exchange of intelligence within the US community is vast and growing. The future will see an even greater exchange, chiefly as the result of the adoption of automatic data processing systems and community projects like COINS, designed to let us query each other directly by machines. The possibility has therefore increased, and will continue to increase, that successful operations by the opposition could obtain information originated by any element, if not all elements of the intelligence community.

The security of our foreign operations is also indivisible, and is also a community responsibility. It differs from other kinds of security work in that it does not employ set defenses, although it also must be based on basic CI principles. The security aspects of each operation must be hand-tailored, and no operations should be planned, let alone launched, without security being a primary consideration from the beginning. Counterintelligence specialists are not firemen, to be called in only after disaster has struck. They must be brought into the picture from the outset and remain throughout the life of any operation, if that operation is to be secure. Through their knowledge of the adversary services and their CI expertise, they are particularly adept at foreseeing complications.

The interdependence of the US counterintelligence community is also manifest in our relationships with liaison services. We cannot cut off these relationships because of concern about security, but experience has certainly shown that we must calculate the risks involved as realistically as possible in the knowledge that the US is now Soviet target number one. Between 1917 and the mid-30's the Soviets focussed their attention chiefly on France, in large part because of the presence of the large white Russian colony in and around Paris. They were eminently successful, a fact from which we continue to suffer today.³ From the mid-30's to World War II the Soviets' emphasis shifted to England. Again they scored notable successes. Consider, for example, the case of George Blake.

³ See the novel *Topaz* by Leon Uris (reviewed in *Studies* XII 1, p. 88).

George Blake, born George Behar, was tried at the Old Bailey in London on 3 May 1961. He was found guilty of offenses chargeable under the Official Secrets Act—that is, of spying for the Soviets—and was sentenced to 42 years of imprisonment. He was born in 1922 in Holland of a Dutch mother and an Egyptian Jewish father who had become a British subject. Blake served in the Dutch underground and became involved in the ill-fated British operation code-named North Pole. In July 1942 he left Holland, on British orders, and travelled through Brussels and Paris to unoccupied France and across the mountains to Spain. He was taken by ship from Gibraltar to England. After nine months in the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve he was assigned in July 1944 to MI-6, the British Secret Intelligence Service. He served in The Hague, London, and Hamburg, went to Cambridge for a Russian language course, took some technical and tradecraft training, and was posted to Seoul, South Korea, in November 1948 as the first British intelligence representative there. His official or cover position was that of vice-consul. In July 1950 he and his colleagues were taken prisoner by the North Koreans and were held until April 1953.

Blake later insisted that he became converted to Communism during this period. This is doubtful. Rebecca West, in her brilliant book *The Meaning of Treason*, speculates that he may have become a Communist agent during his service in the Dutch underground. In any event, the damage he inflicted was enormous.

According to his story, he decided in October 1951 to offer his services to Soviet intelligence. He wrote a letter which was handed by the North Korean intelligence service to the ubiquitous Soviet apparatus. He suggested that *all* British prisoners be interviewed, to protect him against suspicion. This was done, and from October 1951 to January 1952 he was able to meet securely with a Soviet case officer. This part of Blake's story, incidentally, was confirmed by the Polish Deputy Minister of the Interior and chief of the secret police, Col. Alster, a Jew, who defected to the West after learning in late 1960 that the Soviets were planning secret anti-Semitic measures. Among the Soviet spies Alster identified was George Blake.

Between April 1953, the date of his release from imprisonment, and April 1961, when he was arrested, Blake served the British and Soviet intelligence services in London, Berlin, and Lebanon. According to US calculation he furnished the Soviets with 4,720 pages of

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documentary material during those eight years. As a result Soviet intelligence scored some smashing successes. A highly placed penetration agent, a Russian, was identified by Blake and then killed by the Soviets after being identified by Blake. General Robert Bialek, the Inspector General of the People's Police in East Germany, defected to the West at the time of the June 1953 uprising. His apartment in West Berlin was only a block from Blake's. In February 1956, acting on information from Blake, the East Germans under Soviet control kidnapped General Bialek and brought him back to East Germany. He died in a Soviet prison.

Blake attended joint meetings at which CIA legal-travel operations into the USSR were disclosed. He also attended meetings concerned with audio operations against the Poles in Berlin and against a Yugoslav military mission there. He was present at joint planning sessions concerning the activity of the anti-Soviet Russian émigré organization known as NTS. Four NTS leaders, who had previously entered and left the USSR, were caught on their next trip as a result of Blake's information, and were never heard from again.

Blake served only five years and four months of his 42-year sentence. On 23 October 1966 he escaped from Wormwood Scrubs Prison. The facts of the escape demonstrated beyond doubt that it was engineered by the Soviets. The buoying effect upon the morale of Soviet spies everywhere can be easily imagined.

Counterespionage

The other side of the CI coin—counterespionage—has one purpose which transcends all others in importance: penetration. The emphasis which the KGB places on penetration is evident in the cases already discussed from the defensive, or security viewpoint. The best security system in the world cannot provide an adequate defense against it because the technique involves people. The only way to be sure that an enemy has been contained is to know his plans in advance and in detail. Moreover, only a high-level penetration of the opposition can tell you whether your own service is penetrated. A high-level defector can also do this, but the adversary knows that he defected and within limits can take remedial action. Conducting CE without the aid of penetrations is like fighting in the dark. Conducting CE with penetrations can be like shooting fish in a barrel. The famous case of Col. Oleg Penkovskiy is an instructive example.

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Penkovskiy was born in 1919 of aristocratic Caucasian parentage. His father, an officer in the White Army, disappeared in the post-revolutionary fighting in 1919. The son joined the Soviet Army in 1937 and was commissioned in 1939. During World War II he became a regimental artillery commander. In 1945 he married the daughter of Lt. Gen. Gapanovich. From 1945 to 1948 he studied at the Frunze Academy and from 1949 to 1953 at the Military Diplomatic Academy. He was then posted to the GRU. In January 1955 he arrived in Turkey as the assistant military attaché and as acting head of the GRU residency there. He quarreled with a superior, Major General Rubenko, and was sent home in November 1956. He was embittered by the quarrel and its outcome. He began to think about getting in touch with the Americans. During 1958-1959 he was given technical instruction in missiles, and he began to accumulate information against the day when he could deliver it to the West. Having no safe means of hiding the copies that he had made of key documents, he carried them around for two years sewn into his clothing. In 1960, as a member of a scientific-technical committee, Penkovskiy had legitimate reasons for meeting foreigners, among whom was an Englishman, Greville Wynne, who delivered certain materials provided by Penkovskiy to the British Embassy in Moscow. Wynne also delivered a letter from Penkovskiy to American authorities. In April 1961 Penkovskiy was a member of a scientific-technical delegation visiting in the West. Intelligence contacts were made. However Penkovskiy's three applications for visas for further travel to the West, all made in April-July 1962, were refused by the KGB. He was last seen at liberty on 6 September 1962.

The Penkovskiy case illustrates the great value of penetrations. There can never be enough of them. It illustrates the need for effective and secure liaison relationships. And it illustrates the necessity for coordination in all counterespionage activities. In the US intelligence community, the responsibility for the management of counterespionage is lodged with CIA. Specifically, the responsibility of being the community's coordinator for espionage and counterespionage is assigned to CIA by National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5.

Such was not always the case. In the late 50's, when the basic principles of NSCID 5 were hammered out, a good deal of parochial-

ism had to be overcome. During the drafting process, certain proposals were made which would have had the effect of destroying centralization and returning the US intelligence community to the competitive and fractionalized conditions of the past. General Truscott, then the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, read these proposals and said: "Knowing General Eisenhower as I do, I should not wish to be the person who would bring these recommendations to him."

In these later days, however, there is general realization that the Soviet services and their extensions in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe are a highly integrated system, and that we cannot cope effectively with a coordinated attack if we ourselves are uncoordinated. The security problem we can handle in a decentralized fashion because security rules are pretty much the same for all. But counterespionage *must* be centralized. As we have noted, the heart of counterespionage is the penetration operation—and we could not possibly achieve reliable penetrations on a fragmented or departmental basis.

The same is true of the other principal kinds of CE operations. To be effective, all require a central command post. In addition to the penetration, this is true of all efforts to induce defection. And it is true with respect to the deception operation.

This type of CE operation is based upon an established channel of communication with the enemy, and the purpose is to insert into this channel misleading information which will cause the enemy to take action which is contrary to his own interests. The need for centralized direction is clear. It is not possible to mislead the opposition by a series of uncoordinated bright ideas. It can only be done according to a central plan.

The need for central coordination is just as great in the employment of the double agent. He is a center of controversy today in intelligence circles because such operations are hungry consumers of time and manpower. From beginning to end, a DA operation must be most carefully planned, executed, and above all, reported. The amount of detail and administrative backstopping seems unbearable at times in such matters. But since penetrations are always in short supply, and defectors can tell less and less of what we need to know

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as time goes on, because of their cut-off dates, double agents will continue to be part of the scene.⁴

Audio surveillance, another important CE tactic, also must be centrally coordinated. It is a form of physical surveillance, which means sustained drudgery. It may many times depend for success on effective liaison relationships. Although Americans are technically gifted, no amount of such expertise will suffice if the operation is badly managed.

In the past three years the Soviets have been publishing more and more about their own intelligence exploits and key personalities. This also underlines the need for centralized effort on our part. All of this material is being examined and when it concerns intelligence matters, it is being translated into machine language and stored on tape. By now a substantial percentage of the counterintelligence held in machine language by CIA was derived from overt materials.

New Directions

Ever since World War II the Soviets have devoted more and more time and energy to a third kind of subterranean attack in addition to espionage and counterespionage. This involves propaganda and disinformation, including forgeries, designed to convince people all over the world that Soviet accusations against the US, its military forces, and its investigative services, are true. This kind of operation is called *covert*, rather than *clandestine*, because of a basic distinction. A clandestine operation, if properly conducted, remains totally concealed. The authorities in the target area never know that anything happened. A covert operation, on the contrary, must have a product, such as a radio newscast, a newspaper article, a forged document or some other tangible. For this reason the service carrying out a covert operation knows from the start that it cannot keep the activity itself a secret; it aims instead for plausible denial. The object

⁴ It is important to be clear about this matter of defectors. What a pre-World War II defector has to say is still important. We shall not win this war against Soviet intelligence without true depths of expertise. When a Soviet defects, when he walks into an American embassy, the worst thing that can happen to him is a confrontation with incompetence. Strong-arm methods will not work with him. It's no good grilling him, or making him the objective of a squeeze session. Soviet intelligence officers are told over and over that if they come over to the American side, they will be ignored as individuals, and squeezed like lemons. What the defector most needs is the attentions of someone who knows his world.

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is to be able to say, "We didn't do it—someone else did." The fact that a product is surfaced gives the CI man something to work on. He has one end of the trail of evidence in his hand. What he wants to do, of course, is follow it all the way back to the source. In other words, counterintelligence work carried out against covert activity uses the same methods as does CI waged against espionage and counterespionage. What we need to do is to spot the Soviet hand behind the visible product.

We therefore study, for instance, the African, West German, or American writer whose work consistently echoes the main Communist lines. Such themes have become familiar: the US government is fascistic; in America all minorities, including the poor, are ruthlessly oppressed; American foreign policy is bankrupt, a mere display of brute force; CIA and the FBI are Gestapo-like organs; CIA, in particular, has usurped the function of the State Department and is secretly making policy; America is dominated by commercial interests—Wall Street, the United Fruit Company, the big oil companies; the American negro can win equal rights only through violence; and there are plenty of others. When we see these themes played and replayed—often appearing first in a supposedly non-Communist publication, then picked up and replayed by Tass and Radio Moscow, then repeated in Africa—we seek to learn all we can about the original author and the magazine or paper in which the piece first appeared. However far to the left the tone of such an article may be, the question is whether it is legitimate, in the sense of being an indigenous attack. If so, we can do no more than grin and bear it. Intelligence services can't be cry-babies, and they can't get into a public arena and slug it out with attackers who, no matter how hostile, misled, or mendacious, are nevertheless expressing their convictions in their own terms.

But the picture is very different if the supposedly non-Communist writer is in reality a Soviet agent, receiving the standard Soviet package of material from which to work, holding secret meetings with a Soviet case officer or a go-between, and accepting Soviet money. This sort of thing is as deadly as spying.

In sum, the US needs to pay more attention to counterintelligence operations against Soviet covert action. We need to identify the agents, double some of them, place surveillance on them and their case officers, and finally mount operations to recruit Soviet CA specialists.

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Counterintelligence

The Team Approach—Vietnam

Just as the Soviet disinformation campaign underlines the need for centralized effort, the Vietnam problem has placed a premium on coordinated effort. When hostile clandestine pressure grows strong, the US counterintelligence community shows a correspondingly greater capacity for working together. This has happened with respect to Vietnam. The first and gravest CI problem there, which persists, is that there are simply not enough specialists engaged in full-time counterintelligence work. The need for tactical military intelligence has been so great that our CI potential has been largely drained off to meet the need for more order-of-battle and POW information, more analysis of captured enemy documentation, and the like. The CI teams of both the Army and the Marine Corps spend most of their time collecting tactical military intelligence. Compared to these activities, the OSI detachments and the detachments of the relatively new Naval Investigative Service are much less burdened with positive requirements, but these are primarily security, not counterespionage, units.

The second grave problem is to determine the extent to which the North Vietnamese have succeeded in penetrating the government and the intelligence services of the South. The Republic of Vietnam has an extensive CI network. It consists of the Central Intelligence Organization, the Military Security Service, and the Vietnamese National Police. But they too are constantly diverted from long-range projects by the pressing need for tactical collections. The security program in the South simply does not work because the government has expressed and implemented its willingness to accept as citizens of South Vietnam all Viet Cong who profess to have had a change of heart.

The first step toward coordinated action that had to be taken was to identify the enemy. As long as we persisted in using "Viet Cong" as an omnibus term for everything Communist, we were unable to understand events. In February 1967 CIA called together the elements of the CI community and outlined the problems as it saw them. The meeting was attended by representatives of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, the Naval Intelligence Command, the Air Force's OSI, and the CI element of the G-2, Marine Corps. Task forces were created. CIA provided space and equipment, as well as personnel, and furnished the researchers the counterintelligence collected up to that time.

Before February 1967 the US had only some scattered and largely unverified pieces of information about the military intelligence structure of the North Vietnamese and about the Central Research Directorate of the North Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense. What was known of the intelligence structure did not match the typical Communist pattern, and strength estimates were obviously far too low, when judged against the wide range of North Vietnamese intelligence activity. The first research targets to be selected were the Security Sections, called the An Ninh, of the Communist Party of North Vietnam, which are physically situated in South Vietnam. These security sections are built around cadres of intelligence personnel trained by the North Vietnamese Ministry of Public Security and infiltrated south. The Ministry of Public Security, like the rest of the government in the north does not recognize the government in the south and considers South Vietnam as its own territory, temporarily and illegally occupied in part by the American gangsters. Hence the An Ninh elements are regarded by their Headquarters as security forces. The Ministry receives a constant flow of information from these security sections and issues a steady stream of orders to them. The sections also contain South Vietnamese Viet Cong personnel who have been recruited and trained in South Vietnam. Our present An Ninh strength estimate is approximately 20,000.

Because of the view held by the North Vietnamese, these forces carry out not only espionage and CI functions but also public safety and security functions, judicial, police, and even penal functions. At district and higher levels, they also have an "Armed Security Unit" of the Security Section. It is the assigned mission of this unit to seek out, harass, and if possible destroy the intelligence and security organizations and personnel of the opposition—chiefly the Americans.

Other elements of North Vietnamese intelligence and CI are now under study; and it is expected that additional papers, designed primarily for use in the field, will be forthcoming on such subjects as technical intelligence, and the Central Research Directorate. In June 1968, CIA published "The DRVN Strategic Intelligence Service: Cuc Nghien Cuu." Computer programs are now being used to cope with the increasing flow of CI.

In short, the team approach is paying off. Cooperation is excellent, and the results are proving useful to all.

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Counterintelligence

It is no accident that our research into the An Ninh, its functions and structure, has revealed close parallels to the KGB. In Vietnam, too, the Soviet advisory system is at work. The only effective answer to the centralized clandestine war which Moscow wages relentlessly against us is the internal cohesiveness and cooperation of the US counterintelligence community.

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No Foreign Dissem

*Intelligence evaluation
for warning.*

A WATCHMAN FOR ALL SEASONS

Euan G. Davis

To begin with, the knowledge which strategic intelligence must produce deserves a more forbidding adjective than 'useful.' You should call it the knowledge vital for national survival and as such it takes on somberness and stature.

Sherman Kent in *Strategic Intelligence*

* * * * *

Allen W. Dulles in "The Craft of Intelligence" comments: "The cloud in the sky may be no bigger than a man's hand, but it may portend the storm; and it is the duty of intelligence to sound an alarm before a situation reaches crisis proportions."

No intelligence officer is apt to dispute Mr. Dulles' nutshell presentation of problem number one. There are, however, differences in the kinds of interest individual analysts may take in the cloud, depending on their fields of specialization—tactical analysis, current intelligence, strategic warning, and so on through a long list.

There is a degree of overlap among the three fields named both because boundaries are nebulous and because the individual analyst is often expected to don more than one hat. Tactical warning might be described as that which can be obtained by such sensors as the DEW line radars indicating that an attack had actually been initiated. The best-publicized tactical warning in US history occurred in April 1775 when the intelligence apparatus of the patriots sent Paul Revere galloping across the Middlesex countryside.

Strategic warning has been defined to be that which the intelligence community might provide prior to an actual attack, and hopefully while preparations for the attack are still in progress. This is the uneasy realm of the warning, or indications analyst. In the nature of the case, therefore, the warning analyst deals in extreme situations. The hypotheses he tests against the evidence tend to stress the outside possibilities. He is interested in what might be. The problem

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of warning essentially involves the steady contemplation, and sometimes the courageous advocacy of ominous cases. In the trade, these are known as "worst case" situations.

Some other distinctions can be made. Current intelligence seeks to discern the enemy's actual intentions in the short run. The interests of current intelligence are world-wide while those of warning intelligence—as defined in the intelligence community—are rather limited geographically. The latter is engrossed in "indications of preparations for offensive military action in the immediate future against the United States, its overseas forces or its allies." This is the primary mission of the Watch Committee, the Washington focal point under USIB of strategic intelligence. It has historically been largely limited to the USSR, Communist China, and their allies. In the last decade the Watch Committee has followed developments from time to time in a number of diverse areas peripheral to the Communist blocs such as Laos, South Vietnam, Thailand, the Sino-Indian border, Korea, Cuba and the Middle East. The rationale for following these developments has been that a potential for Communist exploitation existed in the situation which might develop into a threat to the US or its allies.

Indications, or warning intelligence thus may be said to be distinguished from other forms of current intelligence in that its primary interest in enemy behavior is in terms of its threat potential. While indications intelligence is usually co-located with current intelligence, is always dependent on the same information, and is frequently dependent on the current intelligence analyst himself, it does nevertheless view matters from a different perspective. The warning analyst takes incoming scraps, matches them in his mind against an indicator list, and frequently refers back to small nuggets that have long since lost their current intelligence value. The warning analyst may find threat overtones in a pattern of events which might otherwise be considered innocuous if viewed piecemeal.

This is not to suggest that there is some peculiar mystique about the indications process. The indications analyst is, in the writer's view, a current intelligence analyst under instruction to review the same intelligence as others, but, as we have said, from a different perspective. The indications analyst looks at the information for any strategic threat, perhaps only potential, to the US, its forces abroad, or its allies. Other current intelligence analysts are also expected, as one of their duties, to think in terms of indications, but it is the warning analyst's sole obligation to do so.

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A hypothetical situation might—in oversimplified terms—illustrate the differing viewpoints. Let us assume that in the 1970s the leadership of Great Frusina (GF)—a mythical nation invented by Sherman Kent—chooses to levy demands in most threatening form on the neighboring small country of Outer Riding (OR) to stop the alleged gross discrimination against OR's Frusinian minority. OR has a defense pact with the US.

Current intelligence evaluation of the situation will proceed along several lines. Thus, the political analyst sees the threat as part of the Frusinian leadership's effort to distract and obtain support from dissatisfied groups. The political analyst will question the degrees of support to be expected from allies of the two countries. The economic analyst calculates the length of time it will take for GF to gird its logistic loins for intervention. The military analyst follows closely the number of GF units involved in exercises near OR's border.

The indications analyst, however, might ask himself whether GF was just possibly using the threat of intervention to disguise efforts at a surprise attack on the US. How many of its submarines are operating out of their normal area? What is the state of GF's heavy bombers? Are there any unusual steps being taken in the civil defense field, such as art treasures being crated and moved out of town in case of a retaliatory attack, keeping in mind that OR has no heavy bombers or missiles that could reach the Great Frusinian capital city?

Hypothetically and ideally the warning analyst should be able to rack up all his indicators, both positive and negative, and produce a rough assessment as to how ready GF may be to launch an attack.

In reality, reading the warning tea leaves is not all that clear or easy. Except in the unlikely event of our having direct access to policy-making circles in Moscow or Peking, and guaranteed channels of prompt communications, the available intelligence may provide no signals, some signals, or ambiguous signals. Should the Kremlin decide on a pre-emptive attack on the US limited to missiles, the preparations would be minimal and indicators might be virtually nonexistent. The other extreme would be a full-scale mobilization of the enemy's conventional forces to be utilized in conjunction with his missiles. In the latter case there may very well be sufficient indicators available to give warning that the enemy had developed his capabilities to the point where he could launch an attack at almost any time should he elect to do so.

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In developing the tools of his trade, the warning analyst has sought to create yardsticks for measuring norms of behavior. Thus, when only a single gauge begins to register abnormally, there may be no particularly serious threat developing. As an increasing number of abnormalities begin to show up simultaneously, however, the warning analyst inches closer to the edge of his chair and seeks to determine the intent behind the enemy action.

The total picture presented by developing enemy action is rarely defined in sharp colors. It tends to be less than clear-cut, in part because of the constantly changing base lines which make last year's abnormalities this year's norms. By way of example, the Soviets' surface Mediterranean Squadron is now always present in the backyard of the 6th Fleet, and the Squadron's size has gradually expanded. There was no surface Mediterranean Squadron consistently on station the year-round prior to the Arab-Israeli War of 1967. Soviet heavy bombers get "out-of-area" and touch off radar reactions in Iceland and the North American east coast periodically, both in numbers and at distances that would have been rated as "abnormal" several years ago, but tend to be considered more or less normal, if not completely friendly at present.

There is a strong tendency in the ranks of professional bureaucrats to safeguard one's nether parts. For the warning analyst, however, continually to utter only shrill cries of "Wolf!" would obviously be no service to the policy-maker. For this reason the warning analyst, keeping in mind the possibility of the worst possible situation, must make a strenuous effort to give a realistic judgment on the significance of any collection of abnormalities. And since the enemy's activity may have been initiated for any one of a variety of reasons, he obviously must try to come up with the best possible assessment of enemy motivation. The enemy may be creating abnormalities as he prepares for a pre-emptive attack on the US or one of its allies; or he may be attempting to defend against a fancied attack from the US, or he may be staging a magnificent bluff in support of a major political move; or as in the recent past he may be planning—right next door to NATO—to force one of his satellites back on to the straight and narrow path that leads to Socialist perfection, Moscow style.

It can be hazardous to measure present and future situations against past lessons. Nevertheless, past experience does suggest a

number of observations that should help shape the warning analyst's general background and judgment.

Two Major Don'ts

Don't expect the enemy to apply the same logic to his estimates of the situation in question as the US analyst would. *To wit*, in the summer of 1968, there was a strongly-argued line current around the intelligence community that the Soviets probably would not invade Czechoslovakia since they would surely be deterred by the opprobrium with which the world would judge such an action.

Don't be a victim of the Easy or Logical Explanation Syndrome. It is frequently tempting to accept such an explanation even if it may not be the correct one. Thus, during the Korean War there was considerable warning that the Chinese might intervene in the conflict, but there was also a tendency to downgrade the seriousness of the Chinese threat. Instead it was interpreted as a diplomatic ploy designed to restrain the US and its allies by means short of direct military involvement.

Three Great "Remembers"

Remember that US intelligence has been trapped before by misjudging the intended target(s) which an enemy is preparing to attack. Before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the warning signals received by US intelligence were analyzed, in part at least, as pointing to a Japanese campaign against Southeast Asia, which turned out to be only a part of the whole truth.

Remember that repeated warnings can dull the reactions and wariness of both the policy-maker and the intelligence analyst. Warnings on North Korean intentions and capabilities were given repeatedly during the year prior to June 1950. How was one to distinguish the North Korean Army activities north of the DMZ in June 1950 as preparation for a jump-off when similar past activities prior to that time had proven invariably to be preparations for maneuvers?

Remember that history does not necessarily repeat itself. An excellent example of this was the Dutch hope prior to World War II that they would again be allowed to remain neutral as they were in World War I. The hope apparently grew into expectation. Thus, repeated warnings from a German military source located in the horse's mouth, including notices of postponements and changes in schedule,

served largely as an irritant and caused disbelief in The Hague. Following receipt of the final warning, the deputy chief of Dutch intelligence is reported to have sought reassurance about German intentions by phoning the German military attaché. In the latter's absence, his "charming wife" is reported to have given the Dutch bureaucrat the assurance he craved. The Dutch official thereupon went home, only a few hours before German ground forces rumbled over the Dutch frontier.

The Two Important Questions

Do the enemy's actions signify an effort at deception and is he deliberately, or perhaps unintentionally, creating a mix of signals that point in virtually opposite directions? The missile crisis in Cuba is a well-remembered example of deception. Another possible example is the Hungarian revolution in 1956 when, in the face of the rapid and large build-up of Soviet troops, Soviet officials in Hungary appear to have carried out a charade by fulfilling an agreement to withdraw Soviet forces from Budapest and apparently indicating agreement to discuss withdrawal from Hungary.

Does everyone have the warning? History records that some nine hours after the opening of the attack on Pearl Harbor, US planes were caught wing-tip to wing-tip at Clark Field in the Philippines.

The points cited are not an all-inclusive presentation of essential background for a warning analyst, but they are typical of points he might ideally check off in reaching a judgment. The points admittedly also overlap to a degree and have been placed under arbitrary designators.

In conclusion, the warning analyst's analysis should tend to sound more ominous than that of the current intelligence analyst. By definition, as the advocate of the worst possible situation, the indications analyst is expected to espouse that attitude in considering each new set of circumstances.

Given the state of modern Soviet weaponry, it is theoretically possible for the USSR to launch a bolt-from-the-blue without a single indication warning that the appropriate Kremlin finger is poised over the ICBM button. If the Soviet preparation, however, called for considerably more activity and of longer duration involving such diverse fields as political warnings, extraordinary civil defense measures, unusual Long Range Air Force deployments and/or an unusually

large number of submarines out-of-area, the chances of sounding a tocsin would be considerably improved.

Several weeks prior to the 20 August 1968 Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, the warning machinery expressed the belief that the Soviets were militarily prepared to intervene if the Kremlin considered it necessary. If the reader will accept this warning as a satisfactory example of what might be expected from strategic intelligence, then the number of hours devoted to the indications type of sentry duty represent a reasonably inexpensive US insurance policy—possibly straight life.

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*The impact of aging on the
conduct of leadership*

ON AGING LEADERS

Jerrold M. Post, M.D.

"The old gray mare she ain't what she used to be."—American Folk Song
"Wisdom is with the aged and understanding in length of days."—Job
12:12

"And so, from hour to hour, we ripe and ripe, And then, from hour to
hour, we rot and rot, And thereby hangs a tale."—Shakespeare

"If a family has in its midst an old person it possesses a jewel."—Chinese
Proverb

There is now a sizable group of world leaders seventy years old or more whose decisions and policies are significant to US interests. To name but a few: Ho Chi Minh is 77; Mao Tse-tung, 75; Chou En-lai, 70; Chiang Kai-shek, 82; Charles de Gaulle, 78; Francisco Franco, 76; Haile Selassie, 76; Josip Tito, 76; and Walter Ulbricht, 75.

This paper will discuss some of the ways the conduct of leadership may be affected by the aging process. Aging is a continuous process which begins with conception; hardening of the arteries was recently found in a fetus. This paper does not seek to make qualitative distinctions between the young and the old, but rather to discuss directional changes which accompany the aging process and have inherent predictive value. Particularly emphasized will be the tendency for longstanding attitudes to become intensified and for personality traits to become exaggerated.

One should not assume because a man has reached his seventies that he has suffered a significant decline in his intellectual or creative powers. The vintage Bordeaux wine only achieves the full measure of its greatness after slowly maturing over many years. One contemporary example of a leader who performed extremely effectively and, at times, brilliantly during his eighth and ninth decades is Konrad Adenauer, who died at the age of 91, having retired only a few years earlier. In the world of arts and letters, we need only think of Sophocles, who was 89 when he wrote *Oedipus at Colonus*, Goethe, who wrote *Faust* at the age of 80, and Michelangelo, who completed the *Pietà* at age 84 and served as architect to St. Peter's until his death at age 89.

But even the finest wine, if kept too long, can turn sour, and some of these leaders are definitely showing signs of aging. Franco and Chiang Kai-shek are two examples. Recent reports from Spain indicate Franco is having increasing difficulties. His mental powers are said to have deteriorated considerably; he is not as alert as formerly and has difficulties concentrating and making decisions. Although alert for the most part, Chiang Kai-shek has had physical symptoms which suggest that his brain is receiving insufficient nourishment, that there has been a decrease in blood flow to the brain.

As the examples illustrate, one really cannot make wide-ranging generalizations about the capacities of aging individuals; there is a great difference between an "old gray mare" and "a jewel." However, just as there are characteristic features of the normal psychology of adolescents (undoubtedly a significant contribution to dissenting youth), so too there are some features characteristic of the normal psychology of aging individuals. Furthermore, as cerebral arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries of the brain) begins to take its inexorable toll, a well-recognized, but often initially subtle pattern develops, which progressively interferes with the intellectual faculties. Of particular importance for estimative intelligence are the ways in which problem-solving abilities, reactions to stress, attitudes, and judgment are affected.

Normal Psychology of the Aging Period

The cultural context has an important bearing on the ways in which an individual reacts to increasing age. In cultures with strong family ties, where religious values stress tranquility and wisdom, the aged individual may be revered as a prophet and given a place of honor. In many Western cultures, a premium is placed on youth, ambition, strength, and daring. In such cultures, old age can be particularly threatening.

Old age can produce a freedom, for as the older person becomes progressively slowed down and has difficulties keeping up with the pace of life, he is also less dominated by his drives. The diminishment of perceptual processes, particularly as eyesight and hearing begin to fail, is often accompanied by withdrawal. There is an increasing tendency to be self-contained, to be less emotionally involved with others, to be less accessible to outside influence.

Although perceptual processes and reaction time slow down, there is no lessening of discrimination and the capacity for strategic or-

ganization may exceed that of the younger individual. Whatever knowledge and experience the aging individual has gained is retained for an indeterminate time, as is his approach to problem-solving. Moreover, he is able to rely upon his accumulated experience and wisdom without the distraction of conflicting personal relationships and disturbing outside signals. Recognizing this, modern society has developed the roles of counsellor and senior statesman.

For many, the idea of losing their occupational status may be very threatening, particularly when the career has been an extremely rewarding one. This often leads to a sense of nostalgia, a tendency to see the present in terms of the past, to look to the past both for solutions and reassurance. The threat of loss of position and the increasing awareness of failing physical powers may lead some to react against being passive by becoming hyperindependent and preoccupied with demonstrating power and strength.

Time is of the essence. The same ambitions, wishes, feelings, yearnings, and desires which motivated the aging individual when younger are present in his old age. It has been remarked that "old wishes never die; they don't even fade away." Although it is rare for an aged individual to think of himself as old, with a growing awareness of the ebbing of time, he often experiences an increasing urgency to make his mark. He may ask, "What have I accomplished? How much time do I have left?" It is this urgency which gives the exaggerated quality to the long-standing personality patterns so that pre-existing attitudes appear to be intensified. It has been suggested, for example, that the recent upsurge in provocative activity by North Korea may be related to Kim Il-sung's sensitivity to his increasing years, for although he is only 56, it is believed in Korea that a man's life work must be accomplished by age 62. Charles de Gaulle is another aging leader in command of his faculties who seems to be demonstrating an increasing need to have his importance recognized, if necessary, by standing out and showing that he is a force to be reckoned with in order to gain this recognition.

Charles de Gaulle

"As a man grows older, he becomes more like himself."—Anonymous

De Gaulle's inflammatory exhortations of the summer of 1967 for a free Quebec were considered by his opponents to be "the aberration of a deluded old man, living in the past." The cry of "liberté,

égalité, senilité" echoed widely. One editorial diagnosed de Gaulle as suffering from "a morbid enlargement of the ego."

Although a member of de Gaulle's circle noted he was showing his mental age from time to time, Ambassador Bohlen was impressed that he was "in very good form," and other American observers have found him to be extremely alert with no evidence of intellectual decline.

The question, "Is de Gaulle senile?" is too bald, too black and white. De Gaulle is almost seventy-nine and has progressively deteriorating eyesight. In 1964, after putting it off for several years, he submitted to prostate surgery. More recently, there have been scattered reports of fainting spells. The variation in reports is consistent with the fluctuation in condition often found in older individuals. On the basis of our review of the available data, we would agree with the observers who have noted that *for a man of his age*, de Gaulle is in good form. To draw the inference from this, however, that the aging process has no influence on his attitudes and behavior, would be in error. What can we expect from de Gaulle in his declining years? How will he react to political pressure? What that *le grand Charles* was, if anything, grander than ever. *And that is exactly the point.*

Observers of the French scene believe there is a rationale and continuity in de Gaulle's attitudes and behavior over the past forty to fifty years with which the Quebec episode was entirely consistent, although some analysts have felt it was rather more extreme than usual. When he went on successfully to confront the rioting students at the barricades and defend the franc from attack, it was observed that *le grand Charles* was, if anything, grander than ever. *And that is exactly the point.*

We believe that with increasing age, the attitudes which have characterized de Gaulle throughout his political career are becoming even more sharply delineated. He is, in effect, becoming a caricature of himself. Although many defensible rationales for de Gaulle's actions in Canada have been offered, it may be that a younger de Gaulle would not have been so provocative. An exaggeration of his long-standing attitudes, perhaps in combination with an early flagging of judgment, may have colored his behavior.

The attitudes of de Gaulle which are particularly likely to become exaggerated with increasing age are those related to his own

sense of power. If through his actions he can make himself feel powerful and France seem important, this is sufficient justification. His own viewpoint will become even more dominant so that he will become less and less accessible to the counsel of his advisors. To rely on others and need the approval of others has always been regarded by de Gaulle as weak, but he increasingly seems to gain gratification from not submitting smoothly to the wishes of others and to grow stronger in the face of disapproval, as if it were a spur and not a deterrent. Even more so than in the past, if de Gaulle cannot feel that he has total mastery, it would not be surprising to see him totally retreat into the exile of private life. Particularly when he is made especially aware of his diminished stature, either as a world leader or in a more personal sense, when he is made forcibly aware of his failing power as a physically healthy and mentally alert man, we can expect, at those times, the most exaggerated action in an attempt to reaffirm his mastery as a man. The weaker he feels physically, and the more secondary France seems politically, the grander his moves can be expected to be. To rephrase an old adage, "the harder he falls, the bigger he will be."

Psychological Manifestations of Hardening of the Arteries

There is no correlation between age and cerebral arteriosclerosis (hardening of the arteries of the brain). As we have earlier noted, many men in their seventies and eighties function at a very high level with little or no impairment of their creative and intellectual capacities. Conversely, younger men may show significant interference with their functioning, particularly when other medical conditions exist which may accelerate arteriosclerosis. Gamal Abdel Nasser, 51, Chiang Ching-kuo, 57, and Francois Duvalier, 61, all of whom suffer from diabetes, may be much older arterially than their chronological ages. Once the march of symptomatic cerebral arteriosclerosis has begun, a pattern of functional disturbance usually follows which can reliably be expected to become more severe.

1. Afflicted individuals demonstrate a progressive impairment in their capacity to think abstractly. Thinking becomes more concrete, rigid, and inflexible with a tendency to see things in black and white terms.
2. Responses to stimuli become less flexible and more stereotyped; it becomes difficult to change a mental set so that afflicted individuals are seen as becoming more "stubborn."
3. There is a general decline in intellectual capacities. Concentration and memory, particularly recent memory, are usually especially affected.

4. There is an associated impairment of judgment. Impulses which had earlier been checked by the restraint of judgment may now be more easily expressed. Thus, an individual may behave more aggressively or be more easily provoked.
5. Emotional reactions in general become less well controlled; afflicted individuals are irritable, easily provoked to anger, tears, or euphoria, and are more sensitive to slight. Depressive reactions are common.
6. Earlier personality traits tend to flower. As with the normal aging individual, the basic personality and life style remain intact. But even more than in the older individual without organic problems, long-standing attitudes and drives are expressed in an exaggerated way. The characteristically distrustful person may become frankly paranoid. Josef Stalin is a case in point.
7. Afflicted individuals have both good days and bad days. The course of cerebral arteriosclerosis is often characterized by wide fluctuations, but is invariably downhill. Thus, a reliable report of apparently excellent health should not lead the analyst to discount other reports of failing health, as has sometimes been the case with Mao Tse-tung.

Mao Tse-tung

"Though he has watched a decent age pass by, A man will sometimes still desire the world."

Sophocles, *Oedipus at Colonus*

Millions of Red Chinese today give daily praise to the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. As best as we are able to tell, the thoughts of Mao are probably rather confused. There can be little doubt that Mao is suffering from significant symptomatic cerebral arteriosclerosis. Reports continue to depict a deterioration in his health. Some of the apparent discrepancies in Mao's behavior and appearance have confused many observers and led some to discount the reports of ill health. We believe in the main that the fluctuations in his behavior and appearance are related to the varying course of the arteriosclerotic process.

The impaired use of his left side and several appearances without speaking suggest organic brain damage. Paralysis or weakness and difficulty in finding words and in speaking are frequent residual symptoms of "stroke," a frequent complication of hardening of the arteries of the brain. It has been reported that Mao was told by his physician that he has "brain anemia." His waxen facial expression and robot-like manner of moving give added weight to the impression that he is suffering from a cerebral deterioration.

It was possible in 1966 to indicate some of the ways Mao's thinking and behavior would be increasingly affected by these difficulties. We suggested that Mao would probably become more and more

We suggested that Mao would probably become more and more rigid and inflexible with a tendency to see things in black and white; that once he had set a plan in motion, it would be difficult for him to stop it despite compelling evidence and advice; that his judgment and decisionmaking faculties would become progressively impaired. We suggested that distrust, suspiciousness, and emotional lability would mount so that a friend one moment could be seen as an enemy the next, and he would be less and less accessible to outside influence. We observed that individuals damaged by arteriosclerosis are often unaware of their incapacities, so that Mao might attempt to maintain control beyond the time when appropriate to yield the reins; but that to the extent he was aware of his failing powers, vanity and pride would become magnified so that he would be more sensitive to loss of face and would feel an increased urgency to accomplish his mission and demonstrate that it was he that brought Communism to its full flowering.

The Cultural Revolution represents a complex crisis in the contemporary history of Communist China. Powerful social and political groups are in conflict, fighting for their very existence. Although it would be foolish to ascribe such a complicated social crisis to one man's intellectual deterioration, as the foregoing estimate suggests, it may be that an important contribution to the chaos of the Cultural Revolution is the internal diameter of the arteries in the brain of Mao Tse-tung.

Conclusion

We have attempted to delineate some of the effects of aging on the intellect and personality. We have suggested that understanding these changes may help in evaluating and predicting the political behavior and decisionmaking of some world leaders. To illustrate these points, two world leaders from opposite sides of the globe have been discussed: Charles de Gaulle,* as an example of normal reactions to old age; and Mao Tse-tung, as an example of changes associated with hardening of the arteries.

Of particular importance to intelligence estimation is the interaction of exaggerated pre-existing attitudes with decrease in judgment. More than political factors should be considered in trying to fathom the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung and Charles de Gaulle, for the relentless onslaught of age is probably playing a significant role.

* *Editor's Note.* This edition of *Studies* was in an advanced stage of production when de Gaulle resigned in April, 1969.

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No Foreign Dissem

*A multifarious technical collection
system ready to come of age.*

PRESENT AND FUTURE CAPABILITIES OF OTH RADARS

Nicholas R. Garofalo

The unique significance of over-the-horizon (OTH) radar systems is that they can provide information on hostile missile and aircraft activity, and support other intelligence gathering systems, at ranges up to 5,000 kilometers. By using the ionosphere as a reflector for radio energy, these radars are not limited by the line-of-sight restrictions on conventional ground-based radars. The ionosphere performs as a reflector when the radar operates in the high frequency (HF) region, nominally 3 to 40 MHz. By means of this technique, intelligence can be gathered by a ground-based radar placed in a friendly country adjacent to the target area. The OTH system can, to a limited extent, alleviate the need to deploy costly and sometimes operationally sensitive line-of-sight platforms, such as aircraft or satellites. The purpose of this paper is to outline the history and results of the community's efforts in this area to date, and to offer a forecast of the future capabilities of this variety of collector.

Development Philosophy

With the Office of Naval Research, the CIA shared in the use of a domestically situated OTH radar facility called CHAPEL BELL. This has been especially helpful for equipment checkout and experimentation. The CIA program also has benefitted from the extensive basic research sponsored by other agencies at this facility conducted by a single commercial contractor. From the outset, the CIA's method in deploying OTH installations has been to continue research and development in the field, for reasons of economy as well as expediency. Indeed, fiscal circumstances did not allow development of a test prototype prior to deployment.

This procedure has worked, and CIA-sponsored systems have been and remain in the vanguard of sophistication for operationally deployed OTH systems. Not the least of the merits of the overseas

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deployment philosophy is that the installations it has produced have yielded valid data. In addition, this kind of approach has provided valuable information to others in the defense community planning deployment of similar systems in the future.

History of CIA Systems

The first OTH radar system deployed overseas was called EARTHLING (formerly CHAPLAIN). Plans for this installation started during the embryonic stages of OTH technology in 1958. The radar began operation in [] in March 1961. Compared to later systems EARTHLING was crude indeed, but continuous experiment with it spawned invention and made possible new and viable systems.

EARTHLING was what is called a monostatic-pulse radar which operated over a frequency range of 6-26 MHz and had peak power of 200 kilowatts. From the outset it was evident that it had to be able to compensate for variabilities of the ionosphere. The system was therefore designed to be tuned instantaneously to any frequency in the above-mentioned band. This so-called frequency diversity mode of operation is still a feature of CHECKROTE, our present system. At any given period of time, the frequency moves about in such a manner that only two or three coherent pulses are transmitted at a specific frequency in a selected optimum 3 MHz band. The coherent pulses are required for a moving target indicator, which discriminates moving targets from fixed ground clutter. There are numerous advantages to this "frequency diversity" format, perhaps the most important being that it causes minimal interference with other HF uses. On this score, indeed, there have been no serious complaints from the international community in more than eight years of overseas operation.¹

EARTHLING was designed primarily to detect ICBM or earth satellite vehicle launches from the Tyuratam missile complex. The engines of such missiles continue to burn until they reach an altitude well above 100 kilometers, thereby creating an enhanced radar cross section which can be 3 to 5 times larger than the actual radar cross section of the body of the missile. This effect is caused by excess

¹ It is interesting that [] picked up the CHECKROTE signal and correctly diagnosed its purpose and the probable location of the transmitter.

electrons generated by the ionization process of the missile exhaust. These electrons remain unattached because of the rarified atmosphere at these high altitudes. IRBMs, MRBMs and ABMs² usually burn out below 100 kilometers and such enhancements are not frequent in firings of such missiles. Radar sensitivity requirements for detection of such firings are therefore much more stringent than for the larger vehicles.

Research and development to improve EARTHLING's performance continued into 1964. In June of that year it was felt that the system had reached operational readiness for employment against the enhanced missile targets mentioned above. To September 1965, EARTHLING detected 65 missiles launched from Tyuratam. This was 82 percent of the total number known to have been launched when EARTHLING was on the air. There also were a few detections not reported by any other source. These could have been aborts which line-of-sight collection systems could not have picked up. There is also the possibility that certain of these detections could have been false alarms.

In September 1965, [] closed the EARTHLING installation, an action precipitated largely by the political uncertainty resulting from []. After negotiating with [] for over a year to little avail, CIA decided to remove the equipment in November 1966.

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CHECKROTE

In May 1965 work began to install an OTH radar system called CHECKROTE in the western Pacific off the China coast for the purpose of monitoring missile launch activity from the Shuang-Cheng-Tsu missile complex (SCTMC). The program met an ambitious schedule and CHECKROTE was on the air by 1 August 1966. This system is the most sophisticated OTH radar presently developed or operationally deployed within the intelligence community.

² There is a possibility that ABM types such as high-performance SPRINTs will create an enhanced radar cross section. The reason is that such missiles travel at much higher velocities at lower altitudes than conventional missiles, and also high g maneuvers usually occur during these flights. Interest has been generated in this hypothesis because of suspect SPRINT detections made by the Naval Research Laboratory's MADRE radar. This matter is presently under investigation within the community.

It was suspected that the Chinese were at the time testing medium or possibly intermediate range missiles at this complex, and it was therefore necessary to design the radar to detect the missile skin, rather than the enhanced image. This meant that the radar had to be at least three times more sensitive than EARTHLING. The CHECKROTE format was patterned after that of EARTHLING, but improved performance was obtained by increasing the peak power and the antenna gain. In addition, the system processing gain was increased through the use of a technique known as pulse compression. This latter modification also improved range resolution (20 times better than EARTHLING) vital to the acquisition of missile trajectory information. Also included in CHECKROTE was an automatic azimuth monopulse mode which has the capability of providing refined target azimuth data; however, this feature has not yet functioned effectively. The difficulty is that presently the missile signature signal-to-noise ratio is not sufficient for such an automated operation. It is hoped that the present equipment modifications will alleviate this problem.

The first missile detection from the SCTMC was made on 5 December 1966. Through September 1968 there have been 38 suspect missile detections reported by CHECKROTE, 3 in 1966, 29 in 1967, and 6 in 1968. There is a justifiable tendency within the intelligence community to demand firm collateral substantiation of events observed by OTH early in the development phase. Unfortunately, no such collateral information presently exists with respect to China, which in turn ironically emphasizes the importance of CHECKROTE. The procedure at present is to analyze any doubtful signatures with care to make certain they are consistent with the characteristics of the missiles expected from the SCTMC complex and with the expected radar performance. We can therefore be reasonably confident that the great majority of the signatures collected were *bona fide* detections. Obviously, in the absence of collateral information and because of the present limited statistical base, accurate determination of the rate of false alarm or misses is impossible. It is hoped that improvement in the performance of CHECKROTE will in time improve the situation and allay doubt. As a matter of fact a major modification is presently in progress to improve the target-discerning capabilities of CHECKROTE. More refined signature data should become available after these improvements are completed in the spring of 1969.

OTH Records

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Major Problem Areas

The difficulties of predicting the performance of OTH radar systems can be attributed mainly to ionospheric vagaries and to background noise. Past and present systems have continued to be plagued by uncertainties introduced by these conditions. Proponents of OTH therefore usually have felt constrained to offer rather modest or qualified judgments about the results to be expected from any new systems. Not surprisingly, this often engenders scepticism, which is enhanced when the realization dawns that the interpretation of missile signatures on OTH records is a matter of considerable difficulty. In fact, candor compels confession that analyzing these records is more an art than a science. The trick is to distinguish the valid signs from ground clutter, noise, and normal ionospheric perturbation effects. Moreover, these problems are much more acute in systems like CHECKROTE, which detects the actual missile or aircraft skin, than in systems detecting enhanced ICBM targets.

Two techniques are presently being used in the effort to resolve these problems. First, CHECKROTE is being used in such a way that the optimum frequency for illuminating the target area can be definitively determined consistent with the actual ionospheric refraction conditions at the mid-point. By using this technique, known as oblique sounding, unpredictable conditions at the mid-point can be determined at any given moment, thereby permitting the equipment to be adjusted to minimize ionospheric attenuation losses. This technique is successful because CHECKROTE's range resolution is so precise that ground features, such as mountain ranges and cities, are identifiable and thereby act as passive beacons. Since the distances to these features are known, the height of the ionosphere can be determined with some accuracy. This information is essential for the analysis of signature data to calculate missile trajectories.

Concerning the external noise problem, it has been theoretically and experimentally demonstrated that by using a technique known as sub-band filtering, HF interference may be reduced. Here, the receiver IF bandwidth is divided into numerous smaller bands by using contiguous filters, which operate in such a way that an interfering signal will contribute to the overall noise in only a minor fashion. The degree to which this is effective depends on the number of filters used. Without filtering in the receiver, it could be captured

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and desensitized by an incoming signal, rendering it useless for target detection. This filtering technique has been successfully employed in CHECKROTE.

Two of the most difficult problems confronting the OTH radar designer—noise and ionospheric effects—can thus be ameliorated by using the foregoing or similar techniques. It therefore follows that reasonably accurate predictions about performance can be made. In time, these techniques may result in reasonably high quality data from OTH systems and thus increased confidence within the community for their use in fulfilling intelligence needs.

Other OTH Systems

Another variety of OTH radar is the so-called MADRE, developed by the Naval Research Laboratory at the Chesapeake Bay Annex in Maryland. This system can make precision doppler³ measurements as well as those of range and azimuth. This capability is essential to monitor multiple targets, such as aircraft. The AN/FPS-95 or SENTINEL FAN presently under development by the Air Force is patterned after MADRE. It is scheduled to be installed [redacted] in about mid-1970, and will cost approximately \$50 million. The purpose of this installation will be to skin-detect missiles from the northern operational missile complex of the USSR and to provide information on movements of Soviet aircraft. This project has drawn heavily upon the experience gained in the development of CHECKROTE.

[redacted] (of the bi-static CW type) targeted against missile activity at the Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar missile test complexes in the Soviet Union. This radar provides doppler and duration-of-flight data, but not range data. It has the advantage of simplicity, but its inability to provide refined range data forecloses its use to obtain the oblique sounder information so important for continuous reliable operation. The results obtained with [redacted] to date have shown this deficiency. Particularly during the summer months the probability that it will detect missiles is diminished appreciably because of irregularities in the ionosphere.

³ In this type of radar the doppler shift in frequency caused by a moving target is measured accurately. This aids in distinguishing fixed from moving targets, together with isolating specific objects in a multi-target environment.

Also [] modified equipment called [] has been recently installed at [] installation to monitor ABM activity at Sary Shagan in the USSR. As yet, no results have been received, and reliable coverage of this prime target may be difficult because it is so far away from the receivers. This could result in inefficient propagation a good percentage of the time, but there is little doubt that under favorable conditions this system should be able to detect ABMs at Sary Shagan.

The Air Force 440 L program and that of the Army Security Agency are examples of so-called scatter systems. The difference between the two is that the former system controls the transmitters used to illuminate the Soviet missile complexes of interest, while the latter system uses available inimical transmitters which fortuitously illuminate the areas of interest. In the case of 440 L, transmitter complexes in the [] and two in [] are in continuous operation using a programmed frequency format in an attempt to set up sufficient radio paths across the USSR to monitor Soviet operational missile complexes. Five receiver sites in Western Europe, from [] are used to record the missile detection information. The primary mission of this system is to provide early warning of multiple launches against the United States. It has demonstrated the capability to detect the ionospheric perturbation-type signatures associated with ICBM missiles. There is a degree of controversy within the community as regards the false alarm, or miss rate capability of this system. In any case, it has little or no capability for detecting missile skins because of the extremely long ranges at which it must operate.

With regard to using signals from non-cooperative transmitters, i.e., Soviet or Chinese, such a system theoretically could skin-detect a missile if these effectively illuminated the target from line-of-sight, and if the frequency of the transmitter were such that minimal ionospheric path losses were encountered back to the receiver site. The effectiveness of such a system for a particular intelligence or early warning mission, when considering the probability of missile detection under various diurnal and seasonal conditions, is a subject of great complexity and will not be discussed here. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that under certain conditions skin-detection of missiles could be accomplished by such means.

Other Applications

Up to now, the primary applications considered for OTH radar systems have been adversary missile monitoring, trajectory determination, and, to a lesser extent, aircraft monitoring and tracking. Additional uses for such systems are under active investigation, including nuclear detection and diagnostics, command and data retrieval functions for stay-behind devices,⁴ and navigational monitoring and updating for hostile border penetration vehicles. With regard to nuclear detection, OTH can supplement the other elaborate technical collection techniques already deployed. Both the EARTHLING and CHECKROTE systems have demonstrated that they can provide data collateral or complimentary to that obtained by these other systems, especially if the nuclear event occurred at a high altitude and was of a yield in excess of 100 KT. Such collateral data gathered by EARTHLING has been useful in the analysis of past Soviet nuclear tests.

Programs were initiated in the other two areas mentioned above in 1963. These efforts were started by developing equipment which could respond to the unique frequency diversity format used in CIA's OTH radars. The system is thus relatively secure. Experiments have also been made to apply it to tracking cooperative aircraft, and during the WANDERING BOY program in 1964, an aircraft with the appropriate equipment aboard was successfully tracked from San Francisco to Hawaii from the ONR site at Muirkirk, Maryland. It is now possible to use OTH systems to perform such functions when stay-behind data rate requirements are modest, such as 1,000 bits/second, and studies are in progress to improve upon this. Even if the data requirements of a particular application are too high for reliable HF propagation, OTH systems can still perform important command functions required for the efficient operation of remote systems. The CHECKROTE system has already been used in this capacity for China mainland operations, and there will be more such applications. Development in this general area is pointed toward specific operational requirements. The problems are the classic ones of making the equipment reliable and secure as well as extremely small.

⁴Such devices are usually implanted in a hostile country close to targets of opportunity. There they gather intelligence unattended, store the data, and transmit it upon command.

Planned Systems and Capabilities

A recent study has shown that it would be reasonably simple to modify CHECKROTE for aircraft tracking and monitoring. A pulse-doppler radar format would be required for such a mission, that is, one different from that for missile detection. The study in question suggested modifications to CHECKROTE to give it a capability for covering both a missile and an aircraft mission simultaneously. The Air Force is presently contemplating installing a separate OTH system in the Far East similar to the modified CHECKROTE to monitor enemy aircraft activity in the Cambodia, North Vietnam, and Laos areas. Deployment of a modified CHECKROTE system in the Middle East is also planned to gather intelligence on ABM and SAM activity from Sary Shagan.

Future Considerations

Recent advances in technology and overseas operational accomplishments have ensured that OTH radar systems will have an important future role in a variety of intelligence applications. Such systems also promise to be valuable in other areas, including early warning of hostile missiles and aircraft, and peacetime monitoring of commercial aircraft. In the nature of the technique, certain limitations still persist, but technical advances now in sight will give the requisite degree of reliability. What is required now are initiative and imagination in exploiting the available technology. OTH radar systems are finally coming of age.

*Insights into a need intelligence
probably doesn't know it has.*

BEYOND WEBSTER AND ALL THAT: DICTIONARIES OF UNCONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE

Arthur J. Salemme

Every professional linguist, regardless of the language in which he specializes, has repeatedly had to answer the question, "Why do you have to have *another* dictionary? You got three already!" Each time the question is asked, the linguist can only groan and explain once more that yes, he does have three dictionaries, but they were all published before World War II. One, in fact, was compiled by a linguistically unsophisticated missionary in 1862. But this new dictionary has the foreign equivalents of such terms as "radar," "anti-missile missile," and "nuclear warhead." Wouldn't it be nice to know them? Unfortunately, that argument does not always satisfy the non-linguist, who probably is simply trying to economize by eliminating boondoggles and fripperies. At one point he might even interrupt the explanation to say, "But you've been an expert in that language for years—you're supposed to know all the words in it."

Well, to put this on a purely personal basis, I've been speaking English all my life and I must admit that I still don't know all the English words that exist. I still have to use an English dictionary from time to time! Vast technical areas that I am completely ignorant of have their own well-established terminology and are developing new words right and left. These technical and specialized terms often are unrecorded in everyday dictionaries. A general dictionary like Webster's could not be expected to include all of them even if new supplements to the dictionary could be printed every month. And Webster's is having a hard enough time keeping up with the changes in the nontechnical vocabulary (e.g., "irregardless" now means "regardless," "imply" now means "infer"). Therefore, people working in many fields of activity need specialized dictionaries and glossaries. That is why in any language there are specialized dictionaries used in—you name it—the plastics industry, the semiconductors industry, aerospace research, bookkeeping, beekeeping, and

so on and on. Will the nonlinguist concede that there may be, in one or more of those fields, one or two words that he does not immediately know the meaning of? If so, will he then concede that there might be a practical value attached to having those specialized dictionaries printed in the first place?

If this much be conceded, why not also have a dictionary of unconventional language? That is, a dictionary of the very sorts of things that your English teacher used to rap your knuckles for ("Marvin! 'ain't *isn't* in the dictionary!") or your mother used to wash your mouth out for ("Never mind what it means!—just don't say it anymore, and I don't care if kids *do* say it!"). Isn't the collecting and printing of non-standard expressions a legitimate field of linguistic research? Isn't Eric Partridge, the author of the *Dictionary of Slang and Unconventional English* and many other works in the area of unconventional speech, a serious lexicographer, even though some of his listed entries end up having four letters each?

Yes—forgive me answering my own question—such dictionaries do have a practical value. They can, of course, help the casual reader in interpreting graffiti and certain types of literature (how, for example, can a person reading early Mailer be helped by the Webster definition of the verb "fug" as "to loll indoors in a stuffy atmosphere"?). But, more importantly, they can also be of use to anyone who—forgive my indelicacy—is listening in on anyone else's private conversations for whatever reason. Take the law-enforcement officer employing legal means to collect information about an illegal activity. How about an undercover narcotics-squad agent working on a case?¹ Wouldn't it be a good idea for them to know the meanings of all the words they hear, even if some of them are indelicate. Wouldn't it be better for the undercover agent to memorize all the entries in a "List of Words Used by L. A. Hippies" than to blow his cover by saying, "Hey, man, I don't dig that word you keep using!"

And how about a "usually reliable" source who reports that a highly-placed military or governmental figure in country-whatever might be on the point of defecting? Wouldn't it be good for him to know

¹ The word "case" in this context is used in the meaning "the matters of fact or condition involved in a suit," as in the newspaper item, "Police discovered a case of whisky under the railroad culvert last night. No marks of identification were found, but in the meantime the entire detective force is working on the case."

exactly what is compelling that person to consider defecting? Of course the defector will eventually write in his autobiography that he "could no longer live in a society where the personal rights of the individual are trampled under a system of totalitarian, etc., etc." But you and I know, and the source knows, that the would-be defector is probably in some kind of serious personal trouble. But exactly what kind? Since the defector is a foreigner, ask the linguist. Whether he says, "I translated all the words I can find in the available dictionaries, and the blanks represent words I've never seen or heard in my life," or whether he says, "I left blanks for the words I can find in a bootleg copy of a Nasty-Words Dictionary, but I didn't want the typist to see them," there is little value attached to explanations such as the following: "He . . . his . . . with a The two of them . . . a while and then he . . . his . . . She giggled a bit and then all of a sudden, she yelled, 'You . . . ! I'm going to tell my husband!'"² Wouldn't it be desirable for the contact man to have all the facts at his disposal so as to make the proper recommendations to his superiors about how to handle the . . . ?

Well, even if we get a few nonlinguists to admit that there are practical needs for such dictionaries of unconventional speech, that doesn't mean that the linguists can now run out to Brentano's and order one in every language. Who says there's a *Dirty Greek Dictionary* anyway? Even if there is one, it would probably contain only those words that one particular dirty Greek in 1943 thought should be included. One man's idea of obscenity is not another man's, and one nationality's is not another nationality's.³ That explains the sins of omission and commission in the few dictionaries of obscenities that

² As I invented this snatch of conversation, I thought that I was putting the dashes in at random, but then I suppose that Rorschach kept insisting that his inkspots were random too.

³ To this day, Germans keep saying that the officers on the German High Command were completely baffled by General McAuliffe's terse and presumably contemptuous message at Bastogne, "Nuts!" A lot of Americans were baffled too. "Nuts!" is the sort of thing that a male hairdresser might say when he can't get a spit curl to curl just so, but a general telling the Krauts to flub themselves? The mystery was eventually cleared up when it was learned that, somewhere in transmission to the Germans and to the American frontline reporters, the general's original five-letter expletive had been changed to a four-letter expletive. The linguistic tour-de-force of *putting in* a four-letter word to clean up a statement was somewhat marred by the fact that, while the two words are synonymous in one sense, they are not completely interchangeable as expletives.

are available. In the field of Dirty Russian Studies, for example, there are only two publications generally referred to (and you'd be surprised to hear how often they are referred to for operational reasons). One publication, the typescript "Dictionary of Slang, Obscenities and Colloquial Phrases," is incredible in what it includes. In addition to the obvious obscenities, it contains words that can be found in any Russian-English dictionary, such as "plaksa" (crybaby) and "skryaga" (miser). Apparently the Russian compiler simply listed all the words he could think of that would get him a fist in the mouth. The American-born author of the other Russian-to-English obscene dictionary was more selective: his thin but definitive work contains words and expressions which often cannot be found in any other printed source.

The fact remains that there are few dictionaries of unconventional speech in any language you can think of, and the ones that do exist are often incomplete or just plain too old. Even Partridge, for all his work in English, cannot keep up with the times. He is of little use, for example, to the person looking for hidden meanings in the "Have Some Tea with Goldie O'Keefe" skits on the Smothers Brothers program. It took many years for the *Key to Finnegans Wake* to appear. How soon can we expect the *Key to the Smothers Brothers*? What entries will it contain besides the obvious ones like, "Tea: see *pot*"; "Pot: see *marijuana*"; "Gold: *high-grade marijuana*"; "O'Keefe, Keefe: see *keef* (also *kef*, *kief*, *khyf*)." Whenever that key does appear, it will probably be mostly obsolete anyway.

But disregarding those expendable words that are designed to mean something to a particular "in-group" and mean something else (or, presumably, nothing) to everyone else, there are certain unconventional words which, in any language, have a long and mostly unrecorded history. Some of these (are they now respectable?) words in English are in Webster's Third Edition. Unfortunately, the definitions are not always complete. As for what is often called "*the word*" or "this particular four-letter word," it ain't there a-tall! ⁴ But usually

⁴ When reviewers asked the publishers why specifically that word is absent, while others are present in the Third Edition, the publishers replied that it did not seem sensible to risk an investment of several million dollars on a single word. That's right, it doesn't.

that fact does not give rise to ambiguity about its spelling or its meaning.⁵

The situation that applies to English also applies to foreign languages—slang comes and goes, new technical words are created, old words change their meanings, and the new dictionaries try to keep up with the changes. But at the same time there is always an unrecorded, surprisingly stable, list of words that few respectable dictionaries, and certainly no textbooks for foreigners, even want to include. How, then, does the American-born linguist ever learn them? Well, one way that a foreigner can learn them is to watch a native carefully. When he sniggers, try to find out why. That's how the Duke and Duchess of Windsor, on a honeymoon tour of France, are supposed to have learned that the innocent letters CUL on their British license plate were being misinterpreted by the French citizenry.⁶

If only the linguist had dictionaries with *all* the words in his own language, plus *all* the words in the foreign language in which he specializes! Words used in all fields of social and technical endeavor, words at all levels of usage, words with all types of shibboleths! Translation would be extremely easy then, and there would be no

⁵ Ambiguity is, of course, not precluded. One coworker of mine, for example (unmarried, mid-thirties), remarked a while back, "I've seen that word around a lot since I was a little girl, but I didn't know what it meant until last year." The next day, hand-lettered signs began to be posted mysteriously, asking, "Who told?"

⁶ Another coworker of mine, while attending the University of California at Berkeley many years ago, worked on a language-department project to produce completely meaningless literal trigraphs for California license plates. After all three-letter English words—everyday, obscene, and potentially obscene or otherwise improper—were eliminated, the project participants had to eliminate any other combinations that turned out to be nasty words in foreign languages. Someone in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles was probably aware of the embarrassment created toward the end of World War II when someone pointed out that the name of the agency responsible for administering occupied Italy—AMGOT, for Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory—sounded funny when read as two Turkish nouns. At any rate, with the large number of languages spoken in the world, it was not long before the $26^3=17,576$ possibilities were reduced to a pitifully small number. And still, years after the project was over, fellow participants in the project kept turning up improper combinations that had nevertheless slipped through.

linguistic ambiguity in translation, because the linguist would never have to guess at the meaning of any word.

The translator of Russian, at least, has at his disposal one publication in which unconventional Russian words and expressions are translated completely unambiguously into English. That publication, the latter of the two previously mentioned Russian-English dictionaries of unconventional language, is Lawrence M. Carpenter's *Dictionary of Russian Taboo Words and Expressions*.¹ The history of that publication must be typical of the difficulties involved in publishing such linguistic aids. Perhaps Mr. Carpenter will someday chronicle that history himself, starting with the initial unqualified disapproval of his dissertation topic and ending with the ultimate publication of his opus in a complete edition of five copies. In the meantime, the reader will have to imagine the series of administrative crises that had to be resolved before Mr. Carpenter could state his elegantly simple "Purpose":

"The aim of this dictionary is to give the American linguist who encounters unfamiliar Russian obscenities a working aid where he can find out about the Russian birds and bees without the usual ordeal of furtive glances and snickering mumbles or the all-too-frequent preliminary game of 'What do you want to know that for? Cultured Russians don't talk that way.' Anyone who has ever gone up to a sweet old Russian lady and innocently asked her the meaning of 'pizda' will immediately welcome this dictionary. No further attempt will be made to justify the need of a Russian-English dictionary of fairly common and long-standing words that are not listed in any readily available dictionaries."

One of the five copies of the dissertation and one copy of the Russian-English "Dictionary of Slang, Obscenities and Colloquial Phrases" is, fortunately, available for my use whenever a need arises during the translation of colloquial Russian text. Unfortunately, six years after the publication of Mr. Carpenter's dissertation, the world still does not seem ready for a wider dissemination of his major contribution to Russian linguistics. Witness my reluctance to cite, in this brief survey, any of his masterful translations of classic Russian expressions or even to translate the one Russian noun in the excerpt above. Its equivalent is a Webster's Third Edition. Why, then, can't I simply type the four-letter word here and now? Probably for the same reason that Mr. Carpenter himself gave the basic definition of

¹ Dissertation, "U.S. Army Institute of Advanced Russian Studies," Foreign Area Special Training Program (Russian), 1 March 1963, [iv] +20 pp.

the Russian noun not in one four-letter English word with a long and distinguished history⁸ but in three words derived from Latin. So long as he and I feel uncomfortable about using that English word in certain situations, and native speakers of foreign languages feel as uncomfortable about certain words in their own language, there will be gaps in the dictionaries available to the professional linguist. It is the dedicated linguist who attempts to fill those gaps and the brave linguist who keeps the few available aids so produced right there on the top of his desk, alongside of such other specialized dictionaries as his *Russian-English Dictionary of Cybernetics and Computer Technology*.

⁸ See, for example, the famous English-lesson scene in Shakespeare's *Henry V*.

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No Foreign Dissem

*Photographic analysis performs
another service to intelligence*

THE QUEST FOR MAO TSE-TUNG

James R. Williamson

From time to time the need arises to verify that some head of state, important educator, scientist, or other important personage actually is the identity he is alleged to be. This paper describes one of the more exact and relatively new methods by which such verification can be provided.¹ The point is, of course, that in certain circumstances the impersonation of such an individual by a double or "look-alike" could deliberately be arranged to mislead or confuse the outside world, or otherwise be used as a deceptive maneuver in international politics.

Such a possibility arose some years ago with respect to none other than Chairman Mao. Mao had not been physically observed for some months in 1965, and there were reports—none confirmed—that he was in ill health. The question of Mao's health, and correspondingly his role in the scheme of things in China continued to arouse interest and concern until July, 1966, when news of the Chairman's famous swim in the Yangtze burst upon the world. The specific task involved the evaluation of still photographs and movie films depicting Mao, and the invention of photogrammetric² means to determine whether or not the individual in the photography was in fact Chairman Mao Tse-tung in all cases.

The Method

A method of identifying persons through ear measurements was used in this endeavor. This method, also used by police authorities in criminal investigations and by hospitals for infant identification, has proven nearly as reliable as identification through fingerprints. A leading authority on the subject, A. V. Iannarelli, states that "despite

¹ The requirement in the instance in question was levied by the Office of Medical Services upon the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC).

² The science or art of obtaining reliable measurements by means of photographs.

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cellular evolution the pattern form of the ear is as lasting, immutable, and individual as fingerprints . . . this pattern form, as in friction ridges, develops months before birth and remains constant throughout life until decomposition at death.”³ Also, as the body changes after birth “the ear must grow in proportion, governed by the limitations set by nature . . . The rule might be: the ear grows rapidly during infancy and adolescence, tapers during young adulthood, and accelerates during advancing age.” Therefore, “the predominant cause for the growth in the length of the ear can be attributed to the sagging lobe . . . Since it does not affect the over-all anthropometric⁴ measurement of the ear proper, the growing lobe cannot affect the practicality of this system based on the anthropometric measurement of the ear.”

The basic procedure is simple and straightforward, and the validity of the method has been substantiated through many years of study. A 35mm camera is used to photograph the subject's ear, and a print is made with a special set of guidelines overlayed on the photograph. Measurements of the ear are made along the guidelines and recorded. These measurements are compared with those taken from other photographs. If the values are the same for all the photographs compared, then all the photographs are of the same individual. The time span between photographs does not make any difference within the limitations set by nature.

The procedure as described by Iannarelli is considered “clinical” when the photographs are taken under controlled conditions. That is, the subject is posed, specified cameras and film are used, cameras are properly aligned with respect to the ear, and complete photographic data is recorded. The photography presented for the Mao study was “non-clinical,” in that it showed the subject in motion, cameras of various types and unknown manufacture had been used, photographic data was completely lacking, and photography many generations removed from the original film was all that could be provided for study. In order to compensate for the “non-clinical” photography, NPIC devised a procedure which adapts the “clinical” procedure to the “non-clinical” photography. This adaptation proved to be sound.

³ Alfred Victor Iannarelli, *System of Ear Identification*, Police Series, The Foundation Press, Inc., 1964.

⁴ A term from physical anthropology having to do with measurements of the human body to determine differences in races, individuals, etc.

The photography provided was inspected and the best prints and negatives depicting Mao over several years were selected for measurement. This selection also took into account the "look angle"⁵ from which the photography was taken, and the ability of the film to produce acceptable, or relatively unblurred images at high magnification. The initial inspection to determine whether the "look angle" was acceptable was visual. Later, after the measurements were recorded, a ratio of two of the ear measurements was calculated to determine the amount of variation in "look angle" that could be tolerated without introducing radical changes in the measurements due to obliquity⁶ or angle of change. The chronological order of selection enabled the analyst to check for elongation of the ear, and to take this into account in the final analysis.

The adapted or "non-clinical" procedure requires extensive photographic laboratory work before a negative can be made into an ear photograph for measurement. In many instances the frame must be enlarged through several steps in order to obtain a usable negative. The size or scale of the ear images at final printing is very important because all must be at the same scale. Otherwise, the measurements will obviously be meaningless due to variations in scale between images.

A special easel and several guideline templates are used in making the ear photographs for measurement. The templates are placed on the easel, and by using the negative image the analyst can make the proper alignment and control the scale of the ear images for printing the photographs. Superimposed on the final ear photograph is a set of guidelines that are used in measuring. The entire procedure is dependent upon the most accurate use of the special easel and its associated equipment.

Validating the "Non-Clinical" Procedure

In order to derive a basis for comparison and to determine what amount of deviation in comparative measurements should be con-

⁵ The angle between a line from the camera to the plane of the profile of an individual being photographed. A "look angle" of 90° would be a profile photograph, while a forward "look angle" of 80° would move the camera forward from the profile position without moving the individual's position.

⁶ Angle change between the subject's profile plane and the plane of the exposed film introduced by deviation of the taking camera from the plane perpendicular to both the profile plane and the film plane.

sidered significant, the adapted procedure was tested in what might be called a semi-clinical fashion. That is, ear photographs were taken at different angles and from various distances, using a hand-held camera, and pertinent technical information was recorded.

Two groups of people were photographed at different times, and some of the test subjects were included in both groups. No record was kept of the identity of the owners of the ears in the Group A photography but the photographs of Group B were identified by the initials of the individuals photographed. Also, the measurements on the Group A photographs were not taken until measurements were taken from the Group B photography, in order to reduce the possibility that the analyst might remember which ear in Group A belonged to which individual.

The ear photographs having been taken, the laboratory work now began. The final ear measurements depend upon the alignment and scale of each photograph. As indicated, alignment and scale are determined in the photo-lab through the use of a template on the easel. Drawn on the template are two sets of lines, an oblique line and a scale line. These lines enable the analyst to ensure that the alignment of all the photographs to be analyzed and compared is the same, and that all of the photographs are on the same scale. The oblique line is placed across two points on the ear: the overlap of the Helix rim over the upper Concha area, and the outer most point of the Tragus. (See Figure 1) Once the oblique line has been placed correctly, the image is adjusted to make the scale line fit just inside the Concha area, as in Figure 1. As noted above, a set of guidelines for measurement was superimposed on the final prints. The guidelines are on a glass plate which was placed over the photographic paper when the final adjustment had been made and the ear print was ready to be made.

After the photo-lab work was completed, the classification and mensuration could begin. The "primary classification"⁷ of the test subjects was limited to Caucasian and Asian males. A chart of the primary classifications is shown in Figure 2.

⁷ An initial classification using the identification of sex over race, i.e., M/A would be a male Asian, M/C would be a male Caucasian.

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


Figure 1. Placement of oblique line and positioning of scale line in the ear.

The mensuration is divided into two classifications, the first involving 12 individual measurements, and the second, six, as shown in Figure 3. The analysis and identification of the ear photography is based on these classifications.

Shown in Figure 4 are the Group A and B measurements. In Group A the individual ear photography has been identified by a test

The primary classifications are listed as sex over race. There are eight categories to this classification. The use of this primary classification reduces the chance of duplication almost by half, and in the filing system separates the males and females for each race.

$$\begin{array}{cccc} \frac{\text{Male}}{\text{Caucasian}} = \frac{M}{C} & \frac{\text{Male}}{\text{Negro}} = \frac{M}{N} & \frac{\text{Male}}{\text{Asian}} = \frac{M}{A} & \frac{\text{Male}}{\text{Indian}} = \frac{M}{I} \\ \frac{\text{Female}}{\text{Caucasian}} = \frac{F}{C} & \frac{\text{Female}}{\text{Negro}} = \frac{F}{N} & \frac{\text{Female}}{\text{Asian}} = \frac{F}{A} & \frac{\text{Female}}{\text{Indian}} = \frac{F}{I} \end{array}$$

Figure 2. The primary classification of ear photography.




Figure 3a. The 12 First Classification Measurements.




Figure 3b. The 6 Second Classification Measurements.

number, while in Group B the individual ear photography has been identified by the initials of the individual photographed. To simulate the "non-clinical" photography received for the Mao study the test subjects were photographed from three different positions. One photograph was taken from slightly in front of the subject, one from slightly in back of the subject and the third photograph was taken from full profile.

In Figure 4 the September photography is that of Group A and the October photography that of Group B. Comparison of the tabulations of test 6 in Group A and C.C. in Group B showed very close correspondence. In Group B, the measurements marked C.C.1 were of the full profile photograph and the next two sets of measurements were the photographs taken from slightly different angles. The three C.C. tests show that even if the viewing angle is not quite the same, the analytical results can be accurate.

The C.B. test in Group B provides an example of what an error in laboratory procedure will do to the measurements. Test 11, from Group A, and C.B. were found to be of the same ear, but on closer examination so was Test 12 of Group A. The correlation in the values resulted from a difference in the scale on which these photographs were made. In making the ear photograph for Test 12, the correct procedure was not rigidly adhered to and the result was measurements that could not possibly agree with measurements from another photograph of the same ear. It must be emphasized that the photographs to be analysed must depict the ear images all at the same scale.

Inherent in the procedure is a check for human error in visual identification, as was proven when the test photography was being analyzed. The test marked J.C.P. in Group B had been marked incorrectly. In comparing measurements, the prints in Group A the values of J.C.P. were found to be the same as Test 11. That was manifestly impossible, because Test 11 was of C.B. Upon comparing test J.C.P. to test C.B., however, it was found that test J.C.P. had been incorrectly identified and was really a C.B. ear photograph.

These results were most encouraging. In the original clinical study almost any variation in the comparisons of first classification measurements was cause to doubt that the individuals in question were identical. Any change in the second classification measurements was significant enough to state definitely that the individuals were not the

ID : Identification Number of ear photo VAR : View Angle Ratio P : Primary Classification UD : Undated Photography																								
CLASSIFICATIONS																								
ID	VAR	P	first												second									
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6				
GROUP A																								
6	.5	M ₂	1	1	1	1	4	3	2	3	3	2	3	6	11	6	3	3	5	6	8			
10	.7	M ₂	3	2	2	2	5	9	7	5	3	2	3	12										
2	3	M ₂	2	2	2	4	6	4	2	1	4	2	3	9										
7	.5	M ₂	1	2	1	1	4	6	2	5	3	2	3	10										
5	5	M ₂	1	1	1	1	4	3	2	3	3	3	3	6										
12	.4	M ₂	2	2	2	2	5	5	2	2	3	2	3	8										
11	.5	M ₂	3	2	2	2	6	7	3	3	3	3	3	11										
GROUP B																								
CC1	.5	M _A	1	1	1	1	4	3	2	3	3	2	2	3	6	11	6	3	3	4	5	8		
CC2	.45	M _A	1	1	1	1	4	5	3	2	3	3	2	2	6	11	6	3	4	6	8			
CC3	.5	M _A	1	2	1	1	4	3	2	2	3	3	2	2	6	11	6	3	3	5	7			
JCP	.43	M _C	2	2	1	2	7	7	3	3	3	2	2	3	11									
CB	.43	M _C	2	1	2	2	7	7	3	4	3	2	2	11										

Figure 4. Listing of measurements and data from the September and October 1968 photography.

same. From this test it was determined that the first classification measurements (one through twelve) would have to differ by one unit or more for two or three measurements to cause doubt. The second classification measurements (one through six) would have to differ by one unit or more for one or two measurements to invalidate a comparison and indicate that two individuals were involved.

In all cases due consideration was given to the quality of the enlarged photograph, because "non-clinical" photography would very likely give poor resolution⁸ at high magnification. Indeed, the degradation of the enlarged photographs in some instances in the test study was so severe as to render the photographs unusable.

The adapted procedure thus proved to be tolerant of deficiencies in print quality, as well as accurate. This was especially true in the comparison of photography not taken at the same view angle. A ratio of two of the values from the first classification measurements was computed and used as an indicator that comparable photographs had been taken from approximately the same angle. This enabled the analyst to group photographs of the same "look angle," and therefore enhanced the accuracy of the comparison of measurements. The results showed that the correlation between ear photograph measurements of the same individual is very marked and that any scale changes⁹ show up as a radical variation in the tabulated measurements. Normally, if the identification is positive, this scale change can be corrected for by multiplying all changed values by a constant, so that the corrected measurements may be used in the data tabulation. This can also be done when the identification is not sure, but this does not give positive proof that the ear images are identical, and the corrected data thus may not be included in the data tabulation.

Results of the Adapted Procedure

In the Mao study, the adapted procedure had to be applied to photography of highly uneven quality. As indicated, some of it dated back many years. It included several examples selected from each of certain years. The collection of this data is shown in Figure 5.

⁸ The breaking up of the emulsion into its component parts causing the photograph to be blurred.

⁹ Occurs when the final ear photographs for comparison are not made to the same scale.

ID : Identification Number of ear photo VAR : View Angle Ratio N : Measurements not possible P : Primary Classification OA : Overall Average UD : Undated Photography																								
CLASSIFICATIONS																								
ID	VAR	P	first												second									
			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6				
AVERAGE VALUES FROM THE SEPARATE YEARS																								
58	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	5	2	1	3	1	3	5	14	8	6	3	3	8			
60	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	2	0	3	1	2	4	14	8	5	3	3	8			
62	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	2	.8	3	1	3	5	14	8	6	3	3	8			
63	.4	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	2	1	3	1	3	5	15	8	5	3	4	8			
64	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	5	2	1	3	1	3	5	15	8	6	3	3	8		
66	.6	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	5	2	1	3	1	3	5	15	7	8	6	3	3	8	
UD	.6	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	5	2	1	3	1	3	5	15	8	6	3	4	3	8	
OA	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	5	2	1	3	1	3	5	15	8	6	3	3	8		
MEASUREMENTS FROM THE 16M.M. MOVIE FILM																								
FILM NUMBER W6306																								
W-1	1.3	M	A	2	1	1	1	3	5	6	3	N	4	2	3	7	13	7	5	3	5	9		
W-3	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	2	6	3	2	3	5	16	8	6	3	3	8			
W-4	.8	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	5	3	1	3	1	3	4	15	7	6	3	3	8		
W-8	.8	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	3	1	3	2	3	5	14	7	6	4	3	7			
Ave	.8	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	5	3	1	3	2	3	5	15	7	6	3	3	8		
FILM NUMBER Y6028																								
Y-4	1.0	M	A	2	2	2	2	3	4	3	N	2	N	N		11	7	5	3	5	5			
Y-7A	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	2	N	4	N	N		15	8	6	3	5	9			
Y-7B	.5	M	A	2	4	3	2	4	4	2	N	4	N	N		16	8	7	4	6	10			
Y-8	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	4	4	2	N	3	N	N		14	8	5	6	4	5	8		
Y-9	.3	M	A	2	3	2	2	3	3	1	N	3	N	N		12	6	4	2	3	4	7		
Ave	.5	M	A	2	3	2	2	3	4	4	2	N	3	4	N	15	7	8	5	3	4	5	7	8

Figure 5. Statistical data used in determining the left ear measurements of Mao Tse-tung.

The photography covering the years 1958 to 1966 was in the form of enlarged photographs, and therefore required re-photographing in order to obtain negatives with which to work. An analysis of the mensuration by year, and of how individual examples of photography compared in any specific year, is given in the appendix.

The measurements derived from the photographs for each year were averaged, and the resultant is to be considered representative for each year. Note that there are no differences in the first five measurements (see Figure 5) among the seven averages. In the sixth measurement only one of the seven averages differs by a whole unit, and three averages by approximately one-half of a unit. Only one value in measurements seven, eight, ten, eleven and twelve differs among the seven averages. The correlation between the averages over the years is so strong that their average value can be accepted as the left ear measurements for Mao Tse-tung.

Two 16mm films were given to NPIC with the understanding that the Office of Medical Services felt that the individual representing Mao Tse-tung in one of the films was a possible double. The apparent physical abilities of the individual in question were not compatible with the intelligence community's assessment of Mao's physical condition. The films are identified according to their respective file numbers, W6306 and Y6028 (Figure 5). Ten frames were selected from each reel of film, but due to very poor imagery at the high magnification required, only four frames on each film were usable.

The reel of film numbered W6306 provided frames numbered 1, 3, 4 and 8. A break-down on these frames is given in the appendix.

Analysis of the four W6306 frames depicting Mao yielded average measurements differing in two places from the first classification measurements of the 1958-66 photography and at one place in the second classification. Analysis of the data suggested the possible conclusion that the four photographs did not all depict the same individual. Since the enlargements from 16mm film were of the order of 120 diameters, however, the fact is that the selection of measuring points was very difficult and was almost certainly in error. Making yet another photograph would not necessarily have helped because of the poor quality of the negative being used.

The reel of film numbered Y6028 provided frames number 4, 7-A, 7-B, 8, and 9. A break-down on these frames is in Appendix 1-C.

It should be emphasized again that when working with small negative material, such as the 16mm movie frames in the Mao study, the enlargement of the ear image to the scale required for comparative measurement inescapably means serious degradation of the resolution of the film. Obviously, therefore, no single frame can yield conclusive evidence, and the average values of several frames must be used.

The measured values for the photography from the two movie reels (W6306 and Y6028) were independently averaged and a comparison was made between the two reels. There were no differences in the first four measurements of the first classification, and less than a half a unit in the fifth measurement. The seventh measurement differed by a whole unit as did the twelfth measurement. The ninth measurement also differed by a half a unit. There were three measurements for reel Y6028 that could not be taken because of the deficient quality of the film enlargement. Only the fifth measurement in the second classification for the movie data departs from the norm to a significant degree.

On the whole, therefore, the correlation of the two sets of averages derived from the movies was very close, and was sufficiently marked to support the judgment that the same individual was depicted in both movie reels.

Comparison of the values derived from the 1958-66 picture of Mao with the analysis of the two movie reels also yielded close correlation. The following criteria were applied to determine whether observed differences were sufficient to support suspicion that the measurements were of images of different individuals. In the first classification three measurements had to differ by one unit or more. In the second classification, two or more measurements had to differ by one unit or more.

As shown in Figure 5, only two measurements in the first classification and one in the second classification differed from the average for reel W6306. The average measurements of reel Y6028 showed only one difference in the first and second classifications. Therefore, the analysis of all photographs and frames considered in the Mao study yielded a strong correlation in their respective measurements.

Conclusions

The results of the test study and the Mao analysis indicated that positive identification of persons through ear measurements is a practical and accurate method. The procedure has some inherent restrictions with respect to the quality of photography that may be used. The photographic laboratory work must be precise. Once the ear photograph has been made, however, the analyst need only to make his measurements, record the data, and make the comparisons. The criteria by which significant differences between ear photographs are determined must take into account the quality of the photography being used.

In the study of Mao Tse-tung, some apparent anomalies emerged in the early stages of the analysis that were resolved in the final evaluation, having to do with look angles and resolution. The final analysis showed that there was nothing significant enough to cast suspicion or doubt on any particular set of measurements.

In conclusion, the method of identification described in this article can be commended as a useful tool for the intelligence community. Thirty-five photographs and frames were used in the study and the data produced proved conclusively that all measurements were of the same individual, Mao Tse-tung. A file of measurements has been established and through the use of this file additional photography can easily be checked.

APPENDIX

A. *Break-down of mensuration by year.*

1958. Three photographs from this year were measured (one negative was used to make two ear photographs) and the correlation of these photographs is very strong. There were no marked differences in the important first eight measurements of the first classification. The differences in the remaining first classification measurements were not enough to be considered doubtful and were attributed to film quality and the view angle. Photograph 17-A might be viewed as having a significant difference, but since 17-B was produced from the same negative it was adjudged highly unlikely.

1960 and 1962. Since there was only one photograph from each of these two years, data derived from them was entered into the tabulation as it is. Under the criteria stated for the testing there was no reason to doubt the identity of the subject in these photographs.

1963. In this group of three photographs dating from 1963, number V seemed to present enough differences to arouse some doubt, but upon examination the prints were found to be of bad quality. The selection of some points by the analyst was in error. This instance shows the need to use several photographs for comparison in a non-clinical study.

1964. There are five photographs for this year, all of which correlate very closely. There was no doubt that all five photographs are of the same individual.

1966. Five of the six photographs for this year showed a very close correlation. The sixth photograph did not seem to be any different from the others, and the quality of the photography was adequate. Either it depicted a different individual, or some error in procedure had been made, resulting in a scale change. The latter was discovered to have been the case.

Undated Photography. These six photographs could have been taken at any time from 1954 until late 1966. Here, two photographs ("W-1" and #13) seemed to have enough differences from the rest to cause doubt, but the second classification analysis ruled this out.

B. Break-down of mensuration on the 16mm movie film numbered W6306.

W-Frame #1. Many values differed from the averages established for Mao, but the photography was very bad, almost beyond use. A total of eight measurements differed in the first classification and five in the second classification. Due to the degradation of the enlargement, this data had to be discounted as any sort of conclusive proof that the frame represented some individual other than Mao.

W-Frame #3. The frame provided excellent results when compared to the average values derived from analysis of the 1958-66 pictures. Only one value differed significantly in each of the first and second classifications.

W-Frame #4. Another frame that provided close correlations when compared to the average. Only two differences showed up in the first classification and one in the second.

W-Frame #8. There was no reason for doubt in the first classification, but the second classification had four values that differed. Although this enlargement was poor in quality the procedure seems to have been slightly in error, thus causing a shift of the guideline origin.

C. Break-down of mensuration on the 16mm movie film numbered Y6028.

Y-Frame #4. A total of five measurements differed from the average values in the first classification and five measurements in the second classification. Again, this was attributed to very poor quality reproduction in the enlargement.

Y-Frame #7A. Very close correlation with the average values. Only one measurement differed in the first classification and two in the second.

Y-Frame #7-B. Procedural error was the cause for the discrepancies here. Four measurements differed in the first classification and five in the second.

Y-Frame #8. Another close correlation in the first classification when only one measurement differs, but four measurements differed in the second.

Y-Frame #9. Here three measurements disagreed in the first classification, and all measurements disagreed in the second. This is a case of very poor quality enlargement.

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No Foreign Dissem

*The remarkable record
of a case of blackmail.*

RECRUITMENT IN MOSCOW

Donald H. Prunko

This is the true story of the recruitment by the Soviet Committee for State Security, the KGB, of a secretary assigned to a Western embassy in Moscow.¹ The foreign diplomatic colony is fertile ground for such activity, but this particular case is unusually interesting because it shows the KGB at its most proficient, and at its maladroit worst. The timeworn techniques of compromise and blackmail were in the beginning employed with uncommon subtlety and sophistication. When the secretary was reassigned to another country, however, the follow-up was so ham-handed, and so lacking in understanding of how to manipulate her foibles and weaknesses, that she was prompted to report to her own security authorities. We have a remarkably detailed account of the Soviet handling of this case over a period of several years, because the secretary's indiscretions were not limited to her affair with a Russian lay religious leader and her cooperation with the KGB. She also kept a date book in which she noted all her appointments with her Soviet friends.

The victim in this episode, Birgitta Lundberg, was born into a poor family in Ostersund, Sweden. Her parents had minimal education and little interest in the world outside the family and neighborhood. Upon completion of her education and training as a secretary, Brigitta found employment with the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. She served in several foreign posts and by the time of her appointment to the embassy in Moscow in May 1961, had acquired fluency in German, French, English, and Russian, an interest in art and culture, and a predilection for a rather luxurious style of living.

In Moscow, Birgitta settled into an apartment building largely occupied by members of the foreign diplomatic colony and high-ranking Soviet dignitaries. She lived alone and employed a part-time maid,

¹True names, dates, and some nationalities have been altered.

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who also worked at the Swedish Embassy, where Birgitta was a general secretary in the political section. On occasion, Birgitta also worked for the ambassador and the principal political officer.

Not long after her arrival, Birgitta made a bus trip from Moscow to Leningrad in the company of an attaché of the Swedish Embassy who was on a military intelligence mission. When her companion discovered that they were under surveillance in Leningrad, they returned to Moscow without incident. Birgitta had gone along to provide cover for the other employee. She also went twice to a local bookshop which specialized in military publications and purchased several books for the colleague whom she accompanied on the Leningrad trip. It was probably her involvement with the Swedish military intelligence officer and the purchases she made on his behalf that brought her to the attention of the KGB.

In July, 1961, Birgitta was visited by a Swedish friend, a Miss Forsberg, who was in transit from Hong Kong to Sweden. While they were waiting at a bus stop during a sightseeing trip of Moscow, a Soviet officer waiting at the same stop introduced himself, in English, and after a brief conversation invited them to his apartment, saying that he would like to become better acquainted, and that he wanted to show them that personal freedom was not suppressed in the Soviet Union. They accepted this invitation, and the officer, whose name was Sokolov, hailed a taxi. After they alighted from the taxi and were walking to the apartment, someone suddenly took a flash photo of Birgitta and her friend. Sokolov said it was probably the work of hooligans and asked them not to be alarmed. He lived in a well-furnished apartment with his wife, mother, and child. They all spent a few hours discussing Russian history and culture, and listening to the Voice of America and other Western broadcasts. Sokolov asked no questions concerning Birgitta's work, and he invited her and Miss Forsberg to visit him again on 21 July, which they did.

On 30 August Sokolov phoned Birgitta at the embassy and asked her to go out with him, either for lunch or to the theater, but the connection was bad and they were cut off before establishing where or when they were to meet. She made no effort to contact Sokolov.

Birgitta last saw Sokolov at a theater in Moscow about a year later in the company of the woman she had met at his apartment. They had a friendly chat and Sokolov invited her to visit him, but no date

was set. This was the last time she saw Sokolov. Birgitta knew no more about Sokolov other than that he was an officer, apparently a gentleman, and spoke excellent English.

During her first year in Moscow, Birgitta met a Professor Engman of Stockholm who was interested in the Russian Orthodox Church and its art, especially icons. Engman was an enthusiastic Russophile and had contacts with Patriarch Alexei and other church luminaries. Through him Birgitta met many church officials and personalities, and she helped him distribute various religious pamphlets and books which were probably printed in Western Europe by émigré circles. The material was strictly religious in content and not anti-Communist. Birgitta also received letters from Engman which she delivered to various Soviet friends of his. The letters, books, and pamphlets she distributed for Engman were usually kept in her apartment and thus were accessible to her maid.

On 2 March 1962 Professor Engman introduced Birgitta to one Oleg Sergeyevich Belov at the Hotel Ukraine, and they all went on a tour of Moscow churches. Oleg told her he was an official in the office of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church. She also met Oleg in the company of Engman on 8 and 15 March.

On 11 April Birgitta met Oleg alone for the first time. She went to his office and gave him a small package she had received from Engman, and he made a date with her for the following evening at her apartment. Thus began her romance with Oleg, and during the period from April 1962 until August 1964 she had 100 meetings with him, either at her apartment or in restaurants and cafes. To cover her meetings with Oleg, which were illegal since members of the embassy staff were forbidden to have social contacts with Soviet citizens, Birgitta always told her ambassador that she was delivering materials for Professor Engman. The ambassador finally forbade her to have further contact with Oleg or Orthodox priests. Birgitta's reaction was to stop reporting such contacts to the ambassador.

Oleg told Birgitta that he was married to a woman with an education and an intellect inferior to his and that he had nothing in common with his wife. He lamented his unhappy marriage and apparently found an easy and welcome refuge with Birgitta. Oleg was about 35 years old. He said that he had attended a seminary for four years, was one of six children, and that his father was an engineer who had died when Oleg was very young. Oleg said that he intended to

write a book on the Orthodox Church in China, and that he would like to become a priest when he was 50 years old. Birgitta did not know where Oleg lived, but said he sometimes slept at his office. Oleg spoke some English and always appeared to have plenty of money and lived well. He said he received a bonus of 300 rubles a month from the Patriarch because he worked so hard. He claimed to be known as anti-Communist and pro-West. Birgitta sometimes purchased western clothes for him from her colleagues at the embassy, and gave him an occasional bottle of liquor, but never money.

On 17 January 1964, almost two years after their first meeting, Oleg took Birgitta by taxi to a woods where there was a lovely small church. He told the cab driver to wait, and they walked to the church, which unfortunately was closed, so they took a stroll through the woods instead. They walked about for nearly two hours. Upon their return they found the taxi surrounded by soldiers. An army major approached them and announced that they were under arrest for trespassing on a military reservation. (There is in fact a large reservoir in the vicinity.) The major interrogated them on the spot, took their names, places of employment and so forth, and announced that he would send reports of the incident to the Patriarch's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that the Swedish Embassy would be contacted on the case. Oleg became terribly upset, lamenting that his life would be ruined. Birgitta was concerned because her contacts with Oleg had been against the ambassador's orders. She felt more sorry for Oleg, however, and held herself responsible for the incident. In the taxi on the way home, Oleg suggested they go to the house of a friend of his who might be able to help them. The friend, Ivan Basilyevich, had a private apartment which he shared with his mother. He was employed as an economist. Oleg and Birgitta told Ivan the story of what had happened in the woods, and on the basis of his friendship with Oleg, Ivan said he would try to help them, that he had a friend who was with the KGB. He then phoned this friend. Andre Popov, explained the case, and Andre was heard to say over the telephone, "If these people are your friends, if they are 100 per cent faithful, then I will help." Ivan assured him they were his friends and were trustworthy.

In about 30 minutes Andre arrived. He appeared to be about 45 years old, corpulent, almost six feet tall, with dark hair, small teeth with silver dental work, a generally unpleasant, ugly face. He indicated that he spoke only Russian.

Andre asked Birgitta and Oleg to repeat the entire story of their arrest, and when they finished, he promised he would help them as much as he could because they were friends of Ivan's. Andre asked Birgitta what she did at the Swedish Embassy and followed this up by asking her to write out the facts of the incident in her own handwriting in Russian. Birgitta continued to plead with Andre to help them because she did not want Oleg to get into trouble. Andre told them they were not to discuss the incident with anyone, that if they did he would be unable to help them. They promised this in writing. In their presence, Andre telephoned the arresting officer's superior, an unidentified general, and asked that he take no action on the reports and send them to Andre's office. Andre again stressed that the affair was a very serious one because the area where Birgitta and Oleg had trespassed contained a large reservoir. They could easily have poisoned the water.

While Birgitta was writing her account of the incident, Andre asked her also to include her impressions of the Soviet Union and its people. Ivan advised her to say that she approved of everything she saw in Russia. This she refused to do because she didn't like the political system, although she did like the people and the country. The report contained only her favorable impressions. When Birgitta had finished, they had vodka and snacks to celebrate the "settling" of the incident. Before they left Ivan's apartment, Andre told Birgitta and Oleg to meet him the following evening in Ivan's apartment when he would let them know if he had been able to stop an investigation.

The next evening Oleg and Birgitta took a taxi to Ivan's apartment. Andre was already there when they arrived. He produced the report submitted by the major and told them to read it and check to see that it was accurate. They both agreed that the report was correct and Birgitta asked Andre to tear it up. He said that he couldn't do that, but that he would keep it in a safe place in case anyone ever asked for additional details. Perhaps he would be able to destroy it later. Andre asked Birgitta to sign a paper to the effect that she would not discuss the case with anyone.

Barely one week after his "arrest," Oleg travelled to the United States as a member of the Grand Patriarch Alexei's delegation. He explained to Birgitta that he had been unexpectedly selected to accompany the delegation since two other men originally scheduled to

go had been hurt in an automobile accident, and that he had not originally been chosen because he was known to be pro-West and anti-Communist.

Near the end of April Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment at lunch time and asked her to join him at a restaurant for lunch the next day. She agreed. There had been no contact between them for about three and a half months, since the last meeting in Ivan's apartment, and Birgitta had not expected to see Andre again.

The next day Birgitta went by taxi to the restaurant where Andre awaited her. They were served lunch in a private room, and it was apparent from the deference shown to them that Andre was a privileged patron. During lunch he talked pleasantly about many things, without mentioning Birgitta's work. When they had finished lunch, he gave her a brief newspaper article in English and asked her to translate it into Russian. Birgitta said it was difficult for her to do without a dictionary, but that she would attempt it. The article concerned book printing. When she finished, Andre remarked that she had done a good job, although she was unable to determine from his comments whether he could read or speak English. Andre said he would like to meet her again, but that restaurant meetings were difficult because he was well known to many higher ranking employees of various diplomatic installations in Moscow. He asked her if she would meet him elsewhere and she agreed. Andre told her he would phone her at a later date, would send a cab for her, and then instructed her not to discuss her meetings with him with anyone, not even Oleg. Birgitta agreed to keep their meetings secret.

About a week later Andre phoned, again at lunch time, and made arrangements for dinner the following evening. He told Birgitta he would send a cab which would pick her up around the corner from her apartment at seven in the evening and gave her the number of the taxi. He told her the cab driver would deliver her to the meeting place and that she would not have to pay the fare. After this phone call Birgitta began to think that the entire affair was rather strange, but decided to go along with the plan because she had given her word that she would meet Andre. Her affair with Oleg was not affected by the meetings with Andre, nor did Andre appear to have any interest in a more personal relationship with her.

Birgitta was picked up at the designated time and place by a new, very clean cab. The driver opened the door from within and

drove her around Moscow for at least 45 minutes and then stopped suddenly in front of a large apartment complex with a center courtyard. Birgitta has no idea of the taxi's route, but remembers passing the Ukraina Hotel and the Sokol Metro Station.

Andre was waiting for her at the entrance to the courtyard. Birgitta told him she was frightened as a result of being driven aimlessly around the city, but Andre told her not to be alarmed, since he was her protector and safeguard. She then said that she would not go with him unless he told her where they were going for dinner. Andre again said he was too well known to be seen in public with her, and that it was in her best interests to go to private places. He was therefore taking her to dinner at the apartment of an uncle who was away on holiday at his country dacha. Andre said he always looked after the apartment when his uncle was absent. Birgitta accepted this story and went with him across the courtyard to a ground floor apartment. The apartment was well-furnished and in one of the rooms a sumptuous dinner had been readied. Birgitta wanted to know if anyone else was in the apartment and Andre suggested she make a search and see for herself, which she did, finding no one. They consumed much vodka and had a delicious meal. Birgitta is unable to remember much of what was discussed, but she was impressed with Andre's good manners. She thinks they talked about the theater and art, and says that Andre did not ask questions concerning her work.

After dinner Andre served coffee and brandy. He then asked Birgitta if she would do a favor for him and translate something from English to Swedish. She did not want to do it, but agreed after Andre said, "I helped you. Why don't you do me one small favor?" Although Birgitta was vaguely aware that this was probably the beginning of a change in her relationship with Andre, she protested no further. The article concerned economic relations between West Germany and Indonesia and she remembers that it was not a newspaper article.

During the evening Andre stressed that his only aim was to help Birgitta and Oleg out of their difficulties, but that occasionally he would ask small favors of her. Birgitta in turn told him that the only reason she was maintaining contact with him was to prevent Oleg from getting into any further difficulties. She thus played directly into Andre's hands. The dinner party lasted two and a half hours and

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the cab took her home. At the end Andre again warned her not to discuss their meetings with Oleg.

Five days later, on May 12, Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment during lunch and made arrangements for dinner that evening. She was picked up by cab at seven o'clock at the usual corner, and again a long, devious route was followed to the same apartment complex. As before, a feast had been prepared before her arrival in Andre's "uncle's" apartment, and during dinner the conversation again revolved around art and culture. During dinner Birgitta gave Andre a letter she had written in Russian in which she explained that she was an employee of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that she had taken a secrecy oath, and that it was forbidden for employees of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to have uncontrolled social contact with Russians because the people in Western countries believed that the Soviet Union was a hostile country. Andre read the letter through and put it in his pocket. He then said that the Soviet Union was friendly towards Western countries, and pointed out the benefits of living in the USSR. He asked Birgitta about her family, her relatives, her personal life and about her financial status. She answered all his questions freely and truthfully. Andre said that what she did at the Swedish Embassy was of no interest to him. The meeting lasted until 11:30 p.m. and Birgitta was taken home by cab.

On May 20, 1964, Birgitta and a Swedish colleague at the embassy, a Miss Larsson and her mother, went by train to Leningrad on a three-day Intourist excursion. When Birgitta told Oleg of her plans he said that he too would be in Leningrad on May 21. As Birgitta was to be staying at the Hotel Astoria, they made plans to meet in the lobby there at five o'clock on that date.

When Birgitta and the Larssons arrived in Leningrad via the night train from Moscow, they found that the Astoria was fully booked and that they were to be billeted at the Hotel Yeuropeyskaya. Although Birgitta waited for Oleg at the Astoria at five o'clock he did not appear. However, he phoned her at seven saying he had traced her whereabouts by inquiring at the Astoria. He also had a room in the Yeuropeyskaya on the same floor at the end of the corridor. That evening and the following day Oleg accompanied Birgitta and the Larssons on sightseeing trips about Leningrad.

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On May 23 Oleg told Birgitta that he had to fly back to Moscow that evening and invited her to his room to say goodbye at four p.m. They had wine and cheese. Suddenly Oleg said, "Let me make love to you." Birgitta objected, saying that she was afraid of hidden cameras and concealed microphones. To reassure her, Oleg suggested that they search the room. This they did, but found nothing. They drew the curtains, but not the drapes, locked the door and remained together for about two hours. Oleg left for the airport soon thereafter, and Birgitta and the Larssons returned to Moscow that evening by train.

A week and a half later, Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment and invited her to dine. The evening followed the now familiar routine of the rambling taxi ride, and an elaborate meal with vodka followed by coffee and brandy. Andre began to question Birgitta about her work at the embassy and about the other Swedish employees there. Birgitta is unable to recall what she told Andre because she had had so much to drink. She does remember that he asked if other women at the embassy had Russian boyfriends and that she replied affirmatively. Andre then began asking more specific questions about Birgitta's work, about her ambassador's reporting, and whether he sent secret reports to Sweden on his discussions with his West German, American and British counterparts. Birgitta became angry at this line of questioning and refused to answer. Andre arose and left her alone for about 15 minutes. When he returned he told her she should consider his questions in light of the help he had given her and Oleg, that it was assistance between friends, but that he would never ask her such questions again. He cautioned her again not to discuss any of this with Oleg and gave her his private phone number, but did not permit her to write it down. As she was leaving, Andre gave her a silver vase. Birgitta at first refused to accept it but he insisted, saying that she had given him so much of her time. He also gave her a sealed envelope and told her to open it when she arrived at her apartment. When Birgitta arrived home she opened the envelope and found 200 Swedish krone. She kept this money.

A week later, on 10 June 1964, Oleg phoned Birgitta at home at lunch time. He sounded extremely nervous and said he had to see her because something terrible had happened. They met on a street corner after work that evening because Oleg said he could not go to her apartment. He said that that morning he had been picked up

on the street by three men who pushed him into a car and took him to an Office of the Ministry of Interior and interrogated him for three hours about his trip to Leningrad. He was shown a photograph of himself and Birgitta walking on a street in Leningrad but his interrogators told him they had much more information regarding his Leningrad trip, including compromising films. He wailed that he would probably lose his job and appeared to be completely distraught. According to Oleg, his friend Ivan, who had interceded before, was ill in a hospital about 200 kilometers away. Since Birgitta had promised Andre not to reveal his private phone number she suggested to Oleg that they call Ivan's mother to see if she knew how they could get in touch with Andre. This Oleg did and about 10 p.m. reached Andre who told them to meet him at a nearby restaurant. Oleg repeated to Andre the tale of his encounter with the three unknown men and of his interrogation. Andre asked Oleg to describe the office he had been in, and then said that the situation was very bad, because the office described handled all the sensitive cases and that it would be difficult to stop the investigation. He promised to do his best, telling Birgitta, not Oleg, to phone him the next day at his office.

When Birgitta phoned Andre he said that he had all the files and would meet her the next day, June 12, at 7 p.m. at the apartment where they regularly met.

Accordingly Birgitta was picked up on June 12 by cab and taken to the uncle's apartment, where Andre awaited her. The usual dinner had been prepared. During coffee and brandy, Andre brought out some files which he showed to her and said they concerned not only Oleg but her too. He also handed her a sealed package of film and told her she could open it, that he was not interested, but he advised her to look at about one meter of the film. She looked at the strip of film and saw that it depicted everything that had occurred in Oleg's hotel room in Leningrad. According to Birgitta, the films were of excellent quality. After scanning the films, she admitted everything that had happened. Andre then handed her another small package and told her to open it. Wrapped inside were transcripts of all her phone conversations with Oleg in Leningrad and also a reel of tape. Andre told her the tape was a sound recording of everything that occurred in the hotel room. Birgitta did not wish to hear it. Andre then asked her what she thought of the "entire ugly affair" and she agreed that it was a terrible mess, especially for Oleg, who was married. Andre countered that it was also very bad for her, but

that she of course could always leave Russia and start life anew, whereas Oleg could not get away. Birgitta pleaded with Andre and promised that she would do anything she could for him if he would help Oleg. Andre thought this over a long time and finally said that he would try. He told her all the files, films and tape would be transferred to his safe on condition that she write in her own handwriting the following letter in Russian.

"Dear Mr. Andre . . . :

I thank you for all the help you have given me and I promise you that I will not divulge our contacts to anyone, neither the Ambassador, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Swedish intelligence service, and that I will help you in the future in your work."

Birgitta signed this note in her true name.

After this, Andre was very friendly and assured Birgitta that he would help her. She returned to her apartment about 11 o'clock by cab.

The next day Birgitta phoned Oleg and invited him to her apartment that evening, to tell him what had happened and what was in the files Andre had shown her. Oleg appeared to be completely flabbergasted. He got very drunk, but said nothing.

Several days later, as a result of the strain of her involvement with Oleg and Andre, Birgitta went to see an embassy doctor who advised her to go on leave. She spent three weeks at a health resort about 200 kilometers from Moscow. A few days after returning from the health resort, Birgitta flew to Sweden for a short holiday with her family and friends.

She returned to Moscow on July 28 and met Oleg for lunch on the 29th. She mentioned that she had discussed their relationship with some of her friends in Sweden. Oleg was obviously disturbed by this information and said that he wanted to talk about it in greater detail in the evening.

When Oleg arrived at her apartment, he said he had phoned Andre and told him about Birgitta's conversations with her friends in Sweden and that Andre was furious and said he never wanted to see her again. However, Oleg was able to persuade him to meet Birgitta just one more time and he had agreed to come to a dinner arranged by Oleg that evening at the Hotel Praga. Birgitta also agreed

to attend but told Oleg that she would do the talking, that he was to keep silent.

When they met Andre appeared to be angry with Birgitta. She explained that she had discussed Oleg with an old girl friend and her husband who were sympathetic regarding her difficulties and merely advised her to be careful. Andre then asked the identity of her Swedish girl friend and husband and wanted to know if they were members of the Swedish intelligence service. He was assured they were not. Andre then wondered aloud if Birgitta might go to her ambassador with the entire story. She replied that she was brave, but not that brave and promised that if she ever intended to do such a thing she would tell Andre at least three days ahead. By this time Andre probably believed with some justification that he could talk her out of anything, provided he had sufficient warning.

In response to a question from Andre, Birgitta said that it was possible that she would soon be transferred to another post because she had been in Moscow quite a long time, but that she had no idea where she would be sent. When she said she would like to remain in Moscow, Andre promised that if she gave him the name of her replacement he would see that she would not be issued a visa. Birgitta brushed this aside as improper. They parted in a friendly manner and in the presence of Oleg, Andre made a date with Birgitta for August 5 at the Sovietskaya Hotel.

When Birgitta arrived at the hotel Andre was awaiting her in a VIP suite which consisted of several elaborately furnished rooms. There was a cold buffet. Andre repeated the points covered in his previous talk, emphasizing that Birgitta was to notify him, in advance, of any intention to talk to her ambassador. He questioned her again on the kinds of reports the ambassador wrote and asked her if she had any contacts with the Swedish intelligence service. She replied that she knew no one in that organization. Andre told her that if she needed financial assistance he would help her. She declined his offer. She did say that Oleg was now afraid to come to her apartment because someone might see him and report his visit and asked Andre if he could help. He told her that he would arrange with the concierge for Oleg's freedom of entry and exit to her apartment. Birgitta then asked him if her apartment was bugged and her phone tapped, and he assured her he would have everything checked. He asked her if the Swedish Embassy had its own technical sweepers and

she replied she didn't know, but that she was certain that some of the embassy offices and residences had been examined. Andre again asked her if two of the other embassy secretaries, whom he named, had Russian boyfriends, to which she answered affirmatively. He did not ask for the names of the boyfriends, but warned her not to discuss their relationship with the other women.

On August 11 Birgitta phoned Andre as arranged at the last meeting and made an appointment to meet him at the Sovietskaya Hotel the next evening. In the embassy mail the next day there was a letter from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs notifying her that she would be leaving Moscow on 18 August. Andre asked how the letter had arrived and she said by diplomatic courier. He asked her if she had mentioned her impending departure to anyone and she said only to the other secretary in her immediate office. He then wanted to know if she had spoken with anyone from the security section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when she was home. She replied that she had had the normal security interview in which she was asked if she had any contacts with Soviet citizens, to which she had answered negatively. Andre asked for an outline, including personality assessments, of the employees in the security section. Birgitta told him she didn't know anyone employed there. He asked for the name of the person who had interviewed her and was told it was a Miss Ekberg. Andre asked no further questions about this section because Birgitta told him all the people were listed overtly in the ministry personnel roster. He then returned to the subject of the ambassador's reports and pressed her to furnish him with copies. She put him off by promising to bring them to him next meeting. Andre told her the reports were not really secret and that he usually received copies of all such correspondence. However, if she could give him copies, it would save much time since the normal channel required three weeks, and they were further held up because of translation problems. At the end of their chat Andre gave Birgitta an expensive icon as a present. When she pointed out that it was forbidden to take icons out of Russia, he replied that he would arrange everything for her.

Birgitta met Andre the day before she left at the Sovietskaya Hotel for coffee and cognac. Andre was very anxious to know if word had gotten out concerning their relationship and if this had anything to do with Birgitta's sudden recall. She assured him that it was routine and that if there were a problem the ambassador would not be giving

a dinner in her honor. This appeared to reassure him. Andre told her that he had no future need of her assistance, but that if he ever did need her help he would contact her by sending a colleague in his name. He said he was sorry to see her leave because she loved the Russian people and country so much. He asked if she intended to remain in contact with Oleg and upon hearing that she would write to him, gave her an address in Moscow to use, to insure that Oleg would receive her letters.

Andre instructed her to write to Oleg in German, and to sign her letters, "Elsa." He said he would pick up the letters, translate them into Russian and deliver them to Oleg and would do the same with Oleg's letters to her. Andre again assured her of financial assistance if she should need it and promised her transportation and expense-free trips to the Soviet Union. When Birgitta asked if she would be able to see Oleg again, Andre promised he would send him to some western country, such as Switzerland, for a three week holiday whenever she wished it. They parted as great friends and Andre told her he would contact her if he ever needed her help.

Later that evening, Birgitta and Oleg visited Ivan and his mother to say goodbye. Ivan gave her a book as a present. Then Birgitta and Oleg had dinner and Oleg presented her with a beautiful icon, allegedly from the Patriarch's museum. Oleg told her he would not come to the airport to see her off because he was too upset about her departure. Birgitta departed Moscow by air for Sweden on August 18, 1964.

Between 18 August and 30 September 1964, Birgitta was on leave in Sweden. She sent Oleg several post cards to his office address and signed her name as "Juliana Michelovna." It is not clear why she did not use the address Andre gave her. Probably she was under the impression that by not doing so, she could ensure the privacy of her letters to Oleg.

On 30 September 1964, Birgitta arrived in Algiers and took up her duties as secretary to the ambassador. She moved into a small apartment in the Swedish compound and bought a Citroen. Through another Swedish Embassy secretary, whose mother was Russian, Birgitta met a Russian émigré family, the Vinogradovs, who lived nearby. Birgitta enjoyed visiting this family, with whom she spoke Russian and talked about Russian art and culture. She sent Oleg several

letters through the Swedish diplomatic pouch, in care of a girl friend at the Swedish Embassy in Moscow who delivered the letters to Oleg at his office. In Algiers, Birgitta became friendly with another Swede who was married. However, it was a platonic relationship, apparently because he wished it to be so. Birgitta received no mail from Oleg.

On 30 November 1965, more than a year after her arrival in Algiers, Birgitta went to visit the Vinogradov family. As she was parking her car another automobile with two men in it pulled up immediately behind her. One of them got out and came over to her car, opened the door and got in. It was Andre. Birgitta was very surprised to see him and asked how he had found her. He said, "I saw you driving by and I never forget people I like." They made a date for dinner on 4 December.

Andre picked Birgitta up at a prearranged place near her apartment in a taxi and they went to a restaurant. He gave her some presents from Oleg, a letter from Oleg, three photographs of Oleg and an antique wine carafe. Andre was concerned about whether Birgitta knew anyone in the restaurant and was relieved when she said she didn't. After they had dined, Andre asked her the names of the personnel at the Swedish Embassy in Algeria and about their former posts. She gave him as much information as she could remember, later explaining that none of this information was secret. During this part of the conversation Andre took notes. This was the first time he had ever done so.

On 8 December Andre phoned Birgitta at her apartment and asked her to have dinner with him again. In the restaurant he gave her a present, an egg-shaped cut stone allegedly from the Ural Mountains possessing some religious significance. He also gave her an expensive jewel box. Andre said he was unable to eat much because he was suffering from a stomach ailment, so the meeting was very short. No business was discussed during the meeting and Andre said he would phone later.

On 11 December Andre again took Birgitta to dinner. This time he arrived in a grey Simca driven by a stranger whom he introduced as, "My good friend, Vladilen." Andre said that in the future Birgitta would maintain contact with Vladilen because he had to leave Algiers in a few days. Birgitta was agreeable to this arrangement. During dinner Andre gave her a bottle of vodka and two cans of caviar. In turn she gave him a bottle of Martel cognac, following

a pattern she had established while in Moscow. After they finished dinner, Andre said, "I haven't had time to buy you an appropriate gift, so please give me your handbag." He placed an envelope in the bag and returned it to her. Andre said that he would be leaving Algiers soon and assured Birgitta that Vladilen was an interesting man, an engineer by training. Andre stressed that he had to go to Tunisia and asked Birgitta to give Vladilen her phone number, which she did. Vladilen appeared to be reluctant to take it, or at least gave the impression that he didn't know what he was supposed to do with it. Birgitta did not believe that he was a member of the KGB because he did not press her for information, and did not appear to know anything of her background. In any event, they had nothing in common to discuss.

Vladilen phoned Birgitta at her apartment on 15 December and made arrangements to pick her up for dinner that evening at the place where Andre had met her. Vladilen seemed to have difficulty adjusting to Birgitta and near the end of the meal he suddenly blurted, "Give me a list of all the Swedish people in Algiers." Birgitta answered that she didn't know many people but he persisted and said for her to bring the list to their next meeting. When Birgitta asked why such a list was needed, Vladilen answered that it was for her own security, that he wanted to check the names to see if any Swedish intelligence people were on it. Birgitta told him he could get such a list by writing to the Swedish Embassy and asking for it. He became confused and said that he couldn't do that. Apparently disturbed at the way the meeting was going, Vladilen decided to take Birgitta home. He dropped her off about 11 p.m. in the neighborhood of her apartment and told her he would phone her again.

On 19 December Birgitta received a phone call from Andre who said he was back from Tunisia and would like to see her. She said she was busy and asked him to call the next day. When Andre phoned again on 20 December Birgitta again said that she was too busy to see him, that she would like to but unfortunately she had too much to do at the embassy. This was the last time she spoke with Andre. She never saw or heard from him again.

On 27 December Vladilen phoned Birgitta and she agreed to meet him at the usual place. By this time she had made up her mind to break off the contact. She wrote a note in Russian in which she said

she did not enjoy Vladilen's small dinner parties nor the indiscreet questions which followed and that she did not want to see him again. Vladilen read the letter and seemed to be both impressed and embarrassed and said, "Help me please, and go to a restaurant with me." When she refused he demanded that she give him a list of the members of the Swedish colony in Algeria. She refused to discuss it and told Vladilen that he had read her letter and should understand that she did not want to see him again. She left him standing on the street. The meeting had lasted ten minutes.

About three weeks later Vladilen phoned Birgitta at her apartment and said that he would like to see her about the letter she had given him at their last meeting. Birgitta agreed to meet him, mainly because she wanted to see if any mention of Oleg would be made at this time. Vladilen invited her to dinner in a restaurant but she refused to go. She had the impression that he was afraid and didn't know what to do next. He told her he had sent the note she had given him to Andre and that Andre had been very surprised. Vladilen then asked her in Andre's name to give him a list of her close Swedish friends so that he could check it for persons dangerous to her security. She again refused and told him to ask the embassy. He then asked if she would give him a report about Swedish technological and economic assistance to Africa which she also refused to do. He asked for copies of correspondence which she had access to and was again refused. Every refusal by Birgitta brought a warning from Vladilen that he would inform Andre. Before they parted, Vladilen pleaded for her help and cooperation, and when she continued to refuse he told her goodbye on the street.

By this time Birgitta had informed her platonic Swedish friend of her troubles with the Soviets. He told her not to worry, that they would eventually drop the case. There is reason to believe that Birgitta had transferred some of her affection from Oleg to her new male friend, but apparently he did not wish to enter into a liaison with her.

Birgitta met Vladilen again on 18 February 1966 only because he told her he had a letter from Andre. While they were dining Vladilen handed her the following letter which was written in English.

Dear Juliana,

I am very surprised and disappointed with what Vladilen has written concerning your behavior. I don't understand your attitude in view of your excellent help in the past, especially in translating articles concerning

Indonesia, the information about the Swedish Embassy personnel in Moscow, the excellent information concerning the Intelligence Section in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the information concerning Swedish Embassy employees in Algeria. Your information was of great help to me in my work, and I expect you to answer all of Vladilen's questions. If you are unwilling to cooperate, I will then send all the material I have regarding you to Vladilen. You understand quite well what Vladilen will do with this, and that as a result you will be in a very awkward situation.

The letter did not mention Oleg. After reading it, Birgitta asked Vladilen if she could keep it but he said no and told her to give it back to him. She said she would have to have time to think over what to do and explained that at the moment she was upset because her mother in Sweden was ill, which was true, and that she might have to go home. She asked Vladilen not to press her for an answer but to phone her around the end of February. If she was not at home it meant that she was in Sweden and he should call her later. She promised not to discuss her situation with anyone.

Following this meeting with Vladilen, Birgitta could no longer stand the strain of her mother's illness in addition to her own problems with Vladilen and Andre, and phoned one of her colleagues in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sweden to ask for help. The ministry turned the case over to the Swedish security service.

Birgitta was recalled to Sweden for an interview with the service on 27 February 1966 and remained there until 29 February. Arrangements were made for her to return to Algeria to close her apartment and return home permanently.

On 9 March 1966 Vladilen phoned Birgitta at her apartment at 7:15 a.m. in Algiers and asked to see her, saying he had phoned a hundred times before. She told him she would be unable to see him before 20 March because of the pressure of her work, knowing that she would leave Algiers on 19 March. However, she had prepared a letter for Andre which she had planned to give to Vladilen but the Swedish service forbade her to do so. In the letter she had written that she still considered Andre her friend.

Birgitta returned to Sweden 19 March 1966, and was assigned, pending further investigation, to a non-sensitive position in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Epilogue

The Swedish security service described Birgitta as a 52 year old woman who looks about 60 years old, but who believes she has the charm and beauty of a young girl. She told one of the representatives of the service that she was like a young woman of 25, and she believes it. She is easily attracted to men and falls in love with anyone who flatters her or gives her attention. She told one interviewer that she was still in love with Oleg and refused to believe he was an agent of the KGB. She asked that this be proved to her, and said that she would leave for Switzerland on a moment's notice to meet him if she knew he was there. The fact that Oleg is 16 years her junior does not appear to her to be unreasonable or cause for concern.

In the opinion of the Swedish service, Birgitta gave them a self-serving account of her relationship with the KGB and of the information she passed to them. Certainly any reckoning of the time, money, and personnel invested in her by the Soviets indicates that they must have received information of far greater value than she has indicated.

Altogether she had about 100 meetings with Oleg in Moscow, about 16 meetings with Andre in KGB safehouses in Moscow, and five meetings with Vladilen in Algiers. To date, no attempt has been made by the Soviets to recontact her since her return to Sweden.

Birgitta's handling by Andre reflected a shrewd knowledge of her character. He catered to her love for fine things, presented her with gifts of "new icons" described to her as antiques, exploited her fondness for gourmet meals, resplendent furnishings and good manners. In contrast, Vladilen's lack of assurance and poor manners repelled her and had much to do with her decision to end the affair. This case illustrates KGB technique at its best and worst. It also exemplifies a very sophisticated maneuver in which blackmail was applied in a backhanded way, deliberately causing the culprit to feel a moral obligation to "protect" the person who was actually primarily responsible for her troubles.²

²For an account of another fairly recent episode illustrative of KGB techniques, see Cdr. Arthur Courtney's *Sailor in a Russian Frame*, London (Johnson) 1968, reviewed in *Studies* XIII 1, p. 87 ff.

Prospects for push-button manipulation of the unwieldy intricacies of economic data.

COMPUTERS IN ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE

Michael C. McCracken

It is Monday, 21 May 1973, another day in the life of Jim Bond, analyst of the Soviet economy. While drinking his morning coffee he looks through his "mail," the contents of his in-box. This he does by his remote console, identifying himself to the central computer, and asking for mail. On the cathode-ray tube (CRT) screen appears a listing of descriptive titles with other identifying information and data on the length and priority of each item. Jim selects one—an administrative announcement—scans it, indicates how to dispose of it, and sees the list reappear without it.

Next he selects an article translated from a Soviet journal, and as he reads it from the CRT screen he considers under what descriptors it should be made retrievable for future reference. Some descriptors have already been attached to the article by a computer program and by other analysts; he adds others from the viewpoint of his specialty. This system assures a thorough cross-indexing and future availability to analysts of all descriptions.

He goes through all his mail this way, dumping some articles, reserving others for later reading, and adding some, with appropriate descriptors, to the permanent files. Next year he expects to be able to read articles in Russian from his CRT; the programmers have yet to complete the required Cyrillic alphabet display routines and link in a dictionary routine to aid the imperfect Russian reader with automatic definitions on demand.

The phone rings: an urgent inquiry from the Congressional liaison office as to the amount of tin exported by the USSR to Ruritania during the past four years. Jim turns to his console and interrogates the file of Soviet foreign trade data, which has the amounts of tin exported to Ruritania in 1970 and 1971. From another file he gets a forecast of the data not yet published for 1972. Then he interrogates the file of ship

and cargo movements and is given all tin shipments to Ruritania from the USSR in the period from January to date in 1973. In a simple programming language he instructs the computer to sum up this cargo data in a figure for the first part of 1973. Finally he enters all this information and his comments on it onto the console in a message routed to the caller. A bell will ring at the latter's console as the message is entered into his mail.

Later that morning he participates with other analysts in an evaluation of the latest economic data released by the Soviets. One of the first items is the production of cotton cloth. The new Soviet data indicate a 7 percent increase in output but the previous forecast was only 3 percent. Each analyst examines this divergence from his own viewpoint. Jim Bond retrieves the data for production of cotton, exports and imports of cotton, and inventories of cotton. He concludes that there is sufficient cotton available to support a 7 percent increase without reducing inventories substantially. Meanwhile, other analysts are retrieving information on textile plant capacity, consumption of cotton cloth by the civilian and military sectors, and other data related to cotton cloth production. A senior analyst at a CRT display reads the comments of each contributing analyst and prepares a summary at the console that is then displayed at each analyst's console for concurrence or comment. A similar procedure is followed for the rest of the data. Those items agreeing closely with forecasts (most of them) require little additional analysis. However, each major divergence is examined. Subsequently, the OER forecasting group will examine their "misses" and, if possible, adjust their econometric models.

After lunch we find Jim Bond quietly reading a book about the Soviet economy. A bell rings at his console indicating an incoming message. He logs into the system and receives the message that his intelligence memorandum prepared yesterday has been approved by the division chief except for minor revisions required. A list of the desired changes is displayed. Jim then retrieves the draft from the computer files and begins entering the required revisions. He only enters desired changes—the old draft is updated and line justification and pagination changed by the computer program. Upon completion from the console he will file memorandum in the division chief's "mail," but *not* ring the bell!

Jim locks his console and prepares to end a typical working day for an economic intelligence analyst.

The story may read like science fiction but everything in it is "state of the art" in economics and computer science. The computer hardware exists (remote consoles, peripheral storage, large central processors); the computer software is emerging (on-line, time-sharing monitors, file management programs, and interactive programming languages); and the tools of econometrics, programming, and systems design can be mastered. All that remains is to combine these elements—a task which *can* be accomplished during the next five years.

Two preconditions for the adoption of these techniques are, first, demonstration of the potential gains and, second, the education of analysts in the use of computers and quantitative methods. Programs are under way to fulfill these preconditions.

Currently the applications of computer techniques to economic intelligence are few in number. Personnel familiar with economic problems and computer systems design are still scarce. But the potential applications abound. To obtain a better idea of how computers are currently used in this field and how they might be used in the future, let us distinguish the several functions an economic intelligence analyst performs and examine the current and potential applications of computers under each of these functions. There are three primary functions—file management, analysis, and the communication of intelligence. Computers can aid analysts in all of these by increasing accuracy, saving time, and reducing costs.

File Management

This term covers the process of scanning documents for relevance, extracting data, filing the extracted information according to some system, and retrieving information from the files in response to questions—the things we saw Jim Bond doing during his day. CIA has several operational projects using computer techniques to manage economic files.¹ These files, periodically updated and validated, provide the data base of reports both for the use of CIA analysts and for dissemination to the community at large. The advantages of having them automated are speed and consistency in the retrieval of information. Furthermore, they can frequently be maintained by intelligence assistants, and the analysts freed for other tasks that are less routine.

¹ Notably concerning Chinese nutrition, Communist economic assistance, and Soviet foreign trade.

In the future the scope of computer-aided file management will be greatly expanded. It is now technically feasible to have a central data bank containing information on the international trade, income, population, military establishments, economic organizations, prices, and other economic variables of most countries of the world. Such a central store would greatly enhance the ability of research components to rely on strict quantitative methods in their estimates and would ensure that the same data are used by all.

As the CIA central reference files become more completely automated,² the economic analysts should be able to make retrospective searches of intelligence documents on a variety of topics, thereby reducing their need to maintain their own files for all anticipated problems. Work is also under way in R&D components on automatic systems for scanning text and extracting desired information from it.

At present the updating of ADP files is periodic, by batches, and printouts are also provided periodically. Many estimating activities, however, require continuously current data. Time-sharing systems (under which the computer can serve a number of customers at remote locations simultaneously) can provide, at relatively low cost, the required currency. Therefore, it is planned to put the files of international ship and cargo movements to critical areas, for example, into a system in which data can be entered and retrieved at consoles in the analysts' offices.

All these developments point to a time in the not too distant future when each analyst, or at least each branch, will have a remote console which will provide immediate access to a wide variety of files of documents and data, and enable the analyst to retrieve and manipulate quantities of information quickly, cheaply, and accurately.

Analysis

The analysis function encompasses the use of judgment, the performance of calculations, the application of economic theory, and mathematical modeling. Computers are now used to calculate the Soviet national income and product accounts and compare them with the US accounts, to calculate the indexes (percentages of increase from a given base) of Soviet industrial production, and to calculate foreign aid requirements and repayments under various hypothetical situ-

² See Paul A. Borel's "Automation for Information Control" in *Studies* XI 1, p. 25 ff.

ations. The use of the computer on these projects has eliminated a substantial number of hours of desk calculator work. Analysts also can test the effect of various assumptions on the results of the calculations (e.g., the sensitivity of the distribution of GNP by sector to changes in the input-output table or turnover tax component of final demand), an exercise not always feasible before because of the amount of calculation required.

Work has begun on the construction of an econometric model (actually several models) of the Soviet economy based on the 1959 input-output table published in the USSR in 1961. The model is a set of equations describing the interdependence of various components of the economy (e.g., prices, income, output of industry and of agriculture, capital stock, employment, and consumption). When the model is complete, projections of these components under alternative assumptions about increases in military output, the size of labor force, the amount of capital investment, and trends in productive efficiency can be obtained with the aid of a computer program.

The potential in this area is likewise enormous. Eventually we should have models of most foreign economies, of international trade, and of other processes important to economic intelligence. The key to success in this area is to involve the analysts in designing the models and interacting with their application. This requires educating the analysts in the use of quantitative tools and providing them with adequate computer programs, and assistance in the application of these tools.

Communication

The communication function, whether exercised in a telephone call or a formal report or briefing, requires mutual understanding, which computers can improve substantially. When both data bases and analytical techniques have been standardized for all analysts by the use of computers, it will be easier to understand what steps an analyst has taken to reach a given conclusion, and other analysts will be able to reproduce these steps and validate the conclusion. The direct communication of inquiries to a data base will also eliminate the need to bother an analyst with simple questions of fact.

Computers can be employed to advantage in the graphic plotting of data and in the preparation of textual reports. Various organizations have systems under which a secretary can place an analyst's rough draft and any subsequent revisions into computer storage from

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a remote console. The latest version can be printed automatically at any stage. In the brief period that such systems have been in use they have demonstrated that substantial savings in time and costs can be expected from them.

Preparatory Tasks

Computers will play an ever-increasing role in economic intelligence. The analyst will work in an environment of well-organized files, substantial aids to calculation, and other routine-eliminating tools enabling him to apply his mind directly to intelligence problems. The manager will find it easier to transfer responsibilities from one analyst to another because files and the techniques for exploiting them will be standardized. What needs to be done at present to promote this environment of the future?

One major requirement has already been mentioned—a vigorous program to educate economic analysts and management in the use of computers. Certain key personnel will need intensive instruction in programing, quantitative methods, and systems design. A workshop was conducted during the spring and summer of 1968 for ten analysts in these areas. A similar activity is planned for early 1969.

A gradual increase in the number and sophistication of operational applications for computer systems in projects involving file management, analysis, and communication will lead to better working knowledge of the use of computers on the part of analysts as well as to the development of machine-readable data collections.

Much of the expertise and design of future computer systems, particularly remote-console, time-sharing systems, will come from R&D and computer service units. It is desirable that economic intelligence officers keep aware of developments in this direction and at the same time encourage the computer experts to examine economic applications.

Active participation in any community projects for building up data collections, putting documents into machine-readable form, standardizing classification systems, and similar activities³ will of course be of direct benefit.

If these preliminary tasks are not neglected, the economic intelligence analyst will live a very different official life in 1973 than he has in 1968.

³ Such as that described in Zane Thornton's "Community Progress in Information Handling," *Studies* XI 1, p. 13 ff.

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INTELLIGENCE IN RECENT PUBLIC LITERATURE

ŠTA JE CIA? (WHAT IS CIA?) By *Milovoje J. Levkov*. (Belgrade; Sedma Sila. Dokumenti Današnjice, Issue No. 178. 1967. 78 pp. 2 n. din.).

The author of this pamphlet received his law degree from the University of Belgrade in 1956 and his doctorate in 1965, choosing as his thesis topic international law as it pertains to espionage, with special attention to the espionage practices of various countries following World War II. The publishers mention that Mr. Levkov has previously contributed several articles to the same journal on espionage and international law.

The present article contains no startling revelations about CIA. The author's sources are basically overt, ranging from Allen Dulles' "The Craft of Intelligence," (the dust jacket of which the author or publisher has reproduced on the cover of this book) to numerous quotations from "The Invisible Government." The author also refers to other foreign authors such as Soviet Brigadier General V. A. Viktorov, who wrote "Espionage Under the Mask of Tourism" in 1963; G. Zhukov's "Plan of Cosmic Espionage and International Law" in 1960, and F. N. Chistyakov's "The Secret Front War" in 1965, to name but a few. Levkov claims that some of his information comes from "other sources" not further identified.

What Levkov writes is in fact much less interesting than the question of why he (or we should say the Yugoslav government) wanted to publish at all, unless mainly for internal consumption in connection with the revelations made at the time concerning the plans and activities of Alexander Rankovich. The author's major object, it appears, is to attempt to prove that espionage is contrary to all forms of international law. The reader is supposed to infer from his slanted statements that *only* CIA is engaged in international espionage.

Levkov delves into the history of CIA and mentions its early beginnings, including the role of the OSS, which he says was engaged in a variety of special intelligence missions and supported underground anti-Nazi groups deep in occupied territory. In addition, the author comments on the role of OSS in the invasions of Normandy and North Africa. For reasons best known to himself, the

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author chose to ignore the fact that OSS was in the mountains of Yugoslavia helping Marshal Tito in his struggle against the Axis powers.

Levkov refers to most of the other US intelligence agencies, all of which we are to understand are under the control of CIA. He believes that CIA has some 20,000 staff employees and approximately 200,000 agents throughout the world. As far as he is concerned, the US government cannot do anything in the realm of global strategy and politics without the approval of CIA. He pictures CIA as an organization beyond any real control. He apparently wishes to amuse his readers by giving a literal translation of the Watchdog Committee, i.e., that they are "dog watchers," implying that CIA is an organization of dogs that must be watched carefully. He attempts to explain the role of the National Security Agency (CIA-controlled) mostly from excerpts of the 1960 press conference given in Moscow by defectors Martin and Mitchell. In presenting the readers with an idea of how CIA operates (against international law), he makes references to the Berlin tunnel of 1956, CIA's activities in Iran (1952), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1958), Cambodia (1966), Laos, Vietnam, the U-2 affair, the use of Samos and Midas as spy satellites, the Bay of Pigs episode, British Guiana (1963), the National Students Association, penetration of Western European labor unions, purchases of news media, political assassinations, psychological warfare in Vietnam, Camelot, Svetlana Alliluyeva, and Colonel Oleg Penkovskiy.

Despite the western literature presumably available in Yugoslavia, the author chooses to side with the Soviets in the Penkovskiy case. He makes no reference to Penkovskiy's having been a GRU officer and points out that Penkovskiy was a mere reserve officer in the Red Army. He debunks the information given by Penkovskiy and implies that he became an agent for money and no other reason. It is interesting to note that the author, who, we have been told, is an expert at international law, defends the right of the Soviets to arrest Greville Wynne in Budapest "due to a legal agreement between the USSR and Hungary." Then we learn that Wynne was "traded for Gordon Lonsdale (alias Konon Molody), a Soviet citizen arrested in Great Britain for espionage.

Levkov depicts the defection of Stalin's daughter as a CIA operation timed to embarrass the USSR during the celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Revolution. According to Levkov, Svetlana Al-

liluyeva is "two million dollars richer thanks to the actions of CIA." Levkov claims that CIA prepared her book of 80,000 words from CIA archives in Frankfurt. Levkov refuses to believe that she wrote her book three years prior to her defection, apparently because he does not believe her story that she found little difficulty getting her manuscript out of the Soviet Union.

Levkov seeks to leave the reader with the impression that the US government revolves around the CIA. He presents a chart showing all US intelligence agencies (CIA, NSA, FBI, and the Department of State's INR) as being under the control of CIA. When the author comments on psychological warfare, the reader is to understand that the numerous organizations overseas he refers to are really CIA organizations, including the Voice of America.

The author appears to be very frustrated because international law does not seem to be able to cope or curtail espionage, i.e., CIA activities. In his final paragraph he warns nations to look after their individual security and to defend themselves from the "dangerous acts of CIA." In order to strengthen his point, the publishers have a cartoon (drawn by D. Savich but of the type usually found in Soviet periodicals) on the back cover showing a man with CIA written on his chest and sitting on the globe so that he can cover the entire world. In addition to the usual capitalistic cigar in his mouth, the CIA operator has six hands. They hold a telephone, microphone, hand grenade, pistol, and dollar bills.

Unfortunately, Mr. Levkov does not give us any references to his doctoral work in which he allegedly wrote about more than one country. In this article he appears to accept the fact that no country has admitted to being engaged in international espionage and he, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the US is the only country involved because CIA admitted to such activity in 1960 during the U-2 affair.

Frank W. Talpalar

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: PROBLEMS OF
SECRECY IN A DEMOCRACY. Edited by *Young Hum Kim*.
(Lexington: D.C. Heath & Co. 1968. 113 pp. \$2.00.)

This collection of articles is one of a series of volumes entitled "Problems in Political Science" published under the editorial direction of Neal Riemer, of the University of Wisconsin. Kim's introduction states that the purpose of this "reader" is to provide students of politics with carefully selected texts concerning the problem of secrecy in a democracy.

Kim's approach to his task, however, seems closer to that of moral philosophy than to political science. In his introduction, he pronounces as follows:

"Any governmental organization in a democracy which operates in secrecy, such as the CIA (although its activities are primarily directed toward foreign powers), tend to resort to totalitarian means to achieve its ends. As a result, such an agency, particularly but not exclusively in its overseas operations, invariably violates the ethics of a democratic and constitutional society and may ignore that due process of law which has safeguarded fundamental democratic rights and liberties."

Since the foregoing is evidently Kim's settled view, one wonders why he has gone to the trouble of compiling his "reader." If, that is, the consequences of *any* secret government organization are indeed "invariably" malign, then there is no mystery about the matter, nor any "problems of secrecy in a democracy," save that of extirpating secrecy. But elsewhere Kim finds it possible to conceive of circumstances under which "the creation of an instrument of government such as the CIA . . . may be justified."

The (presumably youthful) readership which this volume may reach will not find much guidance in the selections themselves to get them out of the methodological thicket into which the editor has led them. Most of the authors are well-known as critics of CIA from one point of view or another, and none are disposed to address themselves to the much more difficult problem of how, in fact, legitimate secrets can be kept in a democracy.

There is a need for a good and useful reader on this subject. Other selections are available that could give concerned readers a balanced and genuinely dispassionate picture of the CIA, while noting valid criticisms. The *Central Intelligence Agency* is not that volume.

Walter Pforzheimer

BELLE BOYD IN CAMP AND PRISON. By *Belle Boyd*. Edited with Introduction and notes by Curtis Carroll Davis. (New York: Thomas Yoseloff. 1968. 448 pp. \$9.50.)

This is the book to end all books about Belle Boyd; it will of course do nothing of the kind. It establishes her as the author of that almost unheard-of-article, an authentic Civil War spy memoir, and as a greatly overrated spy, in which latter respect it amplifies an opinion previously announced to the readers of this journal.¹

The history of the case is this: Belle, seventeen and living in the Shenandoah Valley, gained notoriety in 1861 by killing a Federal invader in her home. This was a bad start for a would-be spy. While the locality was in Northern hands at several periods in 1862-63, Belle associated amiably with Federal officers. They reciprocated her attentions and kept a decently close watch on her. She was also well covered by the newspapers, which made her a celebrity. She served two short sentences in Washington prisons, the first in 1862 after the famous caper in which she fled Front Royal afoot in broad daylight to deliver information to Jackson as he arrived by surprise before the town. The second, in the post-Gettysburg period, was for causes less evident.

Repatriated to Richmond a second time, she was made a bearer of dispatches to Europe and was arrested at sea, but so charmed her captor that he took a hand in her release, resigned his naval commission and followed her to London, where they were married.

There, her book was published in 1865, ghosted by a prominent local hack. In 35 years of postwar life she tried to capitalize on her wartime celebrity by taking to the stage, first as actress, then as reader of dramatic accounts of her espionage. Although she was thus before the American public off and on for four decades, her fame dimmed until legend eventually confused her with the gunwoman Belle Starr.

As to her book. First, it is surpassingly dull. Second, it follows the pattern of Civil War espionage memoirs by concerning itself with the spy's comings and goings and tribulations, thoroughly disappointing the reader who hopes to find out what information the spy delivered. Third, it differs from most of its genre in that its claims about infor-

¹ Edwin C. Fishel, "Military Intelligence 1861-63," *Studies* X 3, p. 81 ff.

mation delivered are modest indeed. Fourth, as a piece of writing it belongs in the class known as Overblown Victorian, as far from an American girl's natural style as the ghost, George A. Sala, could make it. We forgive—aye, we endorse—Dr. Davis' adjective: "G.A.S.-eous."

In an 80-page introduction Dr. Davis gives the background of this unremarkable document, unearths and dispels enough myths that grew around Belle Boyd to surprise the most hardened historian, and develops Belle's postwar activities with the comprehensiveness of a one-man FBI. In 42 pages of notes he gives many corroborations of her account from other sources. But to this reviewer the most significant result of his work is the contemporary reports he found of Belle's appearances on the lecture platform. These reports do not seem to have elaborated on the limited story she was willing to tell in 1865. This may be taken as an indication that there was not much of a story after all.

Now for the first time we have one of the two dozen American Civil War spy memoirs subjected to exhaustive and skillful detective work. That is a help to future scholarship, and one admires the dedication of Dr. Davis as well as the publisher's, but wonders if the publishing world could sustain a second experiment of this kind.

Edwin C. Fishel

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*How US intelligence obtained
some remarkable documents.*

THE CIANO PAPERS: ROSE GARDEN

Howard McGaw Smyth

Galeazzo Ciano, dei conti di Cortellazzo, was born on 18 March 1903 at Leghorn, the son of Admiral Costanzo Ciano, an Italian hero of World War I and an early supporter of Mussolini. After gaining his degree young Ciano dabbled for a time in journalism and then in 1925 entered the Italian diplomatic service. He served briefly at Rio de Janeiro, Peking, and the Holy See. On 24 April 1930 he married Edda, the daughter of Mussolini. Thereafter his promotions were very rapid indeed. After a brief period serving as Consul General at Shanghai, Ciano was named Minister to China, and in 1932 served as presiding officer of the League of Nations' Commission of Inquiry on the Sino-Japanese conflict. In August 1933, Mussolini named his son-in-law chief of his press office, which in September of the next year was upgraded and renamed the Office of Press and Propaganda with Ciano as its undersecretary. In June of 1935 the Office was transformed into a full-fledged ministry with Ciano at its head.

Ciano volunteered for the Ethiopian War and served in command of a bomber squadron. He was decorated by Marshal Badoglio for military valor in that war. Then on 9 June 1936, at the age of 33, he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, an office which he filled until February 1943. Young Ciano was even accorded, retroactively it would seem, that great Fascist honor of having taken part in the "March on Rome" in 1922.¹

Countess Edda Ciano liked to speak of herself as half-Russian, ascribing her moodiness and weak lungs to her Russian blood. Mussolini's wife dismissed such talk as mere gossip; Edda was born to

¹ At least it is so stated in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, appendix I, p. 412. See, however: Duilio Susmel, *Vita sbagliata di Galeazzo Ciano* (Milan: Aldo Palazzi, 1962) p. 56.

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us on September 1, 1910, she writes, but Benito and she were not yet regularly married; hence, the stupid insinuation that Angelica Balabanoff was the mother of Edda.²

The Cianos had three children: the older son, baptized Fabrizio Benito Costanzo, born 1 October 1931; the daughter, Raimonda, born 21 December 1933; and Marzio, the younger son, born 18 December 1937. But the marriage was not a happy one: it was common knowledge that each spouse had numerous affairs. Edda was headstrong and violent in her feelings, something which seemed to endear her to her father.³

Ciano was Minister of Foreign Affairs during the period of the British acceptance of Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, of the Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War, of Italy's rapprochement and subsequent alliance with Nazi Germany, and of World War II until February 1943. It was in the course of the Italian intervention in the Spanish Civil War that Ciano instigated the murder of the Rosselli brothers, Carlo and Nello, founders of the movement Giustizia e Libertà.⁴ He met and spoke with practically all of the important European leaders of the time, and kept a diary or diaries during all or most of the period of his ministry. The larger portion of these diaries was first published in English translation in the American edition of January 1946.⁵ An earlier portion of the diaries was first published in

² Rachele Mussolini, *La mia vita con Benito* (Milan: Arnaldo Mondadori, 1948) p. 31.

³ Roman Dombrowski, *Mussolini: Twilight and Fall* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1956) p. 114.

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 58, relates that when Edda returned from her trip to Germany in 1937, where she had been shown great attention by Hitler and the Nazi bigwigs, Galeazzo asked her directly if she had ever betrayed him. She answered No, and Susmel assures us that this was the truth.

The statements to the contrary are too numerous to be listed.

⁴ Charles F. Delzell, *Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961) pp. 159-160;

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 74-75.

Cf. Massimo Salvadori, *The Labour and the Wounds, A Personal Chronicle of One Man's Fight for Freedom* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1958) pp. 118-119.

⁵ *The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943: The Complete, Unabridged Diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1936-1943*, Edited by Hugh Gibson. Introduction by Summer Welles (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1946).

Italian in 1948. The English translation followed in 1953.⁶ These diaries are unquestionably, incomparably, the most interesting and important Italian memoir material regarding World War II.⁷

Closely associated with Ciano's private and often highly subjective notations in the booklets of his diary were the supporting papers. In the American edition of the diaries one encounters such interpolations as these:

12 January 1939 (p. 10): "I shall let Mackensen read yesterday's record."

19 July 1939 (p. 110): "I have set down my impressions of Spain in a notebook."

1 October 1939 (p. 154): "As usual I have summarized in a memorandum in my conference book the official account of my contacts with Hitler and other high officials of the Reich."⁸

In the diaries for 1937-1938 (English edition), one finds such references as these:

5 November 1937: "An extremely interesting conversation. I have summarized it in a minute." (p. 29)

3 January 1938: "Conversation with Perth, of which I have made a minute." (p. 58)

5 January 1938: "The first [conversation of the Duce] of which I have made a minute, was with Count Bethlen." (p. 60)

These supporting papers by Count Ciano, in the form which they had acquired when they reached Washington, came to be known as "The Ciano Papers: Rose Garden." Our primary aim in this essay is to narrate how they got here. But this story cannot be told by itself. To make it intelligible we must at the same time unravel the story of the diaries themselves. But even before the diary and supporting papers begin their movements from Rome, a few things should be noted.

⁶ Galeazzo Ciano, *1937-1938 diario* (Bologna: Cappelli, 1948); *Ciano's Hidden Diary 1937-1938*. Translation and notes by Andreas Mayor, With an introduction by Malcolm Muggeridge (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 1953).

⁷ Mario Toscano, *The History of Treaties and International Politics*, Vol. I *An Introduction to the History of Treaties and International Politics: The Documentary and Memoir Sources* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966) pp. 454-455.

Cf. Lewis Bernstein Namier, *Diplomatic Prelude 1938-1939* (London: Macmillan, 1948) p. 494.

⁸ Other such references are to be found on pp. 175, 212, 219, 223, 255, 274, 277, 293, 305, 306, 419, 436, 470, 477, 552, 556.

The diary was not very secret. Parts of it had been shown or read to Dino Alfieri, Ambassador to Germany; to Filippo Anfuso, Ciano's secretary and later Ambassador to Hungary; and to Zenone Benini, a life-long friend of Ciano's, Undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1939, and Minister of Public Works in Mussolini's last cabinet before the overthrow of July 1943. Benini later told the Americans about the diary. It was known also to Felice Guarneri, Undersecretary in the Ministry for Currency and Foreign Exchange, to Giorgio Nelson Page, and to Orio Vergagni, also friends of many years.⁹ Sumner Welles recorded: "He showed it [the diary] to me and read me excerpts from it in my first conversation with him."¹⁰

Mussolini was thoroughly aware that his son-in-law was keeping a diary; he knew of Ciano's dislike and suspicion of the Germans, and that the diary and selection of supporting papers reflected this attitude. In the entry for 6 July 1941, Ciano noted Mussolini's irritation over German activity in the Alto Adige, or the South Tyrol, as the Austrians call it. "Note it down in your diary," Mussolini said, "that I foresee an unavoidable conflict arising between Italy and Germany." For 6 November 1942, it is recorded: "Mussolini asked me if I was keeping my diary up to date. When I answered affirmatively, he said that it will serve to prove how the Germans, both in military and political fields, have always acted without his knowledge." On 8 February 1943, three days after Mussolini had told Ciano that he was being transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the embassy at the Vatican, the Duce "asked me if I had all my documents in order." Ciano assured him that they were in order, and that he could document all the treacheries perpetrated against Italy by the Germans.¹¹

The diary entries were recorded by Ciano in calendar note books issued by the Italian Red Cross, page by page, usually one page for one day. These sheets were about 8 inches by 10 inches. The notations were in longhand in ink. Now and then, when much was recorded for a given day, extra sheets had been pasted in. At other places

⁹ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 76-77.

¹⁰ *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*, p. xxvii. Cf. p. 212, entry 26 February 1940.

¹¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 374, 539, and 580.

the handwriting was extremely cramped in order to compress one day's material on one sheet. One booklet was used for each year. The booklets were kept in the little safe in Ciano's office.¹²

The published volume for 1937-1938 at the second entry, that for 23 August 1937, reads: "From today I mean to resume a regular diary."¹³ This implies or strongly suggests that there were other, antecedent diary notations. This notation, however, should be read in conjunction with the entry for 22 August: "My writer's vanity makes me beg that, if one day publicity is given to these notes, it will be remembered that they were thrown on to the paper by me, in bits and pieces, between an interview and a telephone call. . . ." ¹⁴ The wording may mean that there was at some time some sort of systematic set of notations by Ciano for 1936, a notebook which did not survive the vicissitudes we are about to relate. Susmel insists that the Ciano diaries originally consisted of eight notebooks, one for each of the years 1936 to 1943.¹⁵

The author has found positive evidence of only seven booklets in the various movements of the diaries from 1943 onward. The notation for 22 August 1937 may merely indicate that Ciano experimented from time to time with diary notations prior to that date, but kept a systematic record only thereafter.

In 1944, when American intelligence officers first picked up the trail of the diaries and papers, Zenone Benini, who seems not to have drawn a clear distinction between the diaries and the papers, mentioned additional people to whom the diaries were known: Blasco Lanza d'Ajeta, Duke Marcello del Drago, and the writer Curzio Malaparte. Benini felt sure that the German Embassy knew of the diaries. According to Benini, Curzio Malaparte stated that as early

¹² Interview with Mr. Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966; Telegram, Bern to Washington (Dulles to O.S.S.) 11 January 1945, Item 58 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of Allen Dulles; Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 76.

The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943, pp. 1, 189, 329, 429, 563 reproduce the covers of the Red Cross notebooks used by Ciano. The 1937-1938 *diario*, between p. xvii and p. 1, provides a facsimile of the entry for 22 August 1937.

¹³ *Ciano's Hidden Diary 1937-1938*, p. 3.

¹⁴ 1937-1938 *diario*, p. 5; but placed separate in the English edition (*op. cit.*, p. vi) and labeled "Ciano's Foreword."

¹⁵ *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 57, 336, 370.

as May 1942, Ciano had been advised by a friend to resign and seek refuge in some foreign country but had replied: "The publication of my Diary will be sufficient not only to protect me from all political vengeance and persecution, but will rehabilitate me even in the eyes of my adversaries." Ciano stated on several occasions to his friends that he intended to publish this document abroad, perhaps in America or in England.¹⁶

"Escape" to Germany

Count Ciano, whom Mussolini had relieved of his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 5 February 1943, was one of the ring leaders of the revolt against the Duce in the Grand Council of Fascism. In his new position as Ambassador to the Holy See, Ciano worked assiduously for Italy's withdrawal from the war, with Mussolini if possible, without him and even against him if necessary. He cooperated closely with Bottai and Grandi in preparing for the meeting of the Grand Council on 24-25 July and in lining up a majority of the Councilors to vote for Grandi's resolution. Throughout Ciano's speech, Mussolini glowered at him in contempt and indignation. The revolt within the Grand Council gave the King the opportunity to dismiss Mussolini and to appoint Marshal Badoglio as his successor.¹⁷

¹⁶ Headquarters Peninsular Base Section, Memorandum (by Lt. Col. Henry H. Cumming) for A.C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.Q. 16 August 1944, Subject: Count Ciano's Diary, Enclosure 2, Despatch No. 703, Robert D. Murphy to the Secretary of State, 25 August 1944, Item 63 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of Allen Dulles.

¹⁷ There were no stenographic minutes of this last meeting of the Grand Council but some of the participants made their own records: Benito Mussolini, *Il tempo del bastone e della carota: Storia di un anno* (ottobre 1942-settembre 1943) Supplemento del "Corriere della Sera" No. 190 del 9-8-1944 XXII, pp. 16-18; Dino Grandi, "Count Dino Grandi Explains," *Life* (February 26, 1945) pp. 21 ff.; Giuseppe Bottai, *Vent' anni e un giorno* (Milan: Garzanti, 1949) pp. 295-318; Dino Alfieri, *Due dittatori di fronte* (Milan: Rizzoli, 1948) pp. 320-ff.

The fullest secondary account in English is that by Frederick W. Deakin, *The Brutal Friendship: Mussolini, Hitler and the Fall of Italian Fascism* (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 438-456. See also Ivone Kirkpatrick, *Mussolini: A Study in Power* (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1964) pp. 545-567. There are very full accounts in the Italian works, Giorgio Pini and Duilio Susmel, *Mussolini, l'uomo e l'opera* 4 vols., Vol. IV, *Dall'impero alla repubblica, 1938-1945* (Florence: La Fenice, 1955) pp. 244-255; Ruggero Zangrandi, *1943: 25 Luglio—8 settembre* (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1964) pp. 108-142.

Prior to the meeting of the Grand Council, Ciano seems to have had high hopes that he would play a leading part in the new government, that he and Grandi would steer the Italian ship of state into the harbor of a separate peace with the Western powers. The King's ideas were utterly different. It was the government headed by Badoglio assisted by a cabinet of technicians which took over after Mussolini, a regime which was launched with the slogan that "the war continues." Ciano then reverted to the idea of a withdrawal into private life. He decided to resign as Ambassador to the Vatican, and through Ambrosio whom he had supported as successor to Cavallero as chief of the *Comando Supremo*, Ciano asked for passports so that he and his family might seek exile in Spain.¹⁸ But the days turned into weeks and the passports were not forthcoming. Not only that, but the Badoglio government created a commission to investigate the matter of illicit personal gains by members of the Fascist hierarchy. A press campaign was launched against Ciano charging him with financial corruption. He was placed under house arrest and he began to fear for his personal safety if he remained in Italy.¹⁹

In these circumstances Edda Ciano got in touch with Eugen Dollman, and through him arrangements were made for the German *Sicherheitsdienst* to transport Galeazzo, Edda, and the three children to Germany. The escape, as Count Ciano and the Countess regarded their departure, went off according to plan on 27 August. Edda and the children in one car eluded the Italian police; Ciano took a different car and a different route. They were each picked up later by a German military truck and taken to Ciampino airfield. There they were put aboard a Junker 52 plane which flew them to Munich, and from there they went by auto to Oberallmannshausen. The man who made these arrangements was Wilhelm Hoettl.²⁰

¹⁸ It is said that Ciano and Serrano Suñer had a pact of mutual assistance that each would help the other in case of need for refuge outside his own country. Ermanno Amicucci, *I 600 giorni di Mussolini* (Rome: Editrice "Faro," 1948) p. 19.

¹⁹ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 289-293.

²⁰ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 292-293. Later in the year Ciano told his friend Benini that the Germans tricked him and broke a promise to let him get out to Spain. Zenone Benini, *Vigilia a Verona* (Milan: Garzanti, 1949) pp. 44-45. Hoettl denies any such promise at this time. Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 293.

The pilot of the plane was Captain Erich Priebke, whom Peter Tompkins later met in Rome in rather unusual circumstances. Peter Tompkins, *A Spy in Rome* (New York; Published by arrangement with Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1962) p. 171.

A word may be in order here about the organization and the persons involved in the German security service, the *Sicherheitsdienst*, or SD, in Germany and in Italy in 1943. The head of all the Nazi police forces was Heinrich Himmler. Back in 1929 when the National Socialists were merely a party contending for leadership in the German state, Himmler was simply the head of Hitler's private body guard, the *Schutzstaffel*, or SS, which at that time numbered possibly 300 men. By 1933, this elite corps of the Nazi Party had grown to 52,000.

Within the SS, a security service had been organized as early as 1931. In the summer of 1934, the SD under Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler's chief lieutenant, was recognized as the sole intelligence and counterintelligence agency of the Nazi Party. Himmler also managed to take control of the Prussian police away from Goering in 1934. Himmler's lieutenant, Reinhard Heydrich, brought all the police forces together under one central office, the Main Security Office, or *Reichssicherheitshauptamt*, which was generally known by its initials, the RSHA. After Heydrich's assassination he was succeeded by Ernst Kaltenbrunner who bore the title of *Obergruppenführer*, a rank in the SS equivalent to lieutenant general in the regular army. As head of the Main Security Office, Kaltenbrunner was second only to Himmler in the control of the police, in the operation of that principal instrument of terror of the Nazi regime. These were the men who organized the wholesale slaughter of the Jews of Europe. After Germany's defeat and the dawn of the day of reckoning, Himmler committed suicide on 23 May 1945. Kaltenbrunner was tried before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, was sentenced to death on 1 October and hanged on 17 October 1946.²¹

The Main Security Office was divided into seven subordinate offices (*Ämter*), such as Amt III, which dealt with intelligence work in Germany and the occupied countries; and Amt IV, the old Secret State Police (*Geheime Staats Polizei*, or *Gestapo*), whose task was to ferret out opposition to the State. Amt VI dealt with foreign intelligence. In June 1941 Schellenberg took over Amt VI and reorganized the foreign intelligence service.²²

²¹ *History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission Development of the Laws of War* (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1948) pp. 520-521.

²² See the introduction by Alan Bullock to *The Labyrinth: Memoirs of Walter Schellenberg* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956) pp. ix-xiii; or Hildegard v. Kotze, "Hitlers Sicherheitsdienst im Ausland," *Die politische Meinung* (August 1963) pp. 75-80.

Until the end of 1942, there had been no German secret service in Italy because Hitler had forbidden it, out of deference to Mussolini. The foundations of a very modest service were laid in the early part of 1943, apparently without Hitler's direct knowledge. In February Wilhelm Hoettl was made head of the section of Amt VI which dealt with Italy. In April the security service submitted a report which delineated the growing opposition to Mussolini within Fascist Italy, the physical and psychic decline of the Duce, and something of the moves by Ciano, Grandi, and Bottai. Hitler merely acknowledged the report, and Schellenberg thereupon determined to organize a thorough service in Italy. In a sense it was too late. The Grand Council meeting of 25 July and the King's dismissal and arrest of Mussolini took Hitler quite by surprise.²³

The German search for Mussolini in the summer of 1943, the enticement of Ciano into Germany, and, as we shall see, the search for Ciano's diaries and papers were the work of the SD and particularly of Hoettl as *Referent* for Italy in Amt VI of the RSHA.

To anticipate the story somewhat, there is one more character whom we should introduce in the SD in Italy: *Gruppenführer* (General) Wilhelm Harster. From 1940 to 1943 Harster had served in the SD in the Netherlands where he was instrumental in rounding up the Dutch Jews and sending them on for others to exterminate. On 9 September 1943 Harster set up his headquarters in Verona. He headed the whole of the SD in Italy, ranking just below Kaltenbrunner.²⁴

Throughout the summer of 1943 Hitler had spurred the *Sicherheitsdienst* to the greatest efforts to locate Mussolini. On 12 September,

²³ Wilhelm Hoettl, *The Secret Front: The Story of Nazi Political Espionage* With an introduction by Ian Colvin; Translated by R. H. Stevens (2nd ed., London: Weidenfelt & Nicolson, 1954) pp. 221-223. This English edition is much superior to Hoettl's first account which was published under the pseudonym of Walter Hagen, *Die geheime Front: Organisation, Personen und Aktionen des deutschen Geheimdienst* (2nd ed., Lienz and Vienna: Nibelungen Verlag, 1950).

²⁴ See Allen Dulles, *The Secret Surrender* (New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row, 1966) pp. 58-59. Harster in 1949 was sentenced by the government of the Netherlands to a term of 12 years for his part in the deportation of some 80,000 Dutch Jews. In January 1967 he was again tried in Munich, and on 24 February was sentenced to imprisonment for complicity in the murder of those Jews whose deportation he had arranged. (*Washington Post*, 25 February 1967.)

four days after the Allied attack at Salerno and the simultaneous announcement of Italy's surrender to the Allies, Hitler was successful. Otto Skorzeny had learned that Mussolini was held in the ski lodge on the Gran Sasso, highest peak in the Apennines. He and a small group of paratroopers made a daring drop on the mountaintop, seized Mussolini, flew him to Rome and then north to Munich. On the next day Edda Ciano met her father. She vigorously defended her husband's actions in the Grand Council meeting. The next day, 14 September, Mussolini was flown to Hitler's headquarters in East Prussia.

Ever since learning of the Grand Council meeting, Hitler had had the plan of restoring Mussolini, and of reconstituting the Fascist regime. In his eyes the Grand Councilors who had voted against Mussolini were guilty of treason and he felt it essential that a revived Fascist government punish such traitors with death. But at the meeting with Hitler, Mussolini appears to have defended Ciano's conduct. On 19 September the ex-Duce returned to Bavaria and spoke with his son-in-law. He assured him on this occasion that he had told the Führer "that he would guarantee with his own head the correctness of the attitude of Count Ciano."²⁵

Mussolini's attitude toward Ciano, and his lack of desire for vengeance, left the Germans quite puzzled. They began to write Mussolini off, even though they were determined to re-install him as chief of the government of Italy. They thought that Edda's hold on her father was the knowledge that Mussolini himself had had the idea of deserting Germany.²⁶

When Ciano realized that he would not be permitted simply to fly out to Madrid, he approached Hoettl with a proposition. In exchange for facilitating his transfer to Spain with Edda and the children, he offered his diaries. Hoettl soon became convinced that these materials were of great political and historical value. He convinced Kaltenbrunner that Ciano's diaries and supporting papers could be used to discredit Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister, a man whom Himmler and Kaltenbrunner loathed. It appears that arrangements were practically completed for the Ciano family to fly to Spain.

²⁵ Giuseppe Silvestri, *Albergo agli Scalzi* (Milan: Garzanti, 1946) p. 77.

²⁶ *The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943*, Edited and translated by Louis P. Lochner (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1948) pp. 468-69, 471, 480-481.

Hoettl had even prepared false passports to take the family to South America. But against Hoettl's advice, Edda insisted on asking the Führer's permission. Hitler would have none of it, and the plan fell through.²⁷

Ciano remained in German custody. The diaries and supporting papers remained where Ciano had secreted them in Italy.

We may note in passing that this notion of using Ciano's diaries to discredit the German Foreign Minister was by no means fantastic. Some of the notations by Ciano were used in 1946 to confound and confute Ribbentrop, but not in the fashion and circumstances which Himmler and Kaltenbrunner would in 1943 have imagined, for extracts from the diary were produced in evidence at the Nuremberg trials in refuting Ribbentrop's testimony,²⁸ the same tribunal which condemned Kaltenbrunner to hanging.

On 27 September Edda Ciano returned to Italy alone on a slow military train. She had come to appreciate, somewhat earlier than did her husband, the extreme dangers which threatened him. First she went to Ponte a Moriano where she met her mother-in-law, Carolina Ciano, who turned over to her the notebooks containing the diaries of Galeazzo. The widow of the Admiral Costanzo Ciano is said to have remarked on this occasion that these documents were worth the life of her son.²⁹

It is said that Edda then went to Rocca delle Caminate, Mussolini's one-time summer residence, and now the temporary capital of the neo-Fascist puppet state, the Italian Social Republic, as it came to be called, in which Mussolini was being reinstated in power by

²⁷ Hoettl, *Secret Front*, pp. 274-275; *The Goebbels Diaries*, pp. 479-481.

Cf. Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 296-297.

²⁸ Extracts from the diary were submitted in evidence as Document 2987-PS (Exhibit U.S.A.-166), *Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal—Nuremberg* 14 November 1945—1 October 1946, English edition, Vol. XXXI, pp. 434-438; comment by Sir David Maxwell-Fyffe, 8 January 1946, Vol. IV, pp. 567-568.

Cf. the Introduction to the French edition by S. Stelling-Michaud, Comte Galeazzo Ciano, *Journal politique* 1939-1943 2 vols (Neuchâtel and Paris, 1948) Vol. I, p. vi; and Eugene Davidson, *The Trial of the Germans* (New York: Macmillan, 1966) pp. 153-154. (The citations here in footnotes 9 and 10 should be to *The Ciano Diaries* 1939-1943.)

²⁹ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 302. Susmel asserts that there were *eight* booklets of the diary which were transferred, and which constituted the whole. I have not found confirmation of this number. There seem to have been only seven.

Hitler. Whatever function it performed for the Italians, it spared the Germans the burden of having to administer the four-fifths of the Italian peninsula they occupied by means of military government. Here Edda came to realize how much her husband was hated by her countrymen who were loyal to her father. She persisted in defending her husband's actions and integrity. She told Mussolini that Galeazzo wished to return to Italy. He seems to have been persuaded, for a time at least, that he might have a position in the neo-Fascist government.

Edda had been under great strain, and this was apparent to her father who suggested to her that she go to a clinic for rest. This she did, entering the clinic operated by the Melocchi brothers at Ramiola near Parma. Beforehand she made a trip to Rome where she gathered up her wardrobe. It is said that on this occasion she also carefully hid the diary in a secure place there. It was 10 October when she entered the clinic.³⁰

The author of the diaries, Count Ciano, remained at Oberallmannshausen as a "guest" of the German Government. Although the first attempt to barter his diaries for his freedom had failed when Hitler refused permission for the Cianos to fly to Spain, Ciano recurred to this scheme. He knew that within the seemingly monolithic structure of the Nazi dictatorship there was an incessant struggle for power among the chieftains surrounding the Führer. He too had an intense dislike for von Ribbentrop, and he knew that this antipathy—perhaps even hatred is not too strong a word—was shared by Himmler and Kaltenbrunner, who as we have remarked, were particularly anxious to get hold of Ciano's diaries and supporting papers in order to use them to discredit von Ribbentrop and bring about his replacement. Ribbentrop, on the other hand, was equally determined to see that Ciano was eliminated for his "treason" to the Axis and that his diaries and papers were suppressed.

³⁰ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 302-303, whose account here is apparently based on "Il carnet d'oro della duchessa di Sermoneta" which appeared in 10 installments in *L'Europeo*, 26 June-28 September 1949.

Ciano's diary, that is the seven or eight booklets, may have been hidden at this time, but not in Rome. But the supporting papers, that is the records of Ciano's conversations, were concealed in Rome along with some other materials. These were retrieved on 4 January 1944. See below, p. 20.

Whether Ciano would be able to trade his diaries for his freedom remained to be seen, but of the German interest in the diaries there can be no doubt. Himmler and Kaltenbrunner would have been quite happy to get the diaries without any bargain, if only they could find them. Doubtless at the urging of his superiors, Hoettl now provided Ciano with an interpreter, whose real task was to find out the location of the diaries and supporting papers. This was the pretty, highly intelligent, sensitive, and sweet-natured woman known as "La Burkhardt," or Frau Beetz, or "Felicitas" Beetz, the wife of an officer in the Luftwaffe.⁸¹ Ciano recognized her for what she was, someone set to spy on him, but nevertheless he found her very attractive, *simpatica*. She was not a professional spy; this was her first assignment as an agent; and she found herself strongly attracted to Count Ciano. Frau Beetz was destined to play an extraordinary role in the final chapter of the Ciano's life and in the rescue of his diary and supporting papers for posterity.⁸²

On 17 October Hoettl appeared at Oberallmannshausen and informed Ciano that he was to be returned to Italy. Ciano had meanwhile had an operation on his ear and on returning to the castle learned that his children had been brought to their grandmother, Rachele Mussolini. The children for the time being remained north of the Alps. Ciano was flown back to Italy on 19 October along with Frau Beetz and some SS men. When the plane landed at Verona he was promptly arrested by both German and Italian police.⁸³

⁸¹ Frau Beetz, born Hildegard Burkhardt, at Oberrissa near Weimar in 1919; finished secondary school in 1938; then attended a private interpreters' school in Leipzig. In 1939 she entered the *Sicherheitsdienst*, served in Weimar until March 1940 when she was transferred to Amt VI of the RSHA and worked as an interpreter and translator of Italian in the Rome and Berlin offices. In Rome during the spring of 1943 she met Hoettl who at the time was *Referent* for Italy and Hungary. She returned to Germany, then was back in Rome in July in the staff of the German Embassy. In August she was evacuated to the Reich along with the other female employees of the Embassy and thus was at hand when Hoettl decided to employ her as an agent. Her husband, Captain (later Major) Gerhardt Beetz, was an acquaintance of the Cianos.

⁸² Benini, *Vigilia a Verona* p. 29 records that when he first met her in the Scalzi prison, he wondered if she really were German, for her Italian was almost perfect.

He records further that when he spoke to her shortly before Christmas, she said there was no hope for Ciano; he would be shot. She wept when she said it, and Benini knew that this could not have been pretense (*op. cit.*, p. 93).

⁸³ Rachele Mussolini, *Vita con Benito* pp. 222-223; Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 303-304.

Meanwhile, Mussolini had established himself in the Villa Feltrinelli at Gargnano on the shore of Lake Garda. Donna Rachele rejoined him there and the three Ciano children were brought back to Italy by their uncle, Vittorio Mussolini. Edda Ciano demanded the return of her children to her own custody and in this demand she was successful. She now began to see the full extent of her husband's plight and how difficult it might be to save him. As Dombrowski has phrased it: "It was a public secret in Italy that the Ciano couple was not a good match and that their married life was unhappy. They each went their own way, and nobody thought she had any depth of feeling for him. Yet in the face of this threat she determined to make every effort to save him."³⁴ Edda Ciano's extraordinary effort to save her husband, and when that failed, to revenge him and to vindicate his memory, are crucial parts of the story of his diaries and supporting papers. Apparently it was through Frau Beetz that Edda Ciano learned that her husband had been arrested.³⁵

In late October of 1943 the Council of Ministers of the Italian Social Republic set up a court to investigate and try those who had scuttled the Fascist ship by voting against Mussolini in the Grand Council on 25 July. Ciano and those of the other disloyal Grand Councilors who had been caught were transferred to the Verona prison in early November. Frau Beetz had meanwhile presented herself to General Harster, and he had granted her free rein. She had free access to Ciano's cell, but Edda was forbidden to see her husband. Frau Beetz came to serve as intermediary between the two.

Edda had begun to fear that even her children, Mussolini's grandchildren, were not safe under the puppet neo-Fascist regime. Her friends had been legion before 25 July; now she found almost none.

³⁴ Dombrowski, *Mussolini: Twilight and Fall*, p. 114.

³⁵ See p. 2 of the report of Pucci to Allen Dulles, 24 May 1945, Item 18 R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of Allen Dulles. This item, 17 double-spaced, typewritten folio pages, is cited hereafter simply as *Pucci Report*.

A considerable portion of this report is quoted in the article by Andrea Niccoletti, "The Decline and Fall of Edda Ciano," *Colliers*, 20 April and 27 April 1964. "Fraulein Ilse" is substituted in this printing for the name of Frau Beetz. The article is based on the documents assembled by Mr. Dulles in the file "Edda Ciano Diaries." Further citations to the article will read: Niccoletti, *Colliers*, date and page.

Cf. Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 305.

But there was one friend of former days of the Cianos whose loyalties were undiminished, Lieutenant Pucci of the Italian Air Force.³⁶ With Pucci's help, Edda Ciano managed to get her children across the border into neutral Switzerland, out of reach of Nazi or Fascist vengeance.³⁷

About the middle of December the preliminary judicial investigation of the treason trials of Verona began with Ciano himself as the first defendant. Edda now appealed to her father on behalf of her husband. There were strong words and hot tears from each, but Mussolini would not relent. He had a document, he said, that was proof of Ciano's betrayal and he thought that Edda herself would some day appreciate this.³⁸

Operation Conte

On the night before Christmas Eve—Thursday—Ciano came to realize that he would be found guilty and executed. In his cell he wrote out three documents: a preface for his diaries, a letter to King Victor Emmanuel III, and a letter to Prime Minister Churchill. Frau Beetz again served as messenger and delivered these three items to Edda. Each contained Ciano's denial of guilt and a bitter accusation against his father-in-law. The first became the final entry of the

³⁶ Emilio Pucci di Barsento was born in Naples on 20 November 1914, scion of an ancient Florentine family, but with some blending of foreign blood, for his paternal great-grandmother was a niece of Catherine II of Russia. A part of Pucci's education occurred in the United States. He studied agriculture at the University of Georgia, and then political science at Reed College under Professor G. Bernard Noble, receiving an M.A. degree in 1937. At Reed he was very popular with students and faculty alike, despite his vigorous defense of the Fascist regime. A man of strong loyalties to his country, to his college, to his friends, Pucci was endowed with superb physical coordination and was an extraordinarily graceful dancer and a natural sportsman. At Reed, Pucci served for a time as a ski instructor and apparently during this period he began designing ski costumes, exhibiting the talent that later won him world acclaim.

Pucci returned to Italy in 1937 and received his doctorate (*laurea*) at Florence, but his hopes of entering the Italian diplomatic service were frustrated by Italy's entrance into World War II. He joined the Royal Italian Air Force in 1938, served for more than a decade and was decorated for valor. Since the war Pucci has become one of the world's leading fashion designers. In August 1963 he became a deputy in the Italian Parliament, taking his seat with the Liberal group.

³⁷ *Pucci Report*, 24 May 1945, p. 2. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 20 April 1946, p. 12.

³⁸ The encounter took place on 18 December. Rachele Mussolini, *Vita con Benito*, p. 233.

diaries as printed in America. It contains not one word acknowledging responsibility for his own iniquities and blames the Germans only, and particularly Ribbentrop, for the war. Damning Mussolini for the death awaiting him, he wrote:

"Within a few days a sham tribunal will make public a sentence which has already been decided by Mussolini under the influence of that circle of prostitutes and white slavers which for some years have plagued Italian political life and brought our country to the brink of the abyss. I accept calmly what is to be my infamous destiny."³⁹

Countess Edda apparently sent the letters for the King and for Churchill to her husband's brother-in-law, Massimo Magistrati, Italian Minister in Bern.⁴⁰ Victor Emmanuel III received the letter addressed to him and had it authenticated by a notary, believing it would help the cause of the House of Savoy. Ciano mentioned in that letter:

"I have arranged that as soon as possible after my death my diary and some documents will be published which will shed much true light on many facts hitherto unknown."⁴¹

On Christmas Day 1943 Lieutenant Pucci drove Edda Ciano to Verona, but she was not allowed to see her husband upon orders of Mussolini himself. Through Frau Beetz, Edda and Pucci learned that the trial was now set for 28 December and that the outcome was a foregone conclusion: Ciano would be executed. Edda was terribly distressed on hearing that her father insisted on the execution. Pucci now urged Edda that she escape into Switzerland. During the next day or so Pucci made preparations to get the Countess over the border with the diary in her possession in order to be able to make good Ciano's threats. The booklets containing the diary were carefully hidden in Milan the day after Christmas. Lieutenant Pucci then accompanied Edda back to Ramiola, and made arrangements so that she would be able to make contact with certain people in Como and from there cross the border into Switzerland on 27

³⁹ *The Ciano Diaries 1939-1943*, pp. 583-584.

⁴⁰ Emilio Settimelli, *Edda contro Benito*: Indagine sulla personalità del Duce attraverso un memoriale autografo di Edda Ciano Mussolini, qui riprodotto (Rome: Corso, 1952) pp. 26, 53.

⁴¹ The letter to the king is published in Attilio Tamaro *Due anni di storia*, 1943-1945 (Rome: Tosi, 1948-1950) No. 41, pp. 363-364.

Cf. Pini and Susmel, *Mussolini*, Vol. IV, pp. 379-381.

Edda later told Pucci in Switzerland that Churchill made no acknowledgment of the letter addressed to him. (*Pucci Report*, p. 15.)

December, the day before the scheduled opening of the trial. The plan at this stage was that once safe in Switzerland, Edda would threaten vengeance by publishing her husband's diary if her father would not relent. Pucci would himself come back with the letter threatening revenge against Mussolini. The arrangements were almost finished, and on the morning of 27 December Pucci and Edda drove off from Ramiola, heading for Como by way of Verona where they had arranged to meet Frau Beetz.

The three met at midday. La Burkhart, this German interpreter, agent, and go-between, now came forward with the scheme that came to be known as "Operation Conte." She told Edda to return to Ramiola, and there she would receive a proposal from the German authorities that Count Ciano would be freed despite the wishes of the neo-Fascist government if Ciano's documents were turned over to the Germans. The proposal by Frau Beetz was confirmed by a letter from Count Ciano himself.⁴²

The next day, 28 December, Frau Beetz came to General Harster in his office, greatly disturbed. She explained that it was Ciano's fate to be condemned and shot, but in that case his diary and other documents would be published in America and England. Only if his life were traded for these materials, she indicated, could such publication be prevented. General Harster immediately got in touch with his superior, Kaltenbrunner, who agreed to such an exchange. Kaltenbrunner in turn obtained the consent of Himmler, the leading contender for power in the group immediately surrounding Hitler. These two, as we have noted, were extremely anxious to get hold of Ciano's papers, believing that they would provide the means for

⁴² Pucci Report, pp. 3-4.

Cf. Dombrowski, *Twilight and Fall*, p. 118. Dombrowski's whole account at this point, his chapter 6, "To Save One Life," pp. 114-125, is largely based on articles which were written by Pucci for Italian newspapers after the war's end. The Marchese Pucci at this time did not know the fate of Frau Beetz and chivalrously avoided any mention of her name or even precise identification, for she was referred to only as "Mr. X." "When Edda Ciano returned to Italy she was repeatedly asked to reveal the true name of 'Mr. X.' She always replied that as Pucci had kept it secret there must be good reason for it, and she felt bound to follow his example." But Edda did know that the Allies knew the correct name. (Dombrowski, *op. cit.*, p. 125). Pucci's report, which was both closer to the event and not intended for publication, is much the better source than his newspaper accounts. See also Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 323-325, and Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 20 April 1946, p. 53.

discrediting von Ribbentrop. They planned to act without informing Hitler in advance, to confront him with an accomplished fact. The scheme was to employ a couple of SS men disguised as Fascists, who would abduct Ciano from his cell and speed him on his way with Edda through Switzerland to Hungary. When she received confirmation of Ciano's release she would be expected to turn over the diaries and the supporting papers.⁴³

Kaltenbrunner approved the plan, but wanted a written agreement with Count Ciano regarding the surrender of the diaries and papers, and he summoned General Harster for a discussion at Innsbruck.

On 2 January 1944, in a conference Kaltenbrunner met with Harster, Hoettl and Frau Beetz. The proposed scheme concerning Ciano was now written out in detail in four steps.

Step 1. Ciano was to reveal the hiding place of his Foreign Office records in Rome so that the SD could take them over.

Step 2: Ciano was to be sprung from his cell, and quickly taken to Switzerland with Edda, the children, and Frau Beetz.⁴⁴

Step 3. Ciano, safe in Switzerland, was to turn his diaries over to Frau Beetz.

Step 4. She in turn would return to Italy to deliver them to General Harster. Apparently some stipulation was also made to give Ciano some funds so that he could live in Switzerland.⁴⁵

The "springing" of Count Ciano was set for 7 January. His trial was now scheduled for 8 January.

Lieutenant Pucci, who had heard nothing from "La Burkhardt" since 27 December, had meanwhile gone to Florence to be with his family for the New Year holiday. Late in the afternoon of 3 January he returned to Ramiola. Frau Beetz had come there that same day, a few hours before him, with the complete details of "Operation Conte." These were embodied in oral instructions and in two letters which Ciano gave to Frau Beetz for delivery to his wife.

⁴³ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 328-330. Susmel's account here is based on testimony given him after the war by Harster.

⁴⁴ Frau Beetz at this time was aware that the children were already in Switzerland, but made no mention of it.

⁴⁵ See Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 330, who bases his account at this point on post-war statements made to him by General Harster.

Note that the *documents* (or supporting papers) were to be turned over in advance. The *diaries* were to be surrendered only after Ciano was free on Swiss soil.

Edda was to drive to Rome in a car which was to be provided by the Gestapo. There she was to pick up two groups of documents which were to be used as part payment for Galeazzo's life. The two letters elaborated the oral instructions. In the first, which Ciano wrote with the knowledge that it would be read by the Germans, it was explained that Ciano was to be freed if the documents were turned over to German agents. The first group of documents, which have been hitherto referred to as the supporting papers, were the "colloqui," that is the records of conversations to which one finds reference from time to time in the diary. These documents were to be turned over directly to the Germans.

The second group of documents was in a parcel labeled "Germania." In the second letter, intended for Edda's eyes only, Galeazzo directed that the parcel be retrieved in Rome, and taken north. But Edda was to keep it in her possession so that in case the Germans reneged on their promise to release him, she might deliver the parcel to the Allies.⁴⁶

When Frau Beetz explained the plan to Edda, the Countess did not like it. She did not trust the Germans; she thought it all a dirty business. Lieutenant Pucci argued with her into the early morning hours of the next day, 4 January. He finally convinced her that it offered the only chance to save her husband from Nazi-Fascist vengeance at Verona.

But Edda by this time was quite worn out and in no condition to undertake a hurried trip to Rome by automobile. Lieutenant Pucci now volunteered to go in her stead, to retrieve Count Ciano's supporting papers, and to deliver them over to the Germans in fulfillment of the first step of the agreement for "Operation Conte."

At 0330, 4 January, Lieutenant Pucci left Ramiola and at 0400, a few miles out of Parma, he met the car with the Gestapo agents.

⁴⁶ Pucci's Report, p. 4.

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 330. At this point of his narrative Susmel draws on post-war statements by Harster who incorrectly stated that the diaries as well as the other papers were in Rome. Pucci's knowledge was first hand; Harster's was not. The earlier collaborative work by Susmel is more accurate on this point. Pini and Susmel, *Mussolini*, Vol. IV, p. 382 where the reference is to Silvestri, *Albergo agli Scalzi* pp. 147-149 and to the Italian translation of Walter Hagen's German monograph.

Cf. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, April 20, 1946, p. 53.

They were an odd bunch. There were two Gestapo agents, Pucci records, Frau Beetz, and he himself in place of Edda. One of the Gestapo types was an officer brought from Holland especially for the operation. He had the knack of killing a man with one blow in the face before the victim could utter a sound, and his role would be to deal with the Fascist guards. He was a Dutchman named Johansen, Harster recalled, and the other was SS Lieutenant Johan Thito, a confidential agent of Harster's. The party drove on to Rome for 10 hours without stopping.

In Rome, following directions, Lieutenant Pucci quickly found the five volumes of the conversations, the package marked "Germania," and a third item, the political will of Count Ciano. These had all been carefully concealed in a wall over a doorway. Pucci took the first two items, but left Ciano's political will.⁴⁷

It was some time after midnight (4-5 January) that the foursome started its return trip north. Pucci had the volumes of the conversations in plain view, but he managed to keep the package marked "Germania" concealed under his air force overcoat. Not far from Rome the car got stuck in the snow and the engine conked out completely. Pucci remembered and recorded that he spent the next 18 hours walking knee-deep in snow, trying to get another car for the return trip; that by 5 January they managed to get the car started again, and only on the evening of 6 January did they reach Verona.⁴⁸

But it was probably on the evening of 5 January that they reached Verona, and there certain of the materials which had been recovered at Rome were turned over by Frau Beetz to General Harster. These

⁴⁷ *Pucci Report*, pp. 4-5, refers to five volumes of the "colloqui" which he was to pick up.

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 331-332, states that Marchese Pucci in Rome retrieved all of the Ciano materials: the diary in 8 volumes; the records of conversations in 16 volumes; the package labeled "Germania"; and the papers regarding Ciano's last mission as Foreign Minister. The primary evidence for Susmel's account here is not clear. In any case the diary was not at Rome. Susmel's various references to the number of volumes constituting the colloqui are not consistent.

Cf. Dombrowski, *Twilight and Fall*, pp. 117-119; Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 20 April 1946, p. 53.

⁴⁸ *Pucci Report*, p. 5; Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 20 April 1946, p. 53.

were apparently the conversations ("colloqui") or a good part of them.⁴⁹ Pucci now returned to Ramiola. The first step in Operation Conte had been completed. Edda Ciano had arranged for the delivery of Count Ciano's papers, or at least a good part of them, to the Germans. And it was Frau Beetz who had brought General Harster into possession of these coveted papers. At this point the story of the diaries diverges from the story of the supporting papers.

On receiving the five or six volumes of records of conversation, General Harster consigned them to a young SS Lieutenant, Walter Segna, a South Tyrolese attached to SD Headquarters in Verona. Segna after the war told Susmel that he remembered these volumes as rather large, each bound in green leather. He remembered also that what he saw related to the whole period, 1938-1943. Some of the documents were typewritten, some were stenciled. At the order of General Harster all the volumes of the conversations were photographed by Segna, assisted by a Lieutenant Fritz von Aufschneider of Bolzano. The pair also translated a few selected documents into German and prepared a general summary. They worked against time, right through the night, and then returned all the material to General Harster.⁵⁰

Harster locked the photographic copies of the documents and the general summary in his safe. He ordered Lieutenant Segna to take the original papers, that is the five or six volumes of the records of conversations, by air directly to Berlin and to deliver them personally to Kaltenbrunner. On receiving this portion of the Ciano materials, Kaltenbrunner telegraphed Harster to go ahead with "Operation Conte."⁵¹ Harster in turn notified La Burkhardt who was able

⁴⁹ At this point the evidence is not clear or consistent. Pucci (*Report*, p. 5) does not mention delivery of the volumes of the "colloqui," but states merely that he later went on to Ramiola, and still had the parcel of documents with him, i.e. the package marked "Germania."

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 332, states that six volumes of the conversations were turned over by Frau Beetz to General Harster, and that the remainder were taken to Edda at Ramiola. (If 16 were recovered at Rome, then the remainder should be 10, but Susmel is not consistent with his numbers.)

⁵⁰ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 332. This would have to be the night of 5-6 January (Wednesday to Thursday).

⁵¹ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 332. (The account here reverts to Harster's post-war testimony as its source.)

to let Edda Ciano know of the next step: She was to be on the road from Verona to Brescia at a point 10 kilometers from Verona at 2100 on 7 January. Edda was asked to bring plenty of money with her, apparently for living expenses once they made their way through Switzerland into Hungary. The expectation was that at the appointed rendezvous Edda would meet her husband, and once over the border she would deliver the diaries, and possibly the remainder of the papers and other materials, as the balance of the payment due for Galeazzo's life.⁵²

Everything was going according to plan and everything was set for carrying out Operation Conte. The SS agents, the husky Dutchman Johanssen and his teammate, were on hand. They were prepared to disguise themselves as Fascists, to overpower the guards and liberate Count Ciano. Guards at key points in the prison, whose names were Krutsch and Guck, had been instructed to aid the SS men, but to feign resistance and act as if they had been overcome. Frau Beetz had carried out her assignment beautifully. She had achieved the delivery of Ciano's papers and had arranged that Harster, Kaltenbrunner, and Himmler would get the Count's diaries. At the same time she was aiding Edda to save Galeazzo's life.

At this point the whole plan collapsed. Kaltenbrunner and Himmler had so far kept the plan secret, even from Hitler. Possibly they had hoped to confront him with an accomplished fact, and had reckoned on gaining his approval when they would submit the Ciano documents and diaries to him. Or it may have been that at the last moment they had misgivings and asked for the Führer's approval. In any case Hitler learned of the plan and immediately forbade its execution. General Harster recalled after the war that on the afternoon of 6 January he received a telephone call from Hitler himself who stated peremptorily that Harster would forfeit his own head if Ciano were enabled to save his. Harster immediately countermanded the whole operation. Frau Beetz was bitterly indignant at the role which she had been induced to play, but there was no other course open

⁵² Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 332-333, whose narrative at this point is again based on Harster's post-war account.

to her but to inform Ciano and then Edda and Lieutenant Pucci that her superiors had quashed the operation.⁵³

Edda Escapes

It was late in the night of 6 January as Lieutenant Pucci recalled (more probably 5 January) that he made his way back from Verona to Countess Edda at Ramiola. She was much upset by Pucci's delay which she at first attributed to some new German trick. About noon of 7 January the two started off for the rendezvous with Galeazzo. They made a first stop in Milan where they picked up the seven booklets of the diaries which they had hidden the day after Christmas. They put these seven booklets into one suitcase, packed the large parcel "Germania" in a second suitcase, and placed some letters and other papers of Edda in a third. They did not get off for Verona until about six o'clock in the evening.

An hour or so later they were on the Milan-Brescia highway. About half way toward Brescia the two rear tires went flat. They decided that Pucci would stay with the car, and that Edda would go on

⁵³ Susmel, *Vita sballata*, p. 333, whose quoted paragraph is taken directly from Harster's post-war account. It is Harster who gives the date of 6 January for Hitler's veto. If this is correct, then there is an error of one day in Pucci's report of 24 May 1945, and the foursome got back from Rome to Verona on the evening of 5 January rather than on the 6th. Cf. p. 20 and footnote 48.

Harster (Susmel, *loc. cit.*) was, of course, in Verona at the time, and did not witness what happened in Berlin. He records that he heard later the version which circulated among the German high military: that Ribbentrop was tipped off by someone, and immediately appealed to Hitler who all along had opposed any compromise with Ciano. Hitler promptly summoned Himmler and Kaltenbrunner and gave them a tongue lashing.

Hoettl, *Secret Front*, pp. 276-277, gives a somewhat different version. He states that Himmler and Kaltenbrunner got cold feet at the last moment, and asked Hitler's permission for the operation which was refused. He confirms that Hitler threatened to punish anyone who aided Ciano, but he does not mention a phone call, gives no precise date, and suggests that Hitler rather believed that Mussolini would not permit the father of his own grandchildren to be put to death.

Deakin, *Brutal Friendship*, p. 637, footnote f, states that Rudolf Rahn, the German Ambassador to the Republic of Salò, told him after the war that at this time, just before Ciano's execution, he flew to Hitler's headquarters and urged that Ciano be allowed to escape into Switzerland. Hitler refused, it is recorded, and reiterated that the Germans must regard the Verona trials as exclusively the affair of Mussolini.

Giovanni Dolfin's diary, entry for 7 January, confirms that Rahn was at Berlin at this time. *Con Mussolini nella tragedia: Diario del Capo della Segreteria Particolare del Duce 1943-1944* (Milan: Garzanti, 1949) p. 188.

alone as best she could, taking the diaries with her. Edda managed to thumb a ride as far as Brescia, and from there she walked and ran, and even rode a stretch with a man on a bicycle, straining every nerve to reach the rendezvous point by 2100. She arrived an hour late. She waited and waited in the bitter cold night. But her husband did not appear.

At about 0500 the next morning, 8 January, Edda hailed a ride in a truck and made it into Verona, dragging the suitcase containing the diaries. She sought out Beetz and together they went to General Harster, who merely remarked that the Germans had changed their minds. Frau Beetz apparently recognized what was in the suitcase but said not a word, and Harster did not have Edda searched. Frau Beetz managed to snatch an opportunity to urge Edda to flee to Switzerland, and to explain that General Harster had been made personally responsible for Count Ciano. She also managed to slip secretly into Edda's hands a letter in which Galeazzo recorded his last wishes.⁵⁴

Ciano's trial began on the same day, 8 January. The night before (7-8 January) there had been a rather strange intervention on the part of the Germans. Ambassador Rahn had gone to Berlin. He telephoned from there to Chargé d'Affaires Von Reichert urging that Ciano's trial be postponed for a few days. Von Reichert in turn got in touch with Pavolini, Secretary of the Fascist Party, who brought the proposal to Mussolini. The Duce declared bluntly: "That the Republican Government, given the publicity already made regarding the matter, could not consider it opportune to postpone the opening of the trial by even one day." But this curious intervention of the Germans at the last moment left Mussolini rather perplexed. He felt certain, however, that the German action did not come from Hitler. He then turned to his personal secretary, Dolfin, and declared:

"No intervention now can halt the course of events! For me, Ciano is already dead. He will not be able now to maneuver around in Italy, to let himself be seen, to have a name. Whoever voted for Grandi's order of the day will be condemned for it."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ *Pucci Report*, pp. 5-6; Cf. Dombrowski, *Twilight and Fall*, pp. 120-121; Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 334-335.

⁵⁵ Dolfin, *Con Mussolini nella tragedia*, pp. 188-189. Cf. footnote 53.

Lieutenant Pucci, who had stayed with the car while Edda went on, hoping to meet her husband, managed to get the tires repaired and reached Verona about noon. When he got to Edda she looked so distressed and worn out that he scarcely recognized her. They were not able to say very much for they were under constant surveillance by Gestapo agents. They started back for Ramiola, escorted this time by 14 German police in three automobiles. When they got to the clinic the place was under guard both by the Germans and by neo-Fascist police.

Not till she got to her own room did Edda read the letter from her husband which Pucci recalled ran something as follows:

"Darling, —meanwhile you are still living in the wonderful illusion that in a few hours we are going to be together again and free; for me agony has already started. . . . bless the children and bring them up to respect and worship what is right and honorable in life. . . ."

Edda now broke down in utter helplessness and frustration, knowing that her husband soon would be shot. The doctors worked over her for some time and after midnight she managed to pull herself together sufficiently to think about her next step. At Pucci's urging she decided to escape into Switzerland with Pucci's help, taking the diaries with her, and threaten its publication if Count Ciano were not released. There were the problems of carrying the documents, of eluding the guards, of getting across the Swiss frontier.

It was quite out of the question for Edda to carry all the diaries and the remaining documents as well. Pucci selected the five booklets of the diaries which covered the war years, wrapped them in a cloth which Edda then wound round her middle as a belt. Pucci had a flair with women's costumes! The first two booklets of the diary, the parcel of documents on "Germania," some personal papers of Edda, and some of her jewels were carefully wrapped up and the package was sealed with wax. Lieutenant Pucci then turned the package over to Dr. Melocchi, one of the two brothers directing the clinic, who assured Pucci that he would hide it where no one could find it, near the electric plant where there was danger of electrocution. The doctor was already initiated in the matter, and furthermore, had connections with the partisans. Dr. Melocchi swore that if Edda

and Pucci should be caught and executed, he would turn the documents over to the Allies when they reached Ramiola.⁵⁶

Pucci, in his air force uniform, approached the guards and showed them an appointment which he had at the air force medical institute in Ferrara where he was due for a physical examination following his illness. He was granted permission by the German police to go. At about noon, when there were fewer guards about the clinic than at other times, Edda went out through the basement and across the fields. It is said that she had pinned a "Do not disturb" card to the door of her room. Pucci and Edda made a clean get-away; they followed the back roads and made for Como where they stopped with friends.⁵⁷

Late in the night of 8 January Pucci and Edda Ciano reached Viggiù (or Cantello-Ligurno) on the frontier of Switzerland. They stayed overnight at the Hotel Madonnina and there Pucci helped her to write out three letters.

⁵⁶ This is Pucci's own first hand account, *Report*, pp. 7-8. Cf. Dombrowski, *Twilight and Fall*, pp. 121-122.

On May 16-17, 1945 Allen Dulles visited the clinic at Ramiola and recorded: "At the time of her flight on or about 5 January 1944 (Dr. Elvezio Melocchi thought it was Friday or Saturday) Edda Ciano entrusted to Dr. Elvezio Melocchi her husband's diary for 1937-1938, one package containing a file which bore the mention in Italian 'Ministry of Foreign Affairs—German—Italian relations'; two packages of phonograph records of Bruno Mussolini's voice; one case of jewels and many personal belongings including a quantity of furs. Edda took with her several other of her husband's diaries, concealing them on her own person, which made her look very bulky and gave rise to the rumors in Switzerland that she was to have a child. The documents and the diary left in Dr. Elvezio Melocchi's care represented the surplus which she was unable to carry with her." Memorandum for Files, 18 May 1945, "Ciano Diaries for 1937 and 1938, as well as other important documents left by his wife in Italy at the time of her flight to Switzerland in 1944," Item 12 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of Allen Dulles.

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 335-336, mentions the sealed package given to Dr. Melocchi with the volume on "Germania," and Edda's personal papers and jewels. He states further that the package contained 12 volumes of the conversations. If 16 volumes of the conversations were recovered at Rome (*op. cit.* p. 331), and if 6 were delivered to Harster (*op. cit.* p. 332) the remainder should have been 10, not 12.

Susmel also states that Edda took with her 8 booklets of the diaries.

⁵⁷ *Pucci Report*, p. 8; Dombrowski, *Twilight and Fall*, pp. 122-123. According to Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 336, three booklets of the diaries, those for the years 1936, 1937, and 1938 were left at Como in the house of the Pessina family.

To General Harster she wrote:

"[January 10, 1944]

General: For the second time I have entrusted myself to the word of the Germans with the outcome which you know. Now it is enough. If that is not done which was promised me I shall release against the Axis the most fearful campaign and thereby I shall make use of all the materials which I have and of all that I know. My conditions are: that within three days from the moment at which these letters will be transferred to Frau B[eetz] my husband must be at the Bern railway station, accompanied only by Frau B. between 10:00 and 15:00 hours. If this should be carried out in a completely loyal way, we will retire into private life and let nothing more be heard from us. The diaries will be turned over to Frau B. by my husband on that same day. I enclose two letters on this same subject, the one to the Führer, the other to the Duce. Turn these over immediately together with a copy of this letter itself.

(signed) Edda Ciano."

To Hitler she dictated:

"January 10, 1944.

Führer: For the second time I believed your word and for the second time I have been betrayed. It is only the fact of the soldiers who fell together on the battlefields that restrains me from going over to the foe. In case my husband is not freed in accordance with conditions which I have specified to your general no considerations will restrain me any longer. For some time the documents have been in the hands of persons who are authorized to use them in case anything should happen to my husband, to my children, or to my family. If, however, as I hope and believe, my conditions are accepted and we are left in peace now and in the future, one will hear nothing from us. I am distressed to be forced to act in this fashion, but you will understand.

(signed) Edda."

To her father Edda wrote:

"January 10, 1944

Duce: I have waited until today for you to show me the slightest feelings of humanity and justice. Now it is enough. If Galeazzo is not in Switzerland within three days in accordance with the conditions which I have made known to the Germans, then everything which I have at hand in the way of proofs will be used without pity. If, on the other hand, we are left in peace and security against everything from pulmonary consumption to auto-accident, then you will hear nothing further from us.

(signed) Edda Ciano."⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Deakin, *Brutal Friendship*, pp. 642-643, gives the texts of these letters in English translation in his summary of Kaltenbrunner's telegraphic report of 12 January 1944. I have translated the letter to Harster from the German of Kaltenbrunner's report, the original of which is in the file, Handakten Brobrick, in the Politische Archiv of the Auswärtiges Amt at Bonn. The microfilm is in the collection, Microcopy T-120, Serial 738, frames 267681-686, in the National Archives.

In a written report of 13 January 1944 addressed to Ribbentrop, Kaltenbrunner forwarded photostats of the original letters in Italian which were sent to Hitler and to Mussolini (738/267674-680). These originals each bore the date, 10 January 1944. The facsimile of Edda's letter to Mussolini, and the typed text were first published by the Milanese edition of *L'Unità*, 23 June 1945, p. 1.

The next day, Sunday, 9 January, Pucci took Edda up to the frontier. They stopped a few hundred yards from the line. He gave her a revolver to use—on either German or Italian guards if necessary, or on herself if they caught her. Pucci waited for an hour or so to make sure that she was across the frontier and then turned back.⁵⁹

Pucci records that he got back to Verona at about 0100. This must have been the night of 9-10 January. After some difficulty he was let into the hotel where the German agents lived, and he found Frau Beetz. The hotel is identified as the "Gabbia d'Oro" by Susmel. He assured her that Countess Ciano had reached Switzerland with the diaries. He added that she could let Ciano know of this, and he gave her the letters, urging her to hand them over as quickly as possible. Frau Beetz mentioned that the trial had not yet finished; and said she would wait until 0800 or so to turn over the letters. This delay would give Lieutenant Pucci a head start in getting into Switzerland himself.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Pucci's own account, *Report*, p. 8, indicates that they left Ramiola on 9 January, that they stayed overnight 9-10 January in the Hotel Madonnina, and that on the next day, 10 January he took Edda to the frontier at 1700. He then turned back and reached Verona about 0100 which would be on 11 January. Here again Pucci's chronology is off by one day. It does not leave sufficient time for his subsequent actions and the developments at Verona.

The German police report of the frontier crossing, which was made a short time after the event, states: "On Saturday, 8 January 1944 at 2230 hours there arrived at the Hotel Madonnina in Cantello-Ligurno (the proprietor Rustini), 3 or 4 kilometers eastwards of Varese, a woman with two men. The woman was recognized from a snap shot without a doubt as Frau R. The three stayed there overnight. On Sunday, January 9, 1944 at about 1:30 one of the men and the woman went toward the border. At about 1730 hours the man returned alone. A short time later both men drove away. The woman gave her name as Emilie Santos of Rome." Kaltenbrunner to Ribbentrop; 13 January 1944, German Foreign Office Archives, Inland II geheim: "Geheime Reichssachen" 1944, Vol. XV. (box 3). I have used the film, Microcopy T-120, National Archives, Serial 712/262452-453.

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 336 correctly dates the frontier crossing as the evening of 9 January.

⁶⁰ *Pucci Report*, pp. 8-9. The trial lasted for three days, 8, 9, and 10 January. The remark by Frau Beetz that the trial was not yet finished could not have been made during the early hours of 11 January. Pucci must have reached Verona on the night of 9-10 January, rather than one night later as he records.

The letters which Edda Ciano wrote, and deliberately misdated, were delivered before Ciano's execution, which occurred at about 0900 on Tuesday, 11 January. According to Susmel, Frau Beetz on the evening of 10 January, before making her usual visit to the Scalzi prison to see Ciano, went first to General Harster's office and delivered the envelope with the three letters, stating that they had been brought to her at the Hotel "Gabbia d'Oro" by Lieutenant Pucci. She added that she had also learned from Pucci that Ciano's wife had fled into Switzerland. General Harster forwarded the letter addressed to Mussolini by a special courier. He transmitted the text of the letter to Hitler by a telephone call to the Main Security Office in Berlin, and from there the text is said to have been retransmitted by telephone to Hitler's headquarters.⁶¹

Over at Gargnano, Mussolini had been following the course of the trial and the actions of the accused with great interest. At about 0100 on 11 January he telephoned to his personal secretary, Dolfin, who did not at first recognize his voice. Mussolini asked if Dolfin had had any news of Edda. He had had none, he said, and he had no particular news from Verona.

Mussolini summoned Dolfin the next morning at 0800, a good half hour earlier than usual. The Duce was very upset and extremely tired. "Last night," he said, "a letter was delivered to me from Edda, who has fled. In case Ciano is not set free within three days, she threatens to publish a complete documentary account of our relations with the Germans. I had known for some time that Ciano kept a diary on the events of these last few years, and a dossier which documented it, point for point. Ciano was clearly anti-German. His personal relations with Ribbentrop were never good, and toward the end they hated each other. The publication of this diary which aims to show the continuous German treachery toward us, even during the period of full alliance, could at this time provoke irreparable consequences!" With great bitterness Mussolini went on: "It is peculiarly my destiny to be betrayed by everyone, even by my own daughter. She has probably escaped into Switzerland."⁶²

⁶¹ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 346. The account here is apparently based on Harster's post-war testimony to Susmel.

⁶² Dolfin, *Con Mussolini nella tragedia*, pp. 200-201.

Back in Verona within the walls of the Scalzi prison, at the close of Monday, 10 January, the news soon spread that all of the Grand Councilors were condemned to death except Cianetti who was sentenced to 30 years imprisonment. Zenone Benini, Ciano's lifetime friend, was able to have a few words with him during the early part of that long night.⁶³ The Germans had at first refused even to permit him to take communion and to confess. The brunette lady, as Benini called Frau Beetz, was trying to get such permission. The permission was later granted and Don Chiot, the prison chaplain, was able to offer Count Ciano the last comforts of his faith.⁶⁴

About midnight the Chief of the Province appeared to make an inspection. He said that since the beginning of the trial he had had to report continuously to Mussolini. Ciano, Benini records, was now free for a time from his German guardian angel, and the two friends walked the corridor of the prison, arm in arm. Ciano told Benini: "Forget about the plea for mercy; Let us speak of serious things. When you return among men, and this cursed war will have finished (and it will finish soon) do not abandon my children and my wife: they are the only things that I still have. Edda has conducted herself admirably toward me."—Then he was silent; he wiped a tear with the back of his hand; murmured some words which I was unable to understand. Then he resumed. 'Now she is in flight and is trying to reach Switzerland, where the children have preceded her. She has with her my diary and other important documents, some of which I have written here. The transfer of these papers, the preparation and execution of all of this is mainly due to that noble creature whom the Germans set to spy on me. To her I have entrusted my political testament and other correspondence of great importance. I have also written to my friends letters of no political import, and she has left these with the Director so that they would be delivered through the appropriate authorities and that thus there would be no suspicion of of a clandestine correspondence.

⁶³ Benini was not a member of the Grand Council of Fascism, but in the period before 25 July, while Minister of Public Works, he was active in the movement to oust Mussolini. After the formation of the Republic of Salò, Benini gave himself up to avoid reprisals against his family, and he was promptly thrown into the Scalzi prison where he had the opportunity to talk to Ciano. He was released on 29 January 1944. *Vigilia a Verona*, pp. xlvii, 82, 168-169.

⁶⁴ Benini, *Vigilia a Verona*, pp. 115-125.

"Now if Edda succeeds in crossing the frontier with all the documentary material which she has, she will be in position at the appropriate moment to demonstrate to the world how things really were, and to reveal the principal secrets and the behind-the-scenes moves which led to the alliance with Germany and to the war. It will be something of the greatest interest."⁶⁵

Some time later during that long night, the prison director, Dr. Olas, passed on to Benini the latest news from the Prefecture. The Countess, it appeared, had eluded both the Italian and the German police, who had been searching for her for days. The last word of her was that she was at the Swiss frontier. Toward dawn Benini went back to Ciano's cell. The German lady again was there. Ciano's face radiated satisfaction when he got that news.⁶⁶

The Pursuit

Although Countess Edda had got over the border and into Switzerland, her troubles were by no means over. On 15 January she was able to reach her children and tell them the horrible truth: papa had been shot because grandpa insisted on it. Mussolini himself was embittered by his daughter's attitude and thoroughly alarmed by her threat to publish the diaries. Both he and the Nazi leaders during the year 1944 tried by one means or another to learn of Edda's whereabouts, to make contact with her, and to gain possession of the diaries.

On 11 January Vittorio Mussolini, at his father's instigation, tried to follow his sister's trail in order to get the diaries, or at least to try to persuade her not to have them published. He got to Como and there at the house of the Pessinas learned that Edda had crossed into Switzerland.⁶⁷ He could follow the trail no further.

Later that same month Mussolini arranged to have Don Giusto Pancino visit him at Gargnano. This priest had been a childhood friend of Edda's; later he had been a chaplain in Albania when Edda served there as a Red Cross nurse. Don Giusto had not seen Mussolini since March of 1942 and he was shocked when he was ushered into the private study of the Duce on 27 January.

⁶⁵ Benini, *Vigilia a Verona*, pp. 128-129.

⁶⁶ Benini, *Vigilia a Verona*, pp. 137-140.

⁶⁷ Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 359.

Mussolini appeared emaciated, dispirited, worn out. Their interview lasted for more than half an hour. Mussolini explained how Edda had been pursued by the SS which was intent on getting possession of the diaries at any cost. Mussolini tended somewhat to play down the importance of the diaries in speaking to the priest. He mentioned that he himself had from time to time advised Ciano to record the events of the day. The main thing, he suggested, was to prevent the Germans from getting them. He urged the priest to go to the Vatican for help in getting into Switzerland to find Edda Ciano.

Don Pancino reached Rome on 2 February, spoke to Monsignor Tardini, Deputy Cardinal Secretary of State, and received from him a letter of introduction to Monsignor Bernardini, Apostolic Nuncio in Bern. On 5 February Don Pancino again met with the Duce who directed him to say to Edda that her father's house would be open to her if she wished to return to it. After a second trip to Rome to secure a Swiss visa, Don Pancino was able to reach Bern on 4 March.⁶⁸

According to Don Pancino's testimony at the trial of Graziani, the Germans in Italy got wind of the discussions with Mussolini and of the intended mission into Switzerland in search of the diaries. Mussolini, the priest stated, was at the time nothing more than a prisoner of the Germans who completely dominated the situation and knew his every move. Rahn and Wolff took pains to assure Don Pancino that this was the situation. When he got into Switzerland, German agents approached him with the offer of 100 million lire if he would deliver the diaries to them.^{68a}

Edda Ciano was now practically a prisoner of the Swiss government which maintained a most careful watch over her. Only with difficulty was Monsignor Bernardini able to learn of her whereabouts from Pillet Golaz, head of the Political Department in Bern. When Don Pancino arrived at Ingenbohl, Edda was astonished to see him; she wondered how he had been able to find her. But she refused to hear anything from her father. She told the priest that Mussolini would be redeemed

⁶⁸ Don Giusto Pancino, "Tentai di riconciliare Edda Ciano e Mussolini," *Oggi*, 22 September 1954.

Cf. Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 365-366.

^{68a} Testimony of Don Pancino at the session of January 21, 1949, Rodolfo Graziani, *Processo*, 3 vols. 1948-1950, vol. III (Rome: Ruffolo editore, 1950), p. 1106.

Cf. Deakin, *Brutal Friendship*, p. 777, note c.

in her eyes only if he fled or if he killed himself. On returning to Italy, Don Pancino first sought the advice of Cardinal Schuster before reporting such negative results to Mussolini.

It was not easy for Don Pancino to tell Mussolini, on 29 March what Edda had said. During the course of the discussion Mussolini learned that Hitler had a copy of his own diary of the summer of 1943, which contained comments anything but flattering to Hitler.⁶⁹ This only increased Mussolini's concern lest the Germans gain possession of Ciano's diaries as well.

In April Mussolini for the second time summoned Don Giusto and persuaded him to go to Switzerland again to see Edda. This time the priest carried a letter from father to daughter. He had some success, and was able to make new arrangements for the manuscript of the Ciano diaries. Edda had but little money because most of Ciano's wealth had been confiscated by the Badoglio regime. She was in miserable health. She feared for the fate of her three children in case of her death. The booklets of the diaries were now delivered over to Don Pancino who placed them in a strong box at the Credit Suisse bank of Bern under his name and that of Emilia Conte Marchi, a pseudonym chosen by Edda. In case of Edda's death, Don Pancino agreed to arrange for publication of the diaries with the proceeds to go to support of the children.⁷⁰

In March 1945 Don Pancino undertook a final mission to Switzerland at the behest of Mussolini who now was hoping to make some contact with the Allies. The priest again saw Edda, quite secretly, for the Swiss authorities had refused him permission to visit her. She had left Ingenbohl and now was living in a clinic near Montreux.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Don Giusto Pancino, *op. cit.*
Cf. Hoettl, *The Secret Front*, pp. 232-233.

⁷⁰ Don Giusto Pancino, *op. cit.*
Cf. Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 370.

⁷¹ Don Giusto Pancino, *op. cit.*
Edda later mentioned something of this visit to Allen Dulles whose file has this undated notation:

"Justo Pancino—old friend of Musso—brought letters from Musso to Edda & Nuncio—Told Edda that Himmler wished Nuncio to advise Vatican that Germans wished peace & would let Am. & B's in; didn't want Russians—

"Told Musso re Himmler's plan & said the fools—should have done this 2 yrs ago —" Item 23R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

The next month came the triumph of the Allied armies in Italy, the rising of the partisans in the North, and the end of the Republic of Salò. Edda had just turned her radio to the wave-length of the Milan station on 28 April when she heard the announcement that a great crowd had gathered at the Piazza Loreto to see her father's corpse.⁷²

The Germans Pursue

The Countess Ciano and the Marchese Pucci had neatly given the German guards the slip when they left Ramiola for the Swiss border on 8 January. But when the guards discovered the empty room behind the "Do Not Disturb" sign, there was a quick call for reinforcements. The SD arrived in force and interrogated the Melocchi brothers. But they learned very little and they did not, at this time, carefully search the clinic. The diaries for 1937-1938, the portion of the supporting documents, and the other possessions of Edda Ciano which had been entrusted to Dr. Melocchi, remained safe.⁷³

Meanwhile, other German agents had picked up Pucci. After delivering Edda's letters to Frau Beetz by whom they were passed on to General Harster, Lieutenant Pucci had hoped to make his own escape to Switzerland over the route through Sondrio. But he was ill to begin with, had over-taxed himself, and had had very little sleep for several nights running. He pulled off by the side of the road and slept for several hours. When he tried to move on, the starter of his car failed to operate, and he went to a peasant's house for help. On his return, another car drew up on the road, full of Germans. They asked for his papers, and on learning his identity shouted with gleeful rage. Their first question was, "Where is the Countess?"⁷⁴

Pucci was first taken back to Verona for interrogation, and then on to Ramiola where there was further questioning in the presence

⁷² *Il Giornale del Mattino* (Rome) 21 September 1945, Jader Jacobelli, "Sono stato a Lipari e ho parlato con Edda."

Cf. Anita Pensotti, "Edda Ciano parla per la prima volta," *Oggi*, 25 September 1959.

⁷³ "Memorandum for Files. Subject: Ciano Diaries for 1937 and 1938, as well as other important Documents left by his wife in Italy, at the time of her flight to Switzerland in 1944." 18 May 1945, Item 12R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Personal Files of Allen W. Dulles.

⁷⁴ *Pucci Report*, p. 9.

Cf. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 27 April 1946, p. 24.

of Dr. Melocchi. The doctor, it appeared, had told the Germans that Pucci was violently anti-Fascist and anti-German, but he explained to Pucci that he had said this to make the Germans believe he was on their side. After a few hours a German officer ordered Pucci to change from his uniform into civilian clothes, and to be taken to Gestapo headquarters in the Hotel Regina. Here the Germans produced the hotel keeper of Viggiù who identified Pucci as the man who had helped Edda Ciano over the frontier. The Germans questioned Pucci from all angles regarding Edda, the diaries, the documents, and the children, and beat him unmercifully when he refused to talk.

After some hours of torture, Pucci was thrown into a cell in San Vittore prison with another prisoner who appears to have been an *agent provocateur*. Next day Pucci was brought back to the torture chamber and beaten so severely that his skull was fractured in several places. Fearing that he might betray his trust Pucci tried to commit suicide with a razor blade which he had managed to conceal on his person at Ramiola. But he was handcuffed; the attempt failed; and the net result was that he was further weakened by loss of blood.⁷⁵

The next day the beatings and questionings began again, but suddenly ceased. The Germans moved Pucci back to his cell, and treated him with decency. Frau Beetz appeared. What had happened? It seems that on 14 January Hoettl arrived back in Italy with a new mission for "La Burkhardt." She was to go to Switzerland, make contact with Countess Edda, and learn from her the hiding place of the remaining diaries and papers. She herself made the suggestion that the SD also make use of the services of Pucci, who, because of his relationship with Countess Edda, might be able to persuade her not to use the diaries against the Germans. La Burkhardt burst into tears at the sight of Pucci covered with blood after his torturing. Furthermore, her conscience bothered her. She felt that her own haste in turning over Edda's letters to General Harster had been responsible for Pucci's quick capture. By her tears and pleadings Pucci was persuaded to agree to tell Edda that both she and the children would be killed if she did anything against the Germans.⁷⁶

The SD had little difficulty in getting Frau Beetz into Switzerland. Her cover was that of temporary replacement for a clerical secretary

⁷⁵ *Pucci Report*, pp. 9-11.

Cf. Andrea Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 27 April 1946, p. 24.

⁷⁶ *Pucci Report*, p. 12; Cf. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 27 April 1946, p. 74.

in the German Consulate in Lugano, and as such she was promptly issued a Swiss visa. With Pucci it was different. He had no proper papers. The SD smuggled him across the border by boat during the night, and once across he met Frau Beetz at a prearranged rendezvous.

As soon as he was in Switzerland, Lieutenant Pucci made very strenuous efforts to interest the British authorities, through the Vice Consul in Lugano, Mr. Lancelot de Garston, in the Ciano documents. Perhaps he also asked about the possibility of asylum for Edda and her children in England. The British attitude was completely negative. The one thing that Pucci accomplished here was to give Mr. de Garston a note which he hoped would be delivered to Edda Ciano.

All this time Pucci had been simply going on his nerves. Now he suddenly collapsed. He got to a doctor who felt sure that his skull had been fractured, and thus it was that Lieutenant Pucci felt obliged to report to the Swiss police. He then entered a hospital in Bellinzona under the care of a Dr. Bettellini. Not until the end of March was the Italian Air Force Lieutenant released from the hospital and sent to Estavayer-le-Lac. For the rest of his stay in Switzerland he was under close supervision by the Swiss police.⁷⁷

Pucci under internment was of no use to Frau Beetz and the Germans in their efforts to reach Countess Edda and to head off any attempt at publication of the diaries. Frau Beetz then tried unsuccessfully to raise the bail money required by the Swiss authorities in such cases as Pucci's. Possibly Pucci was able to learn Edda's address, and to write to her, urging her not to undertake any action against the Germans.

Frau Beetz also learned where Edda was staying, and made a trip to Ingenbohl, but without being able to see the Countess. About this time she got some alarming news from her superiors. It appeared that a priest named Pancino had been able to visit Edda in her internment at Ingenbohl, and Frau Beetz suspected that Father Pancino was working for the Germans as well as for Mussolini. It should be remembered that it was through Frau Beetz that General Harster and the SD had got hold of Ciano's supporting papers which had been sent to Berlin in January. She had been a most useful and skillful

⁷⁷ *Pucci Report*, pp. 12-14.

Cf. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 27 April 1946, p. 74.

agent. Now Frau Beetz was greatly afraid that Edda would tell the priest of the part which she had played in helping Edda to escape and to get the diaries into Switzerland. If her masters were to learn of her true role, she feared they would arrest her and torture her. She resolved to cover her tracks by taking the initiative for the recovery of the remaining Ciano materials which she knew were at Ramiola.

After her second Swiss visa expired, Frau Beetz returned to Italy. There she enjoyed a couple of weeks vacation with her husband, whose military leave had been arranged by Kaltenbrunner. She was now directed to make contact with Father Pancino and with his aid to reach Edda and urge her to keep quiet. This second mission into Switzerland did not materialize because the Swiss Government refused to issue a new visa.

In the summer of 1944, either through the direct participation of Frau Beetz, or at her instigation, the *Sicherheitsdienst* was able to get its hands on all of the materials which Edda and Lieutenant Pucci had left at Ramiola in January. There are two or three different versions of this episode varying in credibility and differing as to the precise time and who took part. But there is agreement that it occurred during the summer of 1944 and that a fabricated letter played a big role.

The most convincing version comes from the Melocchi brothers. At war's end, as we will note, Allen Dulles hastened over the border of Switzerland into Italy, equipped with precise directions for getting to Ramiola, and with a genuine letter addressed to Dr. Walter Melocchi by Edda Ciano, asking that he turn over to the American her husband's diaries, certain other documents, and the case of her jewels. Here are the exact words of Allen Dulles' report:

"1. On May 16th and 17th I called on the brothers Elvezio and Walter Melocchi, doctors of medicine, who have a sanitarium ("casa di cure—Ramiola") at Ramiola, Prov. of Parma. Countess Edda gave me a letter addressed to Dr. Walter Melocchi in which she requested him to turn over to me certain documents, parts of her husband's diary and a case of her jewels which she left with him for safekeeping at the time of her flight to Switzerland in January 1944.

"2. The doctors stated that all the documents and the box with Edda Ciano's jewels were taken away by the Germans after Edda's departure. Dr. Walter Melocchi, to whom Edda's letter which I brought was addressed, answered this letter in writing."

[Here follows an account of the searches in January 1944.]

"7. During this first interrogation, no questions were asked about any documents and the brothers did not volunteer any information about them. As a side remark Dr. Elvezio Melocchi mentioned that he had concealed the two diaries behind the books on the shelves of his office. The interrogation by the Germans took place in that room and they looked over some of the books without discovering the diaries. The remaining documents, phonograph records and the jewel case, Dr. Elvezio kept in his own room. None of these were taken away by the Germans at that time.

"8. Shortly afterwards the Italian police appeared at the Sanitarium, wanted to arrest the two brothers and to close the establishment because of its being connected with the Countess's escape. The brothers were convinced that there was an Italian spy among the establishment's personnel, who was reporting to the Italian police, often exaggerating the happenings in order to give himself more importance.

"9. It was not until some time in August that the next development took place. At that time there came to the Sanitarium a man who claimed to be a nephew of Professor Fossati, a well-known gynecologist from Milan. This man stated that he came from Switzerland as emissary for Edda Ciano to obtain the documents left behind by her. Elvezio Melocchi was caught off his guard and asked for the written instructions from the Countess, as it had been arranged between her and the doctors that the things left behind would only be delivered upon written orders from her. The man left but returned two days later bringing a letter purported to have come from the Countess. It was an obvious falsification and the doctors decided not to hand over the things, pretending that they were no longer at Ramiola, which was not a safe place for them, but that they had been taken away and hidden somewhere in Florence. The pseudo-messenger left again. Dr. Walter Melocchi noticed that the car in which he had come had a German license identified as coming from Trieste.

"10. A few days later two agents of the SD from Parma appeared at the Sanitarium accompanied by an SS officer whom they recognized as one of those who conducted the original interrogation in January. Elvezio and Walter Melocchi were both taken to Parma, to via Carlo Alberto XIII (Stradone). A number of the German military were lined up on their entering the building and generally a show of importance was put on, presumably to intimidate the brothers. By that time both of them were quite nervous and unwilling to take any chances on behalf of the Countess. Therefore when they were told that they would be taken to Florence to produce the documents left behind by Edda, they admitted without further difficulties that there was no point of going there as the documents were kept in the Sanitarium at Ramiola. They were taken back and turned over to the German SD officials everything they had for the Countess, including a handbag mentioned by them now, for the first time during this narrative. Elvezio Melocchi stated that the Countess had shown him the contents of this handbag which contained a number of letters from Mussolini to her. The Countess qualified these letters as being 'Important for future developments.' When asked whether they had read those letters after Edda's departure the brothers answered in the negative, saying that they never were interested in politics. I then asked them whether they had read the con-

tents of the Italian Foreign Office dossier left with them. Elvezio Melocchi said that they had not, inasmuch as, to avoid any complications, he wrapped and sealed with his own seal, those documents, in the presence of Edda. They admitted, however, having read some parts of the diary which dealt with the Spanish war events. One of the brothers said that they found the reading nauseating and after a few pages did not read any more. I then remarked that the diary concerning the Munich events was in these volumes, to which one of the brothers promptly reacted by saying that the relative sheets, perhaps 10 or 15 in number were cut out. The brothers then admitted that they had looked for that particular topic as one they thought would be interesting! Both brothers stated that they made no copies of anything at all nor did they make any photostats, . . ."⁷⁸

⁷⁸ "Memorandum for Files, Subject: Ciano Diaries for 1937 and 1938, as well as other important Documents left by his wife in Italy, at the time of her flight to Switzerland in 1944, 18 May 1945, Item 12R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

A letter of Walter Melocchi to Countess Edda Ciano, dated 16 May 1945, related substantially the same facts regarding the two booklets of the diary and other materials and it repeats the statement of the arrest of the brothers by the SD in October of 1944, Walter for five days and Elvezio for 53. Item 20R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

Cf. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 27 April 1946, p. 76.

Frau Beetz, at the end of the war in Europe and after she fell into Allied hands, seems to have explained that she twice visited Ramiola in June 1944 and then with the aid of Dr. Segna regained all of the materials. She herself then took the documents to Zossen where she prepared a summary of them for Hoettl, Chief of Amt VI B. It is not excluded that Dr. Segna is the same person as was described by Dr. Melocchi to Allen Dulles.

Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, pp. 369-370, gives an account which is apparently based on post-war testimony to him by Harster, as follows. Segna remained convinced, despite the failure to discover anything in January, that Edda Ciano must have left important materials at Ramiola. He therefore fabricated a letter purporting to be from Countess Ciano in Switzerland to Dr. Melocchi asking that the materials be turned over for delivery to her. Thereupon Dr. Melocchi surrendered: the 12 volumes of the "colloqui"; the file "Germania"; the documents regarding Ciano's last mission to Hitler's headquarters in December 1942; Edda's diary as a Red Cross nurse; and her correspondence with her father. The Ciano materials were sent on to Berlin; the others were held at Verona. Susmel's account is not so credible as that of the Melocchis. What Harster learned was second hand, not what he himself saw or did.

Susmel makes no mention in this connection (pp. 369-370) of the diaries before 1939. He states, however, that after the recovery of the materials at Ramiola, Frau Beetz and Segna went on to Como and there picked up the three booklets of the diary, that is for 1936, 1937, and 1938.

I find no mention anywhere in Edda Ciano's correspondence with Allen Dulles of a diary for 1936. Edda Ciano in that correspondence frequently referred to the two notebooks for 1937 and 1938 respectively, and stated consistently that she had left them at Ramiola.

The *Sicherheitsdienst*, chiefly through the operations of Frau Beetz, now had the five or six volumes of records of conversations which General Harster had received in January 1944 and had sent on to Berlin; the two diary volumes for the years 1937 and 1938, and the bound volume labeled 'Germania' which had been taken from Ramiola in August. The two volumes of the diaries were quite like the other five calendar notebooks.⁷⁹ The volumes of the '*colloqui*' or memoranda of conversation must have been the copies which Ciano personally made or set aside while other official copies went into the *Archivio di Gabinetto* and have survived in microfilm form.^{79a} The volume, 'Germania' must have been a kind of personal copy retained by Ciano.

Frau Beetz made a summary of the new materials seized at Ramiola in the summer of 1944, and then was directed to return to her home in Weimar to make a full translation of the whole collection. This work was done under careful security precautions. Each night after the day's work the original documents were placed in the safe of the Gestapo in Weimar. In the last month of the Nazi regime, that is in April 1945, Hitler ordered these Italian documents and the translations to be destroyed. Without the knowledge of her superiors, however, Frau Beetz had made an extra carbon copy of her translations. It has been suggested that she thought of using these in a book in case Countess Ciano would grant permission. Just before the end came, she buried these copies of her translations in her garden, which some said was a rose garden.

Enter US Intelligence

On 4 June 1944 the Allied armies entered Rome. In the next month *l'Unità*, organ of the Communist Party in Italy, published a little note which was immediately echoed in the *New York Times* of the following day, 30 July 1944:

"Interested parties are deliberately holding back the publication of the late Count Ciano's diary, the Communist newspaper *Unità*, charged today.

⁷⁹ See above, p. 4-5.

^{79a} In the microfilm collection at the National Archives called the Lisbon Papers, Microcopy T-816.

"The diary, which Ciano kept from the beginning of the war until his arrest last summer, is said to be one of the most important historic documents of the Second World War. It was believed that his wife had taken the only copy with her when she fled to Switzerland, pursued by the orders from her father, Benito Mussolini, to get her, dead or alive. However, *Unità* said that the diary was in Italy and had been hidden or suppressed by some who feared its revelations."

This note in *l'Unità* was apparently the first real alert American intelligence agencies received about the Ciano diaries.⁸⁰

A bit later, that is about mid-August of 1944, American counter-intelligence agents picked up Zenone Benini. Ciano had poured out his heart to Benini on that last long night before his execution, and almost his last words were of his hope that his widow would be able to publish his diaries and notes and thus vindicate his memory.⁸¹ Benini was able to give considerable information about the diaries, information which was embodied in a 15-page memorandum by Lt. Col. Henry H. Cumming, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Peninsular Base Section and dated 16 August.⁸²

Benini mentioned that the diaries were known to quite a number of people, and that Ciano on several occasions had mentioned his intention to have these documents published abroad, perhaps in England or America. Benini also stated that the diaries included:

- a. Records of personal conversations between Hitler and Mussolini;
- b. Terms of the so-called Pact of Steel;
- c. Accounts of the Munich Conference;

⁸⁰ Interview with Mr. Allen W. Dulles, 7 January 1966. Mr. Dulles had learned of Edda Ciano's arrival in Switzerland in the winter of 1943-44, he had made inquiries with Magistrati, Italian Minister in Bern and who had married Ciano's deceased sister, but had got no clue that she had the diaries with her (Message Dulles to OSS, Washington, 19 January 1945 [paragraph 5], Item 44, File "Edda Ciano Diaries").

Sumner Welles knew of the existence of the diaries, but he did not publicly mention this fact until he wrote the introduction for the American edition of the diaries which was issued in January 1946.

German intelligence agents, as noted, had been on the trail of the diaries for some time. It is not excluded that there was a Communist penetration of the SD which enabled *l'Unità* to publish its note.

⁸¹ See above, pp. 30-31.

⁸² Enclosure No. 2, Despatch 703, Robert D. Murphy, United States Political Adviser, AFHQ, Top Secret, File "Edda Ciano Diaries," Item 65R.

d. Copies of all personal secret documents of Mussolini concerning the most important problems of foreign policy, particularly those bearing on Italo-German relations. (Ciano is understood to have copied these documents personally, in long-hand, trusting no one.)"⁸³

Benini declared categorically that Ciano had told him: "They (The Germans and Republican Fascists) have stripped me of my possessions. I am poor now. But there is one treasure they have not taken which is of more value to me than all the rest: my Diary, now in the hands of my wife."

"Benini is convinced that, as life-long friend of Ciano and as financial manager of both Galeazzo and Edda, he can persuade the latter to make the document available to Allied authorities. He is equally convinced that Edda Ciano, now reported in Switzerland, has not turned the Diary over to the Germans, since she regards it as an instrument of eventual security for herself and children after the collapse of Germany and the Italian Republican Fascist government."

To assist the American authorities (and incidentally thereby to help his own cause as a former Fascist) and at the same time to fulfill the promise to Galeazzo, Benini on 15 August addressed a letter to Edda, entrusting its delivery to the Americans.

"I was in the Verona prison," Benini wrote, "from the 30th of November to the 30th of January and I was able to get in touch with Galeazzo in spite of the strict guard kept. I spent the last tragic night of January second [*sic*] with him, and I am burning with the desire to bring you his last wishes, his last words, and his advices." Somewhat cryptically Benini mentioned that "He praised all that you had done for him, upon you he placed the certainty that some day he will be truly understood as to his thoughts and actions in Italy and abroad. He has counted on you so that the world might have an irrefutable revelation of so many capital truths."⁸⁴

Ambassador Kirk was consulted and suggested that the matter of securing the diary was of sufficient importance to warrant its being taken up through the War Department with a view to possible diplomatic action in Switzerland.

⁸³ Note that Benini, in speaking to Colonel Cumming, drew no distinction between the diary and the supporting papers.

⁸⁴ The letter in English is enclosure No. 1 in Despatch No. 703, 25 August 1944.

Between the arrival in Washington of Mr. Murphy's despatch No. 703 to the State Department, the arrival of whatever messages regarding Ciano's diary went to the War Department through its channels, and the next step, there was quite a lapse of time. But on 22 October the US Minister in Bern⁸⁵ received an instruction stating that the Department of State had reliable information that Count Ciano's diaries were in the possession of his widow in Switzerland. The Minister was directed to try to get the diaries or a microfilm copy, and it was suggested that he might wish to make use of OSS help.⁸⁶

The head of the Office of Strategic Services network in Switzerland was Allen W. Dulles. He operated in direct contact with the Legation and was able to use its communications facilities for reporting to home base in Washington. He had managed to get into the bastion of neutral Switzerland just as the portcullis was being lowered following the Allied landings in North Africa and the German overrunning of unoccupied (Vichy) France.⁸⁷

After discussing the problem with Minister Harrison, Mr. Dulles began, or rather renewed his search for Edda Ciano and the diaries. Bellia, the Italian Consul in Lausanne,⁸⁸ had served in Ciano's personal office; he knew Edda well; and from him Dulles gained the impression that Edda probably had the diaries with her. Mr. Dulles enlisted the services of a few people, a team, so to speak, in the quest for Edda and the diary. These were Cordelia Dodson, Mme. Louis de Chollet, an American woman married to a Swiss, and Paul Ghali, correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*.⁸⁹

Meanwhile, Lieutenant Pucci, who had been released from the hospital at the end of March with the fractures of his skull healed, had been sent to Estavayer-le-Lac, and then to Fribourg. There he met Mme. de Chollet in the early autumn. Pucci abruptly turned down

⁸⁵ Leland Harrison (1883-1951); Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland since July 13, 1937.

⁸⁶ Copy of telegram as received, item 60R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."

⁸⁷ See Allen W. Dulles' own delightful account of his adventurous arrival in Switzerland: *The Secret Surrender* (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper and Row, 1966) pp. 12 ff.

⁸⁸ Franco Bellia, entered the Italian foreign service in 1933; in 1941 headed the "Ufficio della Segreteria" in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

⁸⁹ Interview with Allen Dulles, January 17, 1966.

Mme. de Chollet's suggestion that he capitalize on his friendship with the Countess Ciano by writing some newspaper articles about her; but he gained the clear impression that the Americans were much interested in Ciano's widow.

At the end of October, Pucci, who had moved back to Estavayer, managed to see Edda in Lausanne. They talked at length about the diary and documents. Pucci asked her if he should contact the Americans and she agreed. Finally on 6 December Pucci managed to get permission to go to Fribourg along with a school group which made the excursion to see the procession of St. Nicholas. Although Pucci was not able to see Mme. de Chollet, he talked to her on the phone indicating that he wished to see her and had something of importance to say. But he did not wish to run the risk of directly mentioning the diary on the telephone.

A couple of days after this phone call, Mme. de Chollet arrived in Estavayer accompanied by Paul Ghali, and the two met with Pucci. At just about this time there had been newspaper stories of a marriage of Countess Ciano and Marchese Pucci. Ghali wanted to know about this. Pucci denied the rumor, but he brought up the subject of the diaries and indicated that Edda might be willing to let them out.⁹⁰

The next step was the delivery to Edda Ciano of a copy of the letter which Zenone Benini had entrusted to the American authorities in Rome in August. To Mme. de Chollet, who served as messenger, Mr. Dulles wrote on 15 December:

"I do not know whether the original letter was sent to Washington or directly to the Countess by other channels. If she has not already received it, I feel sure she would desire to read it, and, of course, she may keep this copy, if she so desires.

"From Rome I learn that Signor Benini is with the American military forces in the neighborhood of Rome and has given these authorities all information in his possession with regard to the importance of the Diaries, and of his willingness, in the interest of his friend and of the cause, to do what he can to help toward making them available, so that photographic copies can be made under conditions that would preserve to the rightful owners all rights of eventual publication.

"I am sure that you will express to your friend my sincere conviction that it is important that the material we discussed be made immediately available under safeguards which will be scrupulously observed, and which will reserve to your friend and her children all rights of publication."

⁹⁰ *Pucci Report*, pp. 14-15.

In conclusion Mr. Dulles mentioned that he had to leave for Paris next day, but hoped to see Mme. de Chollet on his return which would be on December 20th.⁹¹

We can well imagine Edda Ciano's feelings from the reply to Benini which she drafted on 16 December:

"Dear Zenone: Only today I have received a copy (in English) of the letter you wrote me on August 15th. It is useless, and I cannot tell you all I went through—a real hell—always with the thought that I was not able to do (for reasons beyond my control) what Galeazzo had written me to do.

"Your letter, although late, arrives to the point. For that reason, before arranging anything, I would like to see you as soon as possible. It is very important. I beg you to be careful because if the Swiss (for reasons of quiet living) or above all the Germans knew of the dirty trick I am about to pull on them, my life (but that would not have any importance—I am so tired of everything) and that of my children would be seriously endangered.

"But it is certain that even if I would have to die, I want first to avenge Galeazzo and to succeed in making him known such as he was.

I will be waiting for you. I embrace you affectionately.

[signed]

Edda"⁹²

After this reply by Edda, which was read and analyzed all the way from Bern to Caserta to Rome, the initial thought of the American intelligence authorities was to try to elicit another letter from Benini, in which he would specifically direct Edda Ciano to the next step. This time, however, Benini refused. Edda Ciano wanted Benini to come to Switzerland so that she could consult him directly. But Benini was under a blanket indictment for his Fascist activities, and the American intelligence officers did not wish to go so far as to move him into neutral Switzerland.⁹³

Mr. Dulles in Switzerland had believed, after receiving the reports from Mme. de Chollet and Paul Ghali, that the situation was now ripe for filming the diaries. He made out a certificate that Daniel Schachter was officially authorized "to make photographic reproduc-

⁹¹ Copy of the letter, Bern, 15 December 1944, Item 57R File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

⁹² The Italian holograph, marked 'not sent,' is in the File "Edda Ciano Diaries" Item 8R. A copy in English translation, item 53R; another such copy, item 44R, Exhibit A.

⁹³ Telegram, Caserta to Bern (for Dulles) 29 December 1944, Item 61 L; Telegram, Bern to Caserta (for American Political Adviser) 31 December 1944, Item 60 L; Telegram 837, Caserta to Bern (for Dulles) 11 January 1945, item 57 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

tions of documents, records and reports desired to complete the official documentation of United States Government Offices. Any documents so photographed by him are for official uses only.”⁹⁴ Armed with this certificate, Schachter was sent to Countess Ciano to make photographs of the diaries, but she refused. She stated that she was willing to go through with the matter of making the diary available to the United States Government, but she insisted first on talking directly with Mr. Dulles.⁹⁵

Countess Ciano got the same message to Mr. Dulles through another channel. In a letter sent 20 December to Mme. de Chollet she wrote . . . “when your ‘important friend’ comes I should like to talk with him because, though I am willing with all my heart to carry through the deal the whole thing is too important for me (and I am not thinking of money) to take wild chances blindfolded. . . . Your important friend could come with his car and take me for a ride (not in the American sense of it I mean to say).”⁹⁶

In these circumstances, and despite the risk which was involved of a refusal by Countess Ciano to cooperate, or to spin the negotiations out and exploit a connection with Mr. Dulles, he determined to speak to her directly. He brought Magistrati into the picture at the time, and that influence probably was helpful. Magistrati was no longer Minister in Bern. His prominent Fascist past might require investigation in anti-Fascist Italy. Dulles believed that Magistrati had worked conscientiously for the Allies since the Armistice, and promised to put in a good word for him at Rome if he would help to get the diaries.⁹⁷

Dulles Gets the Diaries

On 7 January 1945 Allen Dulles motored to Monthey, in the Valais, accompanied by Mme. de Chollet, who had arranged for a meeting

⁹⁴ Copy of the certificate, item 58 R, File “Edda Ciano Diaries,” Personal Files of Allen Dulles.

⁹⁵ Dulles’ report to OSS, Washington, Bern, 19 January 1945, item 44R, File “Edda Ciano Diaries.” (This report is of basic importance and summarizes a great deal of Dulles’ moves with respect to the diary.)

⁹⁶ Holograph letter, undated but with envelope post-marked Monthey, 20 XII 44, item 7 R, File “Edda Ciano Diaries.”

⁹⁷ Interview with Mr. Dulles, 17 January 1966; Message of Dulles, 30 December 1944, Item 52 R, File “Edda Ciano Diaries.”

there with Edda Ciano. It was almost a year since Countess Ciano, with the help of Lieutenant Pucci, had been able to escape into Switzerland with the 5 booklets of Count Ciano's diaries. This meeting in Monthey was secret. The war was still going on, and Countess Ciano was under rather close surveillance by the Swiss. The three spent a good part of the afternoon discussing the delivery of the diaries to the United States Government.

On the one hand Edda wished to make the diaries available in accordance with what she now believed to have been her husband's last wishes. On the other she hated to give up her last assets. She wished to bargain, yet she wished at the same time to give the impression of a generous act toward America. She was anxious to get out of Switzerland and beyond the reach of the *Sicherheitsdienst*. She wanted to talk directly with Benini before coming to a decision. She needed clear assurances regarding her rights for commercial publication, and she was very anxious that her husband's political reputation be vindicated.

Mr. Dulles was chiefly anxious to move quickly. He took the position that the diaries were losing value to the US Government every day; that this was Edda's last real chance to make a generous act; that the US Government was not interested in a bargain or in paying out money. He gave full assurances that her rights for commercial publication would not be impaired, but he could not state when, with the war still on, the diaries could be published. He was careful to explain that the US Government might conceivably wish to publish parts of the diaries if it would help in the war.

In the end Edda agreed and arrangements were made for a team of photographers to make the reproductions. Dulles was impressed by Edda's great resentment at her father for failing to heed her intercession for Ciano's life, and by her fear and hatred of the Germans, above all of Ribbentrop. In his report of the discussion, Dulles suggested that if the US government were to publish any part of the diary, there should be consideration of her protection. But no such assurance was requested or given in the discussion of 17 January.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Dulles' report to OSS, Washington, Bern, 19 January 1945 (paragraph 7), item 44 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries";
Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966;
Cf. Niccoletti, *Colliers*, 27 April 1946, p. 74.

Next day Mr. Dulles sent his team. Captain Tracy Barnes, a trained lawyer, supervised; Schachter did the actual photographing. These reproductions were regular photos, not microfilms. The men worked secretly in Countess Edda's room in the sanitarium in Valais where she was confined. They worked in great haste lest they be discovered by the Swiss authorities. The whole job was completed that day: some 1200 pages were photographed of the five notebooks.⁹⁹

Countess Ciano was not completely satisfied with Mr. Dulles' oral assurances, although she felt that his word as a gentleman would be honored. Early next day (at 0500 according to her account), she wrote to Mr. Dulles asking for certain specific guarantees:

- 1) A formal acknowledgement from the Government of the United States that she donated the diaries;
- 2) A written engagement from the American Government that the materials be used only for political and military purposes, secretly; and that nothing be published without her consent;
- 3) For assistance in commercial publication of the diaries in the United States as soon as the Government had gone over the material.¹⁰⁰

At the secret meeting with Allen Dulles, Edda Ciano had mentioned that there were additional documentary materials of Count Ciano which were still in Italy, the "chocolates" as she liked to call them. She referred to these additional documents in her letter of 8 January: "Another thing, the rest. The complement of the diaries are still in Italy—if you take me out of here, I am willing to go and fetch them, only Pucci and I know where they are. Pucci does not know that I know."¹⁰¹

There was no problem in understanding Countess Edda's motives. In his telegraphic report of 11 January, Dulles recorded that "Today Hitler, Ribbentrop and her father are the chief objects of her hatred." But the guarantees which she asked were a different matter. Dulles stated:

"In prior conversation I never accepted such conditions but told her I would give her personal letter of acknowledgement after diaries photographed and

⁹⁹ Telegram Dulles to Washington, 11 January 1945, item 58 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries";

Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966.

¹⁰⁰ Letter, Edda Ciano to Allen Dulles, 8 January 1945, the holograph, item 5 R; a typed copy, item 44 R, exhibit B, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

that in giving us copy, such rights as she might have regarding publication would be undisturbed. I specifically stated our Govt might wish to publish certain extracts."

On 13 January through Mme. de Chollet, Dulles sent the acknowledgement over his signature with the concluding sentence:

"This will further acknowledge that the photographic copies of the diaries will be forwarded to Washington for the information of the government, together with a copy of the Countess Ciano's letter of January 8th, that the material in the photographic copies will be used for official purposes only, and that the giving of these photographic copies will not affect any rights which Countess Ciano may have with regard to the eventual commercial publication of the diaries."¹⁰³

Edda Ciano had not stressed financial considerations, and Count Ciano had insisted that she not accept payment from the American government. But in Switzerland she was living on a very limited budget. The Swiss authorities saw to it that she did not get sufficient funds to move around easily in their neutral country. Mr. Dulles gave her an advance of 3500 Swiss francs against future possible royalties.¹⁰³

In reporting his success in gaining the Ciano diaries, Dulles acknowledged that he had no independent basis of judgment of their contents, but he felt completely sure of the authenticity of the materials. The 1,200 pages covered the period 1 January 1939 through 8 February 1943, and Edda included Galeazzo's note of 23 December 1943 from his cell in Verona. Mr. Dulles noted, however, that there were some pages which were missing or had been cut, particularly those between 25 January and 24 April 1941, regarding the Greek war.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Item 48 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹⁰³ Telegram, Dulles to Washington, 11 January 1945, as cited.

¹⁰⁴ At a subsequent stage the late Professor Gaetano Salvemini was able to examine the photographs of the diary, page by page. He noted that the sheet with the entries for 27 and 28 October 1940 had been removed and substituted. Susmel suggests that when Ciano was Ambassador to the Holy See, he was able to make interpolations and mutilations in the day to day entries which he had made earlier. (Susmel, *Vita sbagliata*, p. 78 and footnote 1.)

Allen Dulles rather suspected that Edda Ciano herself might have excised certain passages which she considered might have been offensive to the Anglo-Americans (Interview with Allen Dulles, 13 January 1966).

Toscano, *The History of Treaties and International Politics*, Vol. I, p. 455 suggests that the French edition, published directly from the original manuscript notebooks, is the more accurate, i.e. *Journal Politique*, 1939-1943 (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1946). See below, note 117.

The work of photographing the diaries had been done in secrecy and in great haste. It was feared that some of the filmed pages would prove to be illegible, that there would be double exposures, and that quite a few of the pages of the original notebooks would have to be retaken. At Allied Force Headquarters, they still had Benini on the hook. At Allen Dulles' suggestion they kept him there in case his intervention should be considered necessary to gain Edda Ciano's consent for the making of re-takes. She was extremely worried throughout this time lest the Swiss authorities learn of her activities and expel her as an undesirable alien, or that the *Sicherheitsdienst* might learn of her disposition of the diaries and kill her.¹⁰⁵

On 16 January, however, Dulles was able to report that the rephotographing had been carried out successfully and that he had good, clear films of all elements of Count Ciano's diaries which Edda had admitted to having with her in Switzerland. There was now no need for any call on the services of Benini, and Dulles arranged for a copy of his report to be sent to Caserta, lest any complications arise from Ciano's friend who was anxious to clear up his Fascist past.¹⁰⁶

On 15 January, Captain Barnes had sent his chief a full report regarding the work of rephotographing. It listed all of the entries of which retakes were necessary. It listed the missing dates as follows:

1939	17-18 February
1940	13-18 April
1941	26-31 January
	February—entire
	March—entire
	1-23 April
	23-31 July
	August—entire
	1-21 September
1942	10-19 July
	17-24 August
	12-21 September

"The only explanation given for the significant omissions in 1941 was that during the period 26 January through 23 April Ciano was a flight officer with the Italian Air Service. The Countess stated that she knew of no reason why

¹⁰⁵ Telegram, Bern to Washington, 13 January 1945, item 56 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹⁰⁶ Telegram, Bern to the American Political Adviser (AMPOLAD), Caserta, 16 January 1945, item 54 L; Telegram, Bern to Washington, 16 January 1945, item 53 L, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

the second big period was left out in 1941 nor for the shorter omissions occurring in other years."

There was another rather puzzling matter about the original diaries. There was a series of initials, in red pencil, and in capital letters, at the right hand top corner of many pages. "The Countess examined these rather carefully but said, and I believe truthfully, that she knew no explanation for them."¹⁰⁷ When Allen Dulles and his team were able to study these initials at leisure, it appeared that they corresponded with the initials of some of Galeazzo's lady friends, and apparently had been recorded for the appropriate days.¹⁰⁸ These markings argue rather strongly that the diary was genuine, and that there was but little retouching of the original entries by Count Ciano.

In his comprehensive report of 19 January, Allen Dulles informed the OSS central office in Washington that the reproduction of the diaries would be despatched the next day, hand-carried in the form of two sets of microfilm.¹⁰⁹ Apparently there was a reduction to microfilm after the initial photographing sessions by Captain Tracy Barnes and Daniel Schachter. The two aluminum containers of the sets of film were designated respectively "A" and "B". Container "A" held the negatives of the initial filming done on 8 January; container "B" the negative for the subsequent refilming.¹¹⁰ Mr. Dulles further reported that he was keeping one complete set of prints of each of the two films and was arranging to have them translated under the editorial guidance of Royall Tyler.¹¹¹

These translations went forward rather rapidly with covering notes of 19 February, 1 March, and 3 March 1945.¹¹² The Washington central office of OSS, in accordance with Mr. Dulles' suggestion, promptly forwarded a print of the microfilm of the diaries to the Department of

¹⁰⁷ Report of Captain Tracy Barnes to Mr. Dulles, 15 January 1945, Item 45 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Allen Dulles, 17 January 1966.

¹⁰⁹ Item 44 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹¹⁰ Item 44 R, Exhibit E, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹¹¹ Report of 19 January 1945, as cited.

¹¹² Respectively items 37 R, 34 R, and 33 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

State.¹¹³ As the translations reached Washington from Bern, OSS promptly forwarded copies to the Department of State. The series was completed on 12 April 1945, only a short time before the end of the war in Europe.¹¹⁴

Shortly after VE day, and as quickly as the border of Switzerland and Italy was opened up, Mr. Dulles hastened to Ramiola, in search of the supplementary materials of which Edda had told him. At her request, Mr. Dulles supplied her with a film of the photographs of the diary, and promised that she would receive film copies of whatever additional materials he would be able to retrieve in Italy.¹¹⁵ When he reached the clinic of the Melocchi brothers, he learned that the Germans had got there first. The "chocolates" had been gobbled up.¹¹⁶

Publication of the Diaries.

Paul Ghali, correspondent of the *Chicago Daily News*, had been of real service to Allen Dulles in making contact with Edda Ciano and in inducing her to make the diaries available to the United States Government. Dulles felt under obligation for these services and, within the limits permitted by his official position, he assisted Ghali in getting first rights of publication. There were some difficulties for Ghali in making a bid. Use of commercial cable from Switzerland in describing the materials would promptly alert the authorities and jeopardize the status of Countess Ciano as a political refugee. If Ghali were to cross the border and telegraph from Paris his message might not get through the Allied censorship. Yet if he did not act there was the risk that Edda would become impatient and approach some other publisher. Toward the end of January Dulles reported to the OSS in Washington that he felt obliged to let Ghali go ahead in

¹¹³ Covering letter, Charles S. Cheston, Acting Director, OSS, to James C. Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, 6 February 1945, Top Secret, 103.918/2-645, Central Files, Department of State.

The author, at this period, was serving in the Division of Southern European Affairs, and thus learned for the first time about the diary but had but little time to study it. The film, so far as I recall, was carefully guarded and kept in the safe in Mr. Dunn's office.

¹¹⁴ Under cover of hand-carried letters, 16 March, 15 April and 12 April, Secret File, 865.01/3-1645; 865.01/4-545; and 865.01/4-1245; Central Files, Department of State.

¹¹⁵ Edda Ciano to Mr. Dulles, 3 May 1945, item 25 R; receipt by Edda Ciano, 9 May 1945, item 24 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹¹⁶ See above, p. 48.

contacting his publisher. At the same time Dulles pointed out that any aid with communications would enable the OSS to keep control over the whole matter. Edda agreed orally to give the *Chicago Daily News* preference. She asked for \$25,000 for the newspaper rights and for an additional offer for publication of the diaries in book form, but leaving Mme. de Chollet free to negotiate for a French edition to be published in Switzerland and France.¹¹⁷

The *Chicago Daily News* readily agreed to accept censorship of such materials in the diaries as might be judged necessary by the Department of State—since the war was still on in Europe—but without seeing the material the newspaper felt able to offer only \$3,500 for exclusive first publishing rights, leaving the publication in book form to await inspection of the manuscript.¹¹⁸

By mid-March some of the staff in Chicago had been able to read a portion of the diary in translation. (At this time only the OSS and State Department had the text of the whole manuscript.) After a second trip to Paris, Chali returned to Switzerland at the end of March with full authorization to offer \$25,000 for the exclusive first publication rights for newspapers and periodicals throughout the world, excepting only Switzerland and France.¹¹⁹

On 7 April Edda Ciano, acting for herself and for her three children, and Paul Chali representing John Knight (*Chicago Daily News*) signed at Monthey, Switzerland, the formal contract for publication. The *News* agreed to pay \$25,000 for the rights of serial publication of the five booklets of the diaries of Count Galeazzo Ciano. Edda agreed to deliver to the firm a photocopy of the manuscript, and she formally guaranteed its authenticity. The *News* further agreed to act as Edda Ciano's representative in arranging for publication of the manuscript in book form. She retained the right to accept, to reject, or to discuss such offers as would ensue. Switzerland and France were excepted.

¹¹⁷ Telegram Bern (Dulles) to Washington, 17 January 1945, item 52 L; Telegram, Bern to Washington, 25 January 1945, item 42 R; undated message, by Chali for John Knight, item 31 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹¹⁸ Telegram, OSS to Bern (via Department of State) 14 February 1945, item 36 L; copy of letter, Paul Chali to Edda Ciano, 5 March 1945, item 28 R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹¹⁹ Telegram, OSS to Bern, 20 March 1945, item 26 L; Telegram, Bern to OSS, 31 March 1945, item 23 L; File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."

Article 3 of the contract stated:

"There are references in the manuscript to certain documents which are not at the present time in the possession of Countess Ciano.

"If they should be retrieved, it is understood that she will send photocopies to the *Chicago Daily News* of such of those documents as clearly have the character of supplements or appendices to the manuscript."¹²⁰

After VE day Lieutenant Pucci decided to return to Italy and applied for permission of the Swiss police to travel to Bern in order to put himself at the disposal of the Italian authorities. The Swiss police promptly granted the request but at the same time notified him politely but very clearly that he was expected to leave Switzerland by the end of the month, May. On 15 May Pucci called on Ghilia, the Italian Air Attaché in Bern. Whatever may have been the chivalry of Pucci's aid to Countess Ciano in her escaping into Switzerland, or however admirable his courage under German torture, there was the basic fact that he was an officer of the Italian Air Force, and he had been absent without leave.

Pucci identified himself to Ghilia, for he had a distinguished war record, but the Attaché indicated that Pucci's actions had made him a political figure. He suggested that Pucci write out a complete account of his actions since September 1943. Pucci did not feel free to do this although he declared that he was willing to submit to an investigation or judgment by the Italian authorities. The suggestion was then brought forward that Pucci indicate that he had been aiding the Allies, and that he submit his case to the Allied authorities in Bern. Lieutenant Pucci explained the matter to Miss Dodson who was able to assure him that some favorable solution would be found.

A few days later Pucci again spoke to the Attaché who indicated that the members of the Italian Legation were quite pessimistic regarding his chances of returning to Italy. Ghilia thought there were only two possibilities: a statement by some Allied authority that Pucci was working for them; or an Allied declaration that he was a supporter of the Allies and that his return to Italy would be useful to them.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Copy of the contract (in French) item 29 R, File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹²¹ Memorandum by Pucci, undated, but written some time between 15 May and 24 May 1945, item 16 R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."

It was Allen Dulles who represented the Allied authorities as far as Pucci was concerned and it was Cordelia Dodson who on 24 May got from him his most interesting account regarding his help to Edda Ciano and in preserving Galeazzo Ciano's diaries.¹²² Apparently the intervention of Allen Dulles was promptly forthcoming and effective. Not long afterwards Pucci returned to Italy and he himself published the first accounts of his key role in saving the Ciano diaries.

Edda Ciano also returned to Italy not long after Pucci. In June there was some press agitation in Switzerland against her presence, and her name was linked with others whose Fascist political activities had been notorious: Alfieri, Volpi, Bastianini. But the Swiss, despite the wars of their neighbors, have preserved a humane tradition. They did not wish to force Edda Ciano across the border into Italy if such action would result in her maltreatment or death. They asked if the Americans would accept delivery and assure her safety. Some sort of assurances seem to have been offered, and at the end of August Countess Edda was consigned to Allied authorities by the Swiss guards at the frontier. The *Risorgimento Liberale* (Rome) of 31 August told something of her life in Switzerland, "including her alleged marriage to an Italian diplomat named Pucci and her confinement in Swiss sanitarium. Story concludes with report of Italian semi-official communiqué which has announced she might return to Italy safely and had nothing to fear from Italian or Allied authorities."¹²³

For almost a year Edda was confined on Lipari Island, but without serious suffering or even real hardship. It was a very different kind of imprisonment from that which her father had inflicted on the anti-Fascists whom he confined on that island. On 20 and 21 September 1945 she gave some interviews to two Italian and three American journalists. She mentioned that she was reading the "Memoriale Pucci" which was being published in the *Giornale di Sicilia*, and on being questioned she declared that Pucci's published account was

¹²² Covering memo by Cordelia Dodson to Mr. Dulles, 24 May 1945, item 15 R; Covering letter, Pucci to Mr. Dulles, Bern, 24 May 1945, item 17 R, File, "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹²³ Bern telegram No. 3203, 16 June 1945 (740.0011EW/6-1645 Top Secret); Departmental telegram to Bern, No. 2127, 28 June 1945 (740.0011EW/6-1645 Top Secret); Caserta telegram No. 3369, 24 August 1945 (740.0011EW/8-2445 Secret); Rome press telegram No. 2527, 31 August 1945 (865.00/8-3145 Plain), Central Files, Department of State.

completely accurate and truthful. She declined, however, to reveal the name of "Signor X," explaining that if Pucci had not wished to mention it, she herself would not do so.¹²⁴

We can infer that Edda Ciano managed to keep some contact with Frau Beetz. She told the newspaperman:

"Signor X is a German who is now in an Allied concentration camp and the Allies know his name. He is perhaps the one German who is human."¹²⁵

Countess Edda "reverted frequently" during her talk with the newspapermen to the memory of her husband, and eulogized him. "We all asked ourselves why this woman, who for so many years openly showed an extraordinary indifference to the conjugal bonds, should now instead be so bound up by his memory. Was this a true sentiment or only pretense?"¹²⁶

On 2 July 1946 the newspapers in Rome announced that Countess Ciano had been granted her full freedom; she was released by the Ministry of the Interior from confinement on Lipari and freed to move about and act on her own free will.¹²⁷

During her stay on Lipari Island Countess Edda had kept up some correspondence with Marchese Pucci, as she mentioned to the newspapermen in September 1945.¹²⁸ The rumors that she would marry Pucci persisted into 1947.¹²⁹

Frau Beetz, as we have noted earlier, had been able to regain, directly or indirectly, the two booklets of the diaries of Count Ciano covering the years 1937 and 1938, the booklets which in January 1944 had been left at the clinic in Ramiola. Whether Frau Beetz was able to hold the originals, or merely to hide photostats or microfilms of these two notebooks after the final collapse of Nazi Germany is not clear. But the texts of Ciano's notations for 1937 and 1938 were re-

¹²⁴ Jader Jacobelli, "Sono stato a Lipari e ho parlato con Edda," *Il Giornale del Mattino*, Rome, 21 September 1945, news cutting enclosed in Rome Despatch No. 2346, 25 September 1945 (865.00/9-2545) Central Files, Department of State.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 22 September 1945.

¹²⁷ *New York Times*, item 14, Rome, 2 July 1946, File "Lanfranchi-Mussolini IV."

¹²⁸ Jader Jacobelli, *op. cit.* (21 September 1945).

¹²⁹ Newscutting, "Edda Ciano to wed friend of late husband," Paris, 11 September 1947, item 11, File "Lanfranchi-Mussolini IV."

stored to Edda Ciano prior to their publication in 1948. We read in the introduction:

"Of the seven notebooks. . . , Edda Ciano . . . was able to bring with her only five, and precisely those of 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943, which were edited two years ago by Rizzoli of Milan. Having learned that only those notebooks had been taken into Switzerland, to a secure place, and that the other two, which were of exceptional importance, had been left at the clinic where Edda had rested, the SS were charged to find them. The doctor of the clinic, to whom these notebooks had been entrusted, consigned them under threat of death, to the Reich police who demanded them. From that time on, until a year ago, there was no word of these diaries of the years 1937 and 1938, and it was thought that they had disappeared for good. Instead, they were in the hands of a third party, and their fortunate recovery permits us today to make them known to the public in their entirety."¹⁸⁰

The "Rose Garden" Papers in Washington

Allen Dulles' trip to Ramiola at war's end was a complete disappointment as far as concerned "the chocolates." The *Sicherheitsdienst* had got there first. They had picked up the diaries for 1937-1938, the bound volume marked "Germania," and the jewels and personal belongings of Countess Edda. But this was not the last round.

In May 1945 came the Wehrmacht's total defeat and unconditional surrender. Germany as a state ceased for a time to exist. Teams of Allied experts swarmed over the country searching for government archives; intelligence agents ferreted out Nazi leaders and got accounts of their activities which could be used in the war criminal trials at Nuremberg; Special Counterintelligence (SCI) groups sought out the members of the *Sicherheitsdienst* and of the RSHA. On 30 June Mr. Dulles received word via London that the SCI detachment in Germany¹⁸¹ had picked up Frau Beetz, who had mentioned some-

¹⁸⁰ Ciano, 1937-38 *Diario*, p. xvii.

¹⁸¹ The SCI detachments were OSS elements. In Germany they were under command of the then Lt. Col. Andrew H. Berding, who was immediately under Allen Dulles. Lawrence E. de Neufville, who picked up Frau Beetz, was a civilian in Berding's Berlin detachment.

The author interviewed Mr. Berding on 28 November 1967, but he was able to add nothing about Frau Beetz. He had refrained from keeping any personal records; he did not remember her; there was such a press of work that only with difficulty could they keep up the day's tasks. He commented that as the flood of reports and intelligence swept in, they hoped and imagined that some fine day some one in Washington would carefully sort the material out. I said that I was trying to do just that for a small fraction of the materials with which I was familiar, but was encountering difficulties.

thing about having Ciano's diaries for his tenure of office. The message did not seem clear. In reply it was explained that the diaries for 1939 to 1943 had been obtained some months earlier, but that the diary for 1937-1938 and the memoranda which Ciano prepared for Mussolini had been seized by the SD; if Frau Beetz could give any clue regarding these missing documents it would be of great interest. Four days later, on 6 July, the report reached Allen Dulles that his detachment in Germany had obtained from Frau Beetz in German translation the memoranda of Ciano as Foreign Minister. The detachment had sent them on to the Documents Center of 12th Army Group Headquarters.¹⁸²

It was almost a year later that the Department of State received official information about Ciano's supporting papers. In May 1946 Ambassador Murphy¹⁸³ informed the Secretary of State:

"I have the honor to report the information that complete copies of Ciano's records of conferences of Hitler, Mussolini and Ribbentrop, and all telegraphic and letter correspondence between Hitler and Mussolini were discovered by SCI detachment in May 1945. They were obtained from Hildegard Beetz, a German SD agent assigned to Ciano while he was in jail in Verona. The documents in question were sent to the document center, 12th Army Group and then transmitted to War Department. I understand that in one of the file indexes is the name of Beetz.

"Further information concerning these documents can be obtained from Lawrence E. De Neufville who originally obtained the documents from Frau Beetz. . . ." ¹⁸⁴

The author first heard of this collection on 13 January 1947, being at the time the head of the Mediterranean Section, Historical Office of the War Department (since redesignated Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, or OCMH). At lunch on that day Professor Raymond J. Sontag, then on leave from Berkeley and serving as Editor-in-Chief of the *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, mentioned that he had learned of this most interest-

¹⁸² Telegram London to Bern, 29 June 1945, Item 7 L; Telegram to London, 2 July 1945, item 6 L; Telegram London to Bern, Item 4 L; File "Edda Ciano Diaries."

¹⁸³ The various teams of experts which gathered up the German Foreign Office archives and began their microfilming operated as members of the staff of Robert Murphy.

¹⁸⁴ Despatch No. 3614, Berlin, 21 May 1946, 840.414/5-2146 Secret, Central Files, Department of State.

ing find, possibly from the report, possibly from Ambassador Murphy directly.¹³⁵

The next day I first telephoned and then sent a memorandum to Major Seeley, War Department General Staff, describing the papers on the basis of what I had been told by Professor Sontag, and asking that they be transferred to the Historical Office. My memorandum mentioned that

"Ciano also kept certain materials, reports and memoranda in addition to the diary—materials which constitute a kind of appendix for the diary as published. The materials were seized by the Germans during their occupation of Rome and were translated from Italian into German by a woman employed by the German Foreign Office. While making this translation this woman made an extra copy of the translation for herself which she buried in a rose garden. . . ." ¹³⁶

Major Seeley promptly sent the material but I was not able, at that time, to learn much more about its acquisition than I had been told by Professor Sontag.

The papers consisted of a couple of bundles of loose sheets of carbon copies in German, without an index or table of contents. Because of the method of their acquisition there was a presumption of authenticity of the documents. After examining the materials the author became convinced that they were genuine, chiefly for two reasons: many of the accounts of conversations comprised in the collection tallied precisely with references in the published Ciano diaries to full records kept elsewhere; and scattered among the sheets of German carbon copies were a few stray items of Italian originals.¹³⁷

¹³⁵ I wrote to Professor Sontag on 10 August 1964, asking if he could tell me how he first learned of this collection. In his reply of 21 August 1964 he stated that he could no longer remember the circumstances of his learning of these papers. (Personal Files).

¹³⁶ Memorandum for Major Rudolph G. Seeley, WDGS, 14 January 1947, copy in Personal Files.

¹³⁷ "Verbale del colloquio a Palazzo Venezia tra il Duce, von Ribbentrop e il ministro Ciano," Roma 28 ottobre 1938-XVII, item 2, 1938, revised paging 007-010; "Appunto, Salisburgo, 12 agosto [1939] XVII, item 11, 1939, revised paging 044-046;

"Verbale del colloquio del Duce con von Ribbentrop presenti Eccellenze Ciano, Alfieri e Mackensen," 19 settembre 1940-XVIII, not listed as a separate item, initial paging pp. 196-199;

"Colloquio Ribbentrop-Ciano, Schönhof," 4 novembre '40, not listed as a separate item, initial paging 223-224.

I arranged the papers in chronological order, and numbered the pages with a stamping machine. I then prepared an index or table of contents of the papers initially sent to me which comprised:

4 items for 1939 (pp. 1-31);
56 items for 1940 (pp. 32-254);
32 items for 1941 (pp. 261-393);
19 items for 1942 (pp. 394-469);
6 items for 1943 (pp. 470-490).

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In the Historical Office, War Department, we wondered what to call this collection. I had understood from Professor Sontag that it was dug up out of a rose garden and we dubbed it the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden." The name stuck. This is the designation usually used in the citations to this material in the Historical Office, now Office of the Chief of Military History.¹³⁸

Having put the materials in shape for our use we then received a bunch of additional sheets: some material for 1938; and a great deal for 1939. The integration of this additional material required a re-numbering of the pages and the preparation of a revised index which now showed:

4 items for 1938 (pp. 1-13);
108 items for 1939 (pp. 14-290);
56 items for 1940 (pp. 297-519);
32 items for 1941 (pp. 520-652);
19 items for 1942 (pp. 653-728);
6 items for 1943 (pp. 729-749).

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The index for the revised paging lists two of the Italian original texts as separate items. Hence the total number of documents is 223.¹³⁹

Professor Sontag in the spring of 1947 arranged for the State Department to borrow the material from the War Department and to have it microfilmed.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ See Albert N. Garland and Howard McGaw Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1965), p. 34, note 21;

George F. Howe, *Northwest Africa: Seizing the Initiative in the West* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1957), p. 4, footnote 5.

¹³⁹ Cf. footnote 137 above.

¹⁴⁰ Assistant Secretary of State J. H. Hilldring to Howard C. Peterson, Assistant Secretary of War, 8 April 1947, copy in files of the Historical Office, Department of State.

Thus the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" was assimilated into the collection of microfilms of the German War Documents Branch of the Historical Office, Department of State. A copy of the microfilm was sent to J. W. Wheeler-Bennett who at the time was British Editor-in-Chief of the *Documents on German Foreign Policy* and thus a copy of the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" became available at the Public Record Office.

The carbon copies of the German translations made by Frau Beetz with the few, stray Italian originals were held in the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army for 22 years. In January 1969 they were turned over to the National Archives which had assumed the succession to the German Military Documents Section.^{140a}

These carbon sheets bear the revised page numbers 1-749. The crossed out page numbers reflect the revision which I made when the additional items were received at OCMH. The microfilm is held in the National Archives, listed as Reel No. 4597 in the great series of films made by the German War Documents Project, the series designated Microcopy T-120. The film is complete and gives the 223 documents. But I have no way of proving whether or not the collection comprises all of the supporting papers which Count Ciano originally set aside in his office in Rome.

One or two more descriptive comments. Throughout most of the materials there is merely the notation at the end of each document: "übersetzt." For the last two items of the collection, items 5 and 6 for the year 1943, on pages 742 and 749 respectively, is to be found the typewritten note "übersetzt" followed by the signature "Beetz."

The handwritten, arabic numbers enclosed in circles are in my writing, added when I listed the documents by year. The other series of numbers and letters, such as "7-y" (p. 007) or "7-x" (p. 004) were on the papers when they reached OCMH and apparently were notations made by Frau Beetz. It appears that she made some retouches on the materials on turning them over to the Americans. We find such

^{140a} By letter of transmittal dated January 16, 1969, Col. H.A. Schmidt, Chief, Historical Services Division, OCMH, to the Archivist of the United States. (Memorandum for the Record, National Archives, February 25, 1969).

GMDS was initially succeeded by the Captured Records Section of the Departmental Records Branch, TAGO, which in turn became the World War II Records Division of the National Archives and later evolved into the Modern Military Records Division, NA.

notations as the following and in English: p. 196, "This is separated from the sheet that should go with it. Translator;" p. 223, "Italian version;" p. 245, "List of necessary raw materials;" p. 484, "Separated from the sheets that belong with it. Translator."

Most of the letters and memoranda of conversations which are recorded in German translation in the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" appeared in the Italian original in the book, *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*. This work was published in Italy in January 1948 by the firm Arnoldo Mondadori, and was promptly translated into French and English.^{140b} But there was not one word in the Italian work or in the French or English translations regarding the provenance of these documents.

Beyond all shadow of a doubt, these Italian texts came from the collection of documents known as the Lisbon Papers. These had been sent out of Rome by plane by the Foreign Minister Raffaele Guariglia and hidden in the safe of the Italian Legation in Lisbon in the summer of 1943. In 1946 these papers were demanded by the United States Government under terms of the Armistice. They were delivered to Washington and microfilmed, and the originals were restored to the Italian Government in May 1946.^{140c} Only the Italian Government itself would have been able to arrange this publication. These original Italian texts confirm overwhelmingly the authenticity of the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden."

But the collections are not identical. There are at least a couple of cases, however, of texts which are to be found in the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" which do not appear in the Italian Cabinet Archives or in the published version of *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*. Thus we have given the draft of the secret protocol dated Hendaye, 23 October 1940 but which clearly is Ciano's modified version which he had on 3-4

^{140b} *Les archives secrètes du conte Ciano 1936-1942*, Traduction de Maurice Vaussard (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1948); *Ciano's Diplomatic Papers*. Edited by Malcolm Muggeridge (Long Acre, London: Odhams Press, Ltd., 1948).

^{140c} Cf. p. 73, footnote 79a.

¹⁴¹ *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D, vol. XI (Washington, 1960) Editors' Note pp. 466-467.

The German text was initially published by Donald S. Detwiler, *Hitler, Franco und Gibraltar: Die Frage des spanischen Eintritts in den zweiten Weltkrieg* (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1962) pp. 118-119 and is now available in *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918-1945*, Serie D, Band XI, 1 (Bonn: Gebr. Hermes, 1964) pp. 394-395.

November 1940 at Schönhof.¹⁴¹ What we printed in Washington is an English translation from an enlargement ("blow-up") of a microfilm made from a carbon copy of a German translation of an Italian document, the original of which had disappeared.¹⁴² We also printed Ciano's minute of 8 December 1940 which is not found elsewhere.¹⁴³

We can now summarize the relationship between the Italian cabinet archive—the so-called "Lisbon Papers," the printed selections published under the title *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*, and the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden." We can have no doubt of the authenticity of the Lisbon Papers because of our precise knowledge of their origin, travels, filming and restitution. They are in fact the Cabinet archives, and are by far the largest of these collections. The printed book presents only a portion of the Lisbon Papers, and in a few cases the complete texts have not been reproduced. The duplication of many of the same documents in the "Ciano Papers: Rose Garden" only clinches the argument for their authenticity. They survive in translation only. The original Italian copies were destroyed in Germany. Probably the collection is not complete. They are, however, the genuine "Ciano's Diplomatic Papers." They are what he himself set aside to accompany his diaries.

¹⁴¹ But surely this is as close to the vanished original as is the reconstructed text, for example, of the "Defensor Pacis" to that missing original manuscript, as edited by Richard Scholz, *Marsilius von Padua Defensor Pacis* (Hanover: Hansche Buchhandlung, 1932-33). See particularly the Introduction, pp. v—lxx.

¹⁴² *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945*, Series D., vol. XI, documents No. 477, footnote 7, p. 823. (German text, *op. cit.*, Band XI, 2, 686).

See also Series D, Vol. XII No. 17, footnote 7 (p. 30).